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Addendum 1

FILED DISTRICT COURT

Thor O. Emblem (Admitted Pro Hac Vice)
LAW OFFICES OF THOR O. EMBLEM
205 West Fifth Ave., Suite 105
Escondido, CA 92025
Telephone: (760) 738-9301
Fax:(760)738-9409

Third Judicial District

APR 1 6 2007
>y-

Matthew H. Raty (#6635)
LAW OFFICE OF MATTHEW H. RATY, PC
New England Professional Plaza
9677 South 700 East, Suite D
Sandy, Utah 84070
Telephone: (801) 495-2252
Fax:(801)495-2262
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DOLORES CLAYTON, et al.
Plaintiffs,

I

Case No. 000909522

v.

PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED MOTION
FOR NEW TRIAL

UTAH AUTO COLLECTION, et al.

REQUEST OF ORAL ARGUMENT

Defendants.

Judge Joseph C. Fratto

Pursuant to Rule 59 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs Amend the Motion for New
Trial filed in this Court to consider and include the grounds (a)(1): A new trial should be granted
because of an irregularity in the proceedings - Ford Motor Company presented false evidence
pertaining to the door latch defect and perpetrated a fraud on the jury; and because the jury was

coerced into a verdict. The grounds supporting the grant of a new trial are set forth in the
original moving papers previously filed and in the Reply Memorandum filed herein.
DATED this 13™ day of April, 2007.

THOR O. EMBLEM
MATTHEW H. RATY
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

-2-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL
was served upon defendant's counsel at the address listed below, by depositing the same in the
United States mail, postage pre-paid on the 13 TH day of April, 2007.
Dan Larsen, Esq.
Snell & Wilmer
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

THOR O. EMBLEM

-3-

Addendum 2

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE CITY

1

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
-0O0-

DEE CLAYTON, e t a l . ,

)

Plaintiffs,

vs .

)

Case No. 000909522

)

P L A I N T I F F ' S MOTION

)
UTAH AUTO COLLECTION,
j

FOR NEW TRIAL

)

et al.,

Defendants.

)

-0O0-

BE I T REMEMBERED t h a t
2007,

on t h e 7 t h d a y o f May,

commencing a t t h e hour of 2 : 3 2 p . m . , t h e a b o v e -

entitled

matter

came on f o r h e a r i n g b e f o r e

HONORABLE JOSEPH C. FRATTO, J R . , s i t t i n g
the

above-named Court

and

that the

the

as Judge

f o r t h e p u r p o s e of t h i s

in

cause,

f o l l o w i n g p r o c e e d i n g s were h a d .
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE CITY
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
-0O0-

DEE CLAYTON, et al.,

)

Plaintiffs,
vs.
UTAH AUTO COLLECTION,
et al.,
Defendants.

)

Case No. 000909522

)
)
)
)

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR NEW TRIAL

)

-0O0-

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 7th day of May,
2007, commencing at the hour of 2:32 p.m., the aboveentitled matter came on for hearing before the
HONORABLE JOSEPH C. FRATTO, JR., sitting as Judge in
the above-named Court for the purpose of this cause,
and that the following proceedings were had.
-oOo-
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The standard for J.O.N. V. and new trial, as
far as sufficiency of the evidence, is the same
standard under Rule 50 for J.N.O. V., a Rule 59 for the
motion for a new trial.
And the—the court has found—or the—the
Utah Supreme Court has fond that the court, this
court, the trial court must view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the verdict and any evidence
that's in dispute must be resoled in favor of the
verdict. So, unless there's undisputed evidence to
support the movant side and no significant evidence to
support the non-movant side, the motion for a newt
trial must be denied.
The courts have said that new trials should
be granted only in rare cases, only when no reasonable
juror could have found the way that they did; so what
they're asking is that-for the—the Court to find
that six out of the eight jurors, if that's how many
supported the verdict according to the instructions,
could not have reasonably found that there was no
defect on the door latch.
It should be noted that they're only moving
for a new trial on the door latch issue, and I think
that's because they-they believe that's probably
their best ground.
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Gilbert, the plaintiffs' expert, did not
have any criticism of the relative strength of the
corporate mini-latch; in fact, he-he did not have any
testimony or opinion that the latch was defective
because it could be overwhelmed. Instead, his theory
in this case that he stuck with was that there was rod
force shortening and basically that, because of crush
on the front of the A-pillar, that caused the inside
door rod to push backwards and instructed the latch to
release, causing the fork bolts to-to come straight
open.
And that gets to the point that Dr.
Caulfield testified about that Mr. Emblem was just
challenging, and his testimony was that if the latch
was instructed to release, the fork bolts would be in
a fully-opened position, with the tangs of the fork
bolts completely hidden by the ends of the fish mouth.
And it was not, in this case, which was evidence
that's consistent with the fact that the latch was
forced or torn open and was not opened all the way by
activation.
And the evidence of that is not only the
testimony and photographs of Mr. Caulfield, but the—
the photographs taken by Mr. Gilbert, which were taken
two months before Packer Engineering inspected it.
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In the case of Child vs. Ro-or Child vs.
Newsome, which is a Utah Supreme Court case, the Court
said that even if nine witnesses testified at trial
that the light was green and one witness testified at
trial that the light was red, the j uty can believe the
one witness that the light was red and that is
sufficient evidence to support the verdict and they
need not believe the nine.
And here, there was much evidence submitted
to the Court and to the jury on the evidence of
defective door latch, not just where the tangs were on
the open latch. And the trial record and the trial
evidence is the best—is the best evidence of what was
actually presented at trial and I won't try to go
through all of that, but I'm going to try to hit some
of the highlights of that.
First, Dr. Caulfield testified that there
was enough lateral outboard force on that door latch
to create 3,000 pounds of pressure, and that 3,000
pounds of lateral force was sufficient to overwhelm
the latch.
As the Court recalls, we offered the FMPSS
206 test latch in which they were able to test the
latch to failure and it took 3,000 pounds for-for it
to fail.
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And let me show you two photographs that
were used on redirect examination of Mr. Caulfield at
trial. You may recall, after Mr. Emblem spent much
time going through each photograph that was taken by
different experts over the many, many years, this
thing was photographed and asking Mr. Caulfield, you
know, isn't this in the fully-opened position and Mr.
Caulfield would point with his little red laser
pointer, saying, no, you can see the tang sticking out
from the edge of the fish mouth in each one of those
pictures that everybody took.
And at Mr. Gilbert's inspection, he likewise
took photographs of the latch and it's interesting to
me, because I was there and I was present and I recall
and these photographs also show exactly what happened,
and Mr Emblem was—was there as well.
The first photograph we have, which is
Exhibit 6 to the Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition
and I'll just point it out and this is more easyeasy-more easy for the Court to take a look at mine,
the photograph, is the latch showing the two bolts or
screws that Mr. Emblem's pointed out, with the tang
that's nearest to those, sticking out slightly beyond
the edge of the fish mouth and you can't quite see the
other pari of the fish mouth, because as he says, the6
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-the sheet metal was pushed over the edge there.
With their next photograph taken by Mr.
Gilbert and what he's done is, he's taken metal pliers
or a device and he moved the fork bolts, he's got to
get them as close as he could to try and get them in
what they call the secondary position, which is the
initial latch position where they-they come together
and they kind of grab the striker of the car when the
door's not all the way shut. And Mr.-in Mr.
Gilbert's report, he explains that-that the-that the
latch, he could not get all the way in the secondary
position nor could he get it all the way in the fullyopened position. It was jammed, it was jammed before
Packer Engineering even took a look at it.
And as you remember, at trial, Mr. Gilbert
came with a latch and the latch had been sent to Mr.
Gilbert by Packer Engineering after it had been
removed. And at the removal, Mr. Emblem, Mr.
Engebritson was present, and they videotaped the
entire removal process step-by-step and we did it all
by stipulation and we were making sure that we were
keeping the latch in the same position and—and
configuration and we took photographs of the latch
immediately after it being removed. We put it on a~a
red oil rag and we photographed it and this thing has
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the frame has been bent and the latch has been bent.
It was his testimony that that all occurred from the
roll-over and that's the trial testimony that was
presented. There's no evidence that Ed Caulfield,
Packer Engineering, Ford Motor Company or its
attorneys, did anything to try to swindle the Court or
to—or swindle the jury into believing that somehow
this latch must have been overwhelmed because now
we've bent it and now you can see-you can see that
we've done that.
This thing had been photographed by so many
experts, inspected so many times and it's a plain
misrepresentation to the Court by Mr. Emblem to say
that this thing was always in a fully-opened position
because none of the experts say it was always ftillyopen. They may say it was open, it was open enough to
be able to get past the striker and open the door and
that's exactly what Mr. Gilbert said on examination at
trial, when I asked him, Was it fully opened? He said
it was open enough to get past the striker but you
could not get it fully opened because it was pinned.
And the reason it was pinned was because
this thing was overwhelmed. And there's so much more
evidence to support the verdict that this was
overwhelmed. This is not the only piece of evidence
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been photographed more a beauty queen, as the Court
1 that supports the verdict.
knows. And then that latch was taken back and
2
As the Court will recall, the latch was bent
photographed at Packer Engineering. Then it was sent
3 from the striker pulling away from the latch and~do
to Cau—or to—to Gilbert's office and it was Gilbert
4 you have that in front of you? Is this t h e that brought it to trial.
5
MR. EMBLEM: I have mine.
When he presented it at trial, I asked him
6
MR. LARSEN: If I may approach?
on cross-examination, when you found the—when you
7
THE COURT: Oh, of course.
inspected the latch, was it in a fully-open position
8
MR. LARSEN: As the Court can see and the
and he said no, not quite, you couldn't get it into a
9 Court probably recalls that the latch is bent. It's
fully-open position, it was jammed. It was pinned.
10 bent in a position where the striker has pulled out
He said it had been trampled on by elephants by—by
1 1 from—from the latch. And this would be the front of
being rolled over many times and that it was bent. At
12 the vehicle, this would be the rear of the vehicle,
no time did Mr. Gilbert testify that there was any
1 3 the striker would be right here, the driver would be
manipulation in the latch by Packer Engineering from
14 right here and this would be the outside of the
the time that it was inspected by him, photographed by
1 5 vehicle.
Engebritson and by Mr. Emblem and then sent to Packer 1 6
And the reason that this-this is bent or
and then sent to—on to Technocon, which is his—his
17 misaligned is because of a force on the outside of the
outfit,
18 door pulling on the latch and the little-you c a n There's no testimony at trial, no record
19 might remember, there's a little flange on the ends of
evidence in the trial record that there was any
2 0 the striker that grabs the fork bolts and cause those
manipulation or fraud or tampering. And what Mr.
21 fork bolts to get pulled out and misaligned. And that
Gilbert did agree with is that the latch is bent, that
2 2 was the testimony that was offered and there's nothing
the pins that hold the fork bolts in place are out of
2 3 to contradict that. Gilbert—
alignment, that the fork bolts are also mis-aligned
24
THE COURT: The one I have here in front of
because this thing has been internally damaged because 2 5 me is the actual latch?
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Addendum 3

LAW OFFICE OF

MATTHEW H. RATY, PC
MEW ENGLAND PROFESSIONAL PLAZA
9677 SOUTH 700 EAST, SUITE D
SANDY, UTAH 84070
TELEPHONE: (801 495-2252
FAX:(801)495-2262

May 14, 2007

The Honorable Joseph C. Fratto
Third District Court
450 So. State Street
P.O.Box 1860
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-1860
Re:

Clayton, etal., v. Utah Auto Collection, et al.
Case No. 000909522

Dear Judge Fratto:
Enclosed please find an Affidavit of Andrew Gillberg, as well as a Motion and Order for
Leave to File the Affidavit.
As you will note, Mr. Gillberg's Affidavit is material to the issues raised in oral argument
of May 7, 2007, with regard to manipulation of evidence during the trial.
We appreciate your attention to this matter.
Yours truly,

Matthew H. Raty
MHR/jp
Enclosures
cc: Thor Emblem

Q-\Claytoi)\C\JudgeFratto.<)51407

Thor O. Emblem (Admitted Pro Hac Vice)
LAW OFFICES OF THOR O. EMBLEM
205 West Fifth Ave., Suite 105
Escondido, CA 92025
Telephone: (760) 738-9301
Fax:(760) 738-9409
Matthew H. Raty (#6635)
LAW OFFICE OF MATTHEW H. RATY, PC
New England Professional Plaza
9677 South 700 East, Suite D
Sandy, Utah 84070
Telephone: (801) 495-2252
Fax: (801) 495-2262
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DOLORES CLAYTON, et al.
Plaintiffs,
v.
UTAH AUTO COLLECTION, et al.

Case No. 000909522
EX PARTE MOTION FOR LEAVE TO
FILE AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW
GILBERG IN SUPPORT OF ORAL
ARGUMENT PRESENTED ON MAY 7,
2007

Defendants.
Judge Joseph C. Fratto
Plaintiffs move the Court to file and consider the attached affidavit of Andrew Gilberg in
support of motion for new trial and argument that was presented on May 7, 2007. The affidavit
is necessary to rebut under penalty of perjury the factually false statements made concerning Mr.
Gilberg's inspection by Ford's counsel at oral argument on May 7, 2007. Because the affidavit

i

was expedited by facsimile transmittal, Plaintiffs will file the executed original affidavit as soon
as it is received by Plaintiffs' counsel
Accordingly, Plaintiffs request this Court issue an order allowing Plaintiffs to file the
motion and accompanying affidavit and to consider the facts set forth in the affidavit in
determining whether to grant Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial and Motion to Tax Costs which
also contends that Ford's door latch expert committed a fraud on the Court..
DATED this 14th day of May, 2007

THOR O. EMBLEM
MATTHEW H.RATY

-2-

I, Andrew Gilberg, hereby declare:
1.

I have a Bachelor of Science degree in Engineering SciencefromRensselaer

Polytechnic Institute, New York, and a Masters of Science in Mechanical Engineering from
the University of Michigan. I have more than 35 years professional experience in
mechanical engineering and was employed by Ford Motor Company from 1971 - 1972
and from 1973 -1978. From 1986 to present, I have been the owner and General Manager
of Teknacon and specialize in analysis of unwanted door openings and other mechanical
failures in automotive accidents. I have testified in many cases on these subjects.
2.

I am completely familiar with this case and I have personally physically

inspected the Explorer as did both Ford's experts, Thomas Tiede and Ed Caufield.
3.

I testified at trial in the above captioned case in Salt Lake City Utah on

January 11 and 12,2007.
4.

I am informed and believe that during the motion for new trial hearing in

this case on May 7,2007, Ford's counsel, Mr. Dan Larsen, represented to the court that I
had used pliers to move the fork bolts. That statement is a blatant falsehood.
5.

At no time during my testimony did I state or infer that I used pliers or any

other tool to forcibly move the fork bolts on the Clayton's 1997 Ford Explorer driver's
door. Indeed, it is, and always has been my practice never to force movement of the fork

bolt with tools when examining the fork bolt range of movement. Use of tools risks
altering the evidence. The fork bolts movedfreelyas stated in my report dated My 1,
2005. (Exhibit 17 to Motion for New Trial.)
6.

On May 13,2005, the date of my inspection of the subject door latck, 1

measured inspected and photographed the Clayton Explorer. I found the latch to be fully
open with the immaterial exception that the upper fork bolt lobe was pushed slightly by the
bent sheet metal. The door latch was left in the same condition as was memorialised by
Ford's previous expert, Mr. Thomas Tiede in Mr. Tiede's report. According to Mr.
Tiede's report, I am informed and believe that he inspected the Explorer on July 15,2002,
At that time he reported and photographed the latch in an open position.
7.

I am informed and believe that Mr. Caulfield testified that all of the other

engineers who inspected the Clayton vehicle moved the fork bolts using tools. I do not
believe that to be true because it would violate the forensic engineer's ethical standards not
to manipulate the evidence. Additionally, to the best of my knowledge, none of the other
photographs taken by the other Ford engineers during their vehicle inspections show that
the fork bolts had ever been moved following the subject accident
1 declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of Utah that the foregoing is true
to the best of my recollection
DATED this

day of May , 2007.

9

Andrew Gilberg, P.E
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO l A
BEFORE ME THIS 14gpAYQF ^ 2 Q ( ^

NOTARY PUBLIC IN AND FOR SAID
Notary Public, Jackson County, Georgia
My Commission Expires July 11,2008

Addendum 4

DELORES CLAYTON, et. al
V.

MINUTE ENTRY
Case no. 000909522
Judge Fratto

FORD MOTOR COMPANY

The matter is before the court to consider plaintiffs' Ex Parte Motion for Leave to File
Affidavit of Andrew Gilberg in Support of Oral Argument Presented on May 7, 2007.
New material, the purpose of which is to persuade the court of a disputed fact, submitted
by one party after briefing and oral argument on motions, should not be considered in deciding
those motions because the opposing party has no opportunity to respond and be heard.
Accordingly, the motion is denied.
This minute entry constitutes the order regarding the matters addressed herein. No further
order is required.
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THOMAS TIEDE
7092 Utde Harbor Drive Huntington Beach, CA 92648 714-536-0794 Fax: 7J 4-960-3944
£ mall: tomt4@socal.rr.com

January 30,2003
Timothy B. Schade, Esquire
Snell & Wilmer
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Gateway Tower West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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RE: (Anthony) Clayton, et al. v. Utah Auto Collection, et al.
Dear Mr, Schade:
Per your request, I inspected the 1997 Ford Explorer that is the subject of the referenced
lawsuit, on July 15,2002 in West Jordan, Utah. This vehicle was located at Jack
Bingham's lot and Mr. Thor Emblem was in attendance.
On November 27,1998, Mr. Anthony Clayton was driving this vehicle on Interstate 80
with Kellie Montoya as a front seat passenger. Outside of Evanston, Wyoming, he swerved
and lost control with a resulting rollover through the median into oncoming traffic lanes.
The driver door was opened at some point in the rollover event, and he was ejected.
Background
My experience in the automotive industry began with my high school at Ford Motor
Company where I had attended Henry Ford Trade School in the Dearborn Assembly Plant.
I have worked as a draftsman, apprentice, designer, development engineer, design engineer
as well as some intermediate positions on my way to Design Analysis Manager, which was
my position when I left Ford Motor Company in 1983. I had a four year assignment in the
Mechanical Hardware Department of Body Engineering, as a designer. I have designed
many of the components and sub-systems associated with door latches. I was also a part of
the design team that designed the first in-house latch design at Ford Motor for some 1962
models , as well as the second generation design that was introduced in the 1965 Ford. I
was asked to investigate the performance of the door latch systems on the Clayton vehicle.
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Inspection
The Clayton vehicle showed clear evidence of rollover damage and the driver door had
come open and been crushed against the A-pillar area. The vehicle had experienced severe
impact to the driver roof side rail during the rollover. The windshield header was caused
to deform upward as the A-pillar and roof side rail were driven downward. The B-piUar
was bowed outward by this same impact mechanism. The B-piiiar displacement was
augmented by the door latch loading. The driver door latch striker is mounted to the Bpillar and it was forcibly rotated outward by the inertial forces of the driver pushing
outward on the door. The door latch mounting surface is designed as a plane, but this
latch plane had been bowed by impact forces.
The driver door latch was found in a fully open position. This design has an upper and
lower latch bolt system where both bolts engage the latch striker. Both bolts were fully
open and had been jammed in place by subsequent impact The entire latch mounting area
on the rear end of the front door had been impacted while the door was open. This vehicle
has a tubular steel side beam structure in the door which had overiaid the latch area as the
door was deformed such that visual access to the latch is limited.
The inside door handle is positioned below the armrest and is recessed into the normal
surface of the door trim panel. The door trim panel had been completely broken away
along with the inside door handle. The forward end of the inside handle actuating rod
could be seen through the remaining opening, but it would normally be attached to the
inside handle. The rear end of that actuating rod is attached to linkage on the door latch.
This Knkage w&s in a free position and was not being actuated.
Hie outside door handle is a painted, semi-flush design. The handle is attached to the
outer door panel that had been folded over and crushed during the rollover. There was no
evidence of ground contact of the outside door handle with the ground.

TIMOTHY SCHADE, ESCL
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Opinions
The Clayton vehicle door latch systems were of good design and manufacture. The lack of
latch bolt deformation,, and the adjacent latch body condition, indicates that the driver
(joor latch system had been actuated during the rollover. Much of the residual deformation
of the door and latch systems occurred after the door opened and impacted the ground.
The outside door handle played no role in the actuation of the door latch in this accident
The handle-to-latch relationship had changed dramatically due to the folding of the door.
The outside handle actuating rod is a compression design, and, it had been displaced in a
tensile fashion during the rollover impact The door handle showed no evidence of ground
contact
_____
___
_
L

—
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The inside driver door linkage was most probably actuated during the rollover, jrfae entire /
door trim panel had been fractured and separated and ££U be seen in the policephotos. «M
Tie inside door handle was broken away and is not available at this time. The rod to the
inside handle is attached at the latch end but the forward end of the rod is free.
The inside door handle system is designed to minimize inadvertent contact It has a
compression linkage to the latch and the handle is recessed into the door panel. But, it
must be designed to provide for comfortable access for operating the handle to open the
door.
My hourly rate for this case is $250 and I have no publications.
Please advise if additional review or comment is desired.
Sincerely,

Automotive Consulting Engineer
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N THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DEE CLAYTON, et a I.,
Case No. 000909522
PI a i nt i ffs,
vs.

Judge Joseph C. Fratto

UTAH AUTO COLLECTION,
et a I.,
Defendants.
TRIAL TESTIMONY OF EDWARD CAULFIELD
DATE:

January 31, 2007

REPORTED BY;

Kelly L. WiIburn, CSR, RPR

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

NOV - 1 2007
SALT LAKE COUNTY
By.
Deputy Clerk

DEPOMAXMERIT
: LITIGATION SERVICES
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DEE CLAYTON, et al.,
Case No. 000909522
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vs.
Judge Joseph C. Fratto
UTAH AUTO COLLECTION,
et al.,

Defendants.

TRIAL TESTIMONY OF EDWARD CAULFIELD

DATE :
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completely. In other words, no stuck damage to the
striker.
Q. What happens if the latch and the striker are
being pulled apart from each other without the inside
rod being compressed?
A. On the other hand, if you pull them apart due
to overload, whatfs happened is the pawls have a
strong handle on the striker. If you pull them apart
due to overload, bend them, displace them, and then
you overload them, as soon as the striker can escape,
it does.
So it doesn't call for Ml release on the
two pawls. And when it can come scraping out of
there, it will. This is in evidence here,
particularly in that striker. And also the latch that
we have on the panel. They are very significantly
damaged. WhichQ. And I'm gonna hand you whaf s marked as
Exhibit — Plaintiffs Exhibit 334, which has been
identified as the Clayton latch. Is that -- are the
fork bolts in that latch in the fully-open position?
A. One is. One is fully open, and the top one
is not.
THE COURT: Which exhibit, which exhibit are
you referring to?
Page 51
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THE WITNESS: Three thirty-four.
When they're both released as if it were a
mechanism activation, meaning handle or
foreshortening, they will release to a position like
this. All the front tails are completely hidden.
This one here —
THE COURT: That's a different exhibit. What
number is that?
THE WITNESS: Yeah, Ifm sorry. Which-do
we have an exhibit number for this?
MR. LARSEN: That one was admitted. I think
the tab was pulled off of it. That's 464-A-l.
THE WITNESS: Yeah, thank you.
MR LARSEN: Which is the exemplar latch.
THE WITNESS: When it's overloaded - my
point is, it overloads, and overloads, and overloads,
until the striker can just barely escape through the
latch. And then it ends up getting ripped up, as
literally it goes to climb under the fence rather than
open the gate.
Q. (By Mr. Larsen) And when the striker is able
to escape from overloading, does that leave telltale
signs?
A. Yes.
Q. And what signs are those?
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A. You have a damaged latch, which is
Exhibit 334. These two pawls are tremendously out of
plane.
Q. You mean the fork bolts?
A. Yes, the fork bolts are tremendously out of
plane. I said "pawl," I misspoke. The fork bolts are
out of plane. The latch is basically bowed. It's
usually straight. Opening and closing the latch, as
being portrayed by handle activation, doesn't leave
behind that kind of evidence.
Q. And if the Clayton latch was smashed or
trampled on by elephants after it opened, would it —
after it opened by a foreshortening theory, as
Mr. Gilberg testified, would it be in fully-opened
position, or a partially-opened position, as it is?
A. If - let's take it a step at a time.
Q. And that's a confusing question. Let me
clarify that. Let me just rephrase that one. If, if
the latch is opened, as Mr. Gilberg testified, by
inside handle activation compression, would it be in
the position that the Clayton latch is in?
A. No.
Q. Whynot?
A. If it opened as Gilberg was portraying, as
soon as it opens you would have a pristine latch,
Page 53

1 fully open, and it would look like this latch here.
2 Both these leading edges would be hidden underneath
3 the side blades.
4
Q. Can the striker still pull on the fork bolts
5 when it's open?
6
A. Striker can't pull on the fork bolts. It's
7 completely free. Like I said before, it's like
8 opening a gate and walking through the gate, compared
9 to climbing under the fence and scraping yourself to
10 death.
11
Now, on the other hand, the Clayton one is
12 not fully opened. It's still got partial on the top.
13 Not fully released Even if you accept that it
14 opened, and looked like this, and got trampled by
15 elephants? I wouldn't expect it to be bowed in this
16 fashion outward and have moved the fork bolts, or the
17 forks at all, into a different position.
18
This is probably pretty close to the position
19 it released in. And it's this top guy here that's
2 0 causing the scraping on that striker.
21
Q. When you say "top guy" you mean the top fork
22 bolt?
23
A. Top fork bolt Or actually it's the bottom
24 fork bolt if you turn it around. I misspoke. Top has
25 two screws. This bottom folk bolt — top one is fully
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1
A. The push test basically, to summarize, the
2 only thing that's in this case is a displacement from
3 the A-pillar to the B-pillar of about half an inch.
4 Gilberts theory is that that displacement of a half
5 an inch can activate the inside handle rod, push it
6 more toward the latch, and get the latch to activate.
7
I've taken this test, pushed back on the
8 order of 4 inches — not a half an inch, 4 inches —
9 and canft get the inside handle rod to activate.
10 Okay? As a matter of fact, it moves in the wrong
11 direction. From the A-pillar moving to the B-pillar.
12
So the theory that foreshortening caused the
13 door to open, from this test — demonstration test and
14 from the work I've done on the overloading of the
15 latch, basically I have to discard. You can't open
16 the door through rod foreshortening because of closure
17 between the A and the B-pillar.
18
Q. And in the tests that we just showed with the
19 video where the arrow is moving apart, that is where
2 0 you're putting over 8,000 pounds of load on the door
21 and over 4 inches of crush?
22
A. That's correct. That's correct.
23
Q. And that's the video that we actually j ust
24 saw?
25
A. Correct.
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Q. And I know the, the door is dark. Is that
why in this lighting it's hard to see that?
A. It's hard to see it because it's dark, but it
appears better on the computer.
Q. Okay. But at the end of that test what we
would be looking at would be the deformation that we
see with your tape on Exhibit 475-6-A; is that
correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. With — and this tape would show a straight
line from the top to the bottom of the door?
A. Correct. The A to B-pillar shortening, A to
B-pillar shortening just basically crushes the door
but will not move the inside handle rod.
Q. And whafs your opinion about the relative
strength of this door system when it comes to
foreshortening? When we put together the A-pillar,
the 214 bar, and the B-pillar?
A. That's a pretty strong door. Ifs a strong
door, and ifs well connected. Primarily coming from
the 214 beam giving it a lot of its strength. If you
cut away the 214 beam, you basically have a different
vehicle. And if you dont bring that into play, you
wont have as strong of a door.
Q. And does that 214 beam protect the inside

compression rod?
A. It wasn't designed to do that. It's designed
to protect occupants in side impact. But it does give
longitudinal, lengthwise, strength to the door. So in
that way it does protect the linkages from moving
relative to one another if the A-pillar moves toward
theB.
Q. Is that because the 214 bar and the
compression rod are basically parallel to each other
inside the door?
A. No. It's because the 214 bar traverses from
the A-pillar back to the B. And basically bridges all
load that tries to cross that path back to the
B-pillar.
Q. There was one more video I think at the end
of this test that demonstrated that the door latch
still worked. Do you recall that video?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. We'll play that video. And if you can
just describe what we can see. What are we looking at
now?
A. You are looking at exactly the same setup.
Now we'll - and everything is still working fine with
that amount of crush that we put into it of 4 inches;.
There's no bowing of the forks. There's no distortion
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of the forks. The latch still latches and unlatches.
Now we're gonna active it again with the
inside handle. And there's the two arrows moving to
one another. And we'll just take it up and there's
the door basically popping open.
So it's still 5/8ths of an inch travel.
We're activating off the inside handle. Everything
still works fine. But we gave it 4 inches of crush,
not a half inch of crush.
Q. And moving on, was there a time more recently
when the Clayton latch was removed from the Clayton
vehicle?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And I'm gonna show you whafs marked
as Defendant's Exhibit 477, and ask if you can
recognize that?
A. Yes. This is a photo log of the latch being
taken out. The actual subject latch being taken out
of the Clayton vehicle to —
Q- When was the latch removed?
A. October 27,2006.
Q. So just last fall?
A. Correct.
Q. Okay. And who removed the latch?
A. Kevin Vosburgh did, here in Salt Lake;
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Q. Okay.
MR. LARSEN: And we would move to admit
Defendant's Exhibit 477, which is the photo log of a
latch removal.
THE COURT: Any objection?
MR. EMBLEM: No objection.
THE COURT: Received.
(Defendant Exhibit No. 477 was received.)
Q. (By Mr. Larsen) Dr. Caulfield, just to help
us understand how the latch was removed, can you
describe briefly what Exhibit 477-8 demonstrates? And
let me bring it closer.
A. Yeah. My eyes are shot. Turn it that way.
Q. Okay.
A. And 477-8 is a picture of the Clayton door
before the latch removal. And demonstrated there are
cut marks that we'll make into the metal to basically
take off that top piece of metal so we can get at the
latch to take the latch out of the vehicle.
Q. And now I'm going to show you what's marked
as Exhibit 477-16.
A. Okay. There's a photograph ~ 477-16 is a
photograph of that piece of metal cut away, exposing
the Clayton latch. There's the Clayton latch. Which
is the same latch as we have here, which is marked
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334. There's exactly the same view of the Clayton
latch that we have.
Q. Okay. And where's the inside compression rod
in this photo?
A. Inside compression rod will be right here.
Q. And what position are the fork bolts in?
A. Fork bolts, as I said before, one is - top
one is fully released. Which is that one there. And
the bottom one is partially released.
Q. Okay. And is there a primary and secondary
latch position on these fork bolts?
A. By law there has to be a primary and
secondary position on all door latches.
Q. And for our - f o r those of us who open doors
every day, can you explain what that means?
A. Did you ever shut the door on your car, it
doesnt shut all the way completely, but it's still
shut? In other words, there's a little gap there.
Sometimes you can go up to it and push it real hard
and get it to shut all the way. That's the secondary
position.
And what they have is they have a double
position. If you look at this bottom fork. That
clicked into the secondary, and that clicked into the
primary. So when the door is fully shut, it's in the

1 primary.
2
When you just closed it but didn't do a good
3 job, it's not all the way shut but it's still — you
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have to unlatch it to open it, that's the secondary
position.
Q. And is that 206 government standards require
that?
A. Yes.
Q. And the test that you performed, though, is
with the latch in the primary, all-the-way-closed
position?
A. That*s correct.
Q. Let me show you what's marked as
Exhibit 470 - well, excuse me, not yet.
Gonna hand you another set of photo logs.
I'm gonna hand you whaf s marked as 478, and ask if
you can identify that?
A. Four seventy-eight is a photo log. It's
comparing a new latch, I believe, to the Clayton
latch.
Q. And where was this performed?
A. This was taken at Packer.
Q. And was this after the subject removal?
A. Yes.
MR. LARSEN: Okay. We'd move to admit 478.
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1
THE COURT: Any objection?
2
MR. EMBLEM: No objection.
3
THE COURT: Four seventy-eight is received.
4
(Defendant Exhibit No. 478 was received.)
5
Q. (By Mr. Larsen) There's actually a paper
6 clip attaching those; is that right?
7
A. Correct.

Q. And have you also blown up some of these
9 photos so we can look more closely at the latch?
10
A. Yes.
11
Q. Okay. And first of all showing you what's
12 marked as Exhibit 478-13-B. Can you identify what
13 that is a photo of?
14
A. Okay. That's a photograph, after it's
15 removed from the vehicle, of the Clayton latch.
16 That's what it is.
17
Q. Okay. And what does it depict for us that's
18 significant to your opinion regarding overloading?
19
A. Okay. The Clayton latch — and I'll show you
2 0 a comparison to these — is bowed. It's bowed to the
2 1 rear of the vehicle. In other words if the latch sets
22 up like this in the vehicle, it's bowed like this.
23 Bowed out.
24
It's bowed, if you will, toward the striker
25 on the vehicle. The forks are misaligned. The
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latch Q. When you say "misaligned," what do you mean?
A. Well, these forks should be running parallel.
In other words, it's just like a scissors. They're
basically pulled toward the striker. In other words,
they're no longer on parallel paths. Since it's
bowed, that axis is going up, this axis is going down.
And there's no longer alignment between the upper and
the lower fork.
Q. When you say "axis," can you identify what
you mean by the axis that you are pointing to?
A. The axis these forks pivot on are underneath
the springs. That's the release spring for the fork.
Q. And is that basically a pivot pin?
A. And that basically is a pivot pin. There's
one for the upper and one for the lower. What's
happened is the latch is basically spread in this
fashion. And these two latch pins are now moving up
and down, this way and this way. So these two forks
are no longer moving parallel.
Q. Okay. Fm gonna show you what's —
A. In this window here, down here in this lower
window, the mechanisms here are overlapping. So
there's damage to the latch down in this part. Damage
to the latch in this part. The latch is pretty well
Page
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Q. (By Mr. Larsen) And now I'm gonna show you
what's marked as Exhibit 478-37. Is that basically
just the other side of those two latches to compare?
A. Yeah. This is the other side of the story,
so to speak. There's the new latch. And look at the
amount of bowing that's on the Clayton latch. There's
what I meant when we talked about misalignment of the
forks. See how the forks are running parallel in the
new latch? And how they're totally misaligned, due
toTHE COURT: I think we need to proceed as a
question and answer, in that format.
THE WITNESS: Okay.
THE COURT: Let's proceed that way.
Q. (By Mr. Larsen) And before I show these to
the jury I'm gonna show you what's marked as photos
956-A and 956-B. If you can describe what these
photos are basically of, without describing any
details?
A. What I've done is I've taken the test piece
we have from the 206 test where I overloaded the
latch, compared it to the subject latch, and compared
it to an exemplar latch which wasn't tested at all.
MR LARSEN: Move to admit 956-A and 956-B.
MR EMBLEM: No objection.
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mangled.
Q. Now, is that damage that's consistent with
overloading, or j ust ground damage?
A. This latch is inside the door. This latch is
the over — or this damage is clearly the overloading,
because we can repeat that. This is inside the latch.
So this has to be damage due to the overload of the
latch. There's two parts coming together here that
aren't even close to the original construction.
Q. And I'm showing you what's marked as
Exhibit 478-41. Can you describe what you are
demonstrating in that photo?
A. Let me see it closer.
MR EMBLEM: The number again?
THE WITNESS: It's 478-41.
MR EMBLEM: Thank you.
THE WITNESS: This is a - put it back up.
It's a new latch for comparison purposes. Compared to
the Clayton latch over here on the right Clayton
latch is basically bowed. The new latch is basically
straight up and down. So it demonstrates the bowing.
Repeating, there's the Clayton latch still in
the locked position. This latch is also in the locked
position. It's just a back view of a new latch
compared to the Clayton latch.
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THE COURT: Received.
(Defendant Exhibit Nos. 956-A and 956-B were
received.)
Q. (By Mr. Larsen) And first, Dr. Caulfield,
can you describe what 956-B demonstrates?
A. Yes. Nine fifty-six-B, the first one, is the
test that I told you about where we ran the latch to
overload for FMVSS 206.
Q. And that's the exhibit right in front of you?
A. Right. We got around 3,000 pounds.
Q. Which exhibit is that?
A. Four sixty-four-B-one. Which we call the
transverse test.
This is the subject latch. So there's the
Clayton latch. And this is a new exemplar. What
we're showing here on the subject latch is bowed
toward the striker, if you will.
The transverse test is bowed. Not to the
same degree, because it didn't have quite the same
direction of pull that the subject latch did.
And the exemplar latch is straight.
We're also noting the direction of the pivot
pins for the forks. The transverse test has
misaligned pivot pins. The subject has misaligned
pivot pins. That's where these forks pivot about.
31
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will mark the Tiede report, place it in front of the
witness, and ask him if he relied on it, and if he says he
didn't rely on it, it will not be discussed and won't go
in the record. But I also will ask him about photographs
taken by Tom Tiede.
THE COURT: Well, I suppose you're entitled to
see if there's the foundation that I've outlined with the
witness, so I'll permit that. You may inquire in terms of
laying foundation.
Actually, I think because the jury is not here
that rather than have them exposed, if you will, to that
exchange, let's have Dr. Caulfield come in and see if the
foundation is laid there.
(Dr. Caulfield returns to the courtroom.)
THE COURT: Dr. Caulfield have a seat, please.
Before we do that, because we're going to have
this questioning, I think it's bad form, if you will, that
there's a lot of movement in the well, or even anywhere in
the courtroom during the examination. I think we should
pay everyone the courtesy of keeping quiet and allowing
the examination to proceed rather than moving around and
distracting from that. And thafs how I would like
everyone to proceed.
I have Dr. Caulfield. Mr. Emblem, you may
cross-examine.
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A I still have that opinion, yes.
Q Mr. Tiede was a Ford engineer; isn't that
correct?
A That's correct.
Q And he worked in the very department where those
door latches were developed; isn't that correct?
A I believe that's correct. I haven't traced his
history, but I believe that's true.
Q But nonetheless you have a different opinion
concerning that?
A Concerning how the door opened?
Q Yes.
A Well, unequivocally, yes, I do have a different
opinion.
Q And you reviewed the photographs taken by Thomas
Tiede; is that correct?
A I don't know if I reviewed the photographs or
not. I pretty much did my own work.
Q Would you disagree with the contents of the
photographs taken by Thomas Tiede?
A I don't know how to answer. A photograph is a
photograph. I think the content speaks for itself. I
just didn't rely on his photographs.
MR EMBLEM: Okay. So we would move for the
exhibit, Your Honor.
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CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. EMBLEM:
Q Good morning, Dr. Caulfield. I'm going to place
an exhibit in front of you that's been marked as
Plaintiffs Exhibit 396 titled, "Thomas Tiede," T-i-e-d-e.
Have you seen that document before, sir?
A Yes.
Q Did you consider the contents of the report of
Thomas Tiede, dated January 30, 2003, in arriving at your
opinions that you've expressed before the jury in this
case?
A I haven't relied on his report or opinions to
arrive at mine, but I reviewed his report as background.
Q Did you consider his opinion that the interior
door handle rod could have actuated this latch causing the
door to open?
A I read that in his report, if that's what you
mean by "consider it." And I eliminated it from the
possibilities.
Q And you expressed your opinion to this j ury that
this door in the Ford Explorer cannot open in that
fashion?
A Which fashion?
Q By foreshortening of the door, fore-to-aft rod
operation?
H &•'*&?,* yH> */!*«;**?3
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MRLARSEN: Same objection. I think the
foundation has not been laid.
THE COURT: The objection is sustained.
Dr. Caulfield, you may step down, please watch your step.
THE WITNESS: Go out again?
THE COURT: Well, maybe we'll leave you right
there because we are going to have the jury come in. This
gives everyone maybe about two minutes here so we can be
ready for the examination. We are in session.
MR O'NEILL: Your Honor, for clarification,
when things are being displayed, is it permissible to walk
not in the well but back, or do you want permission first
even in the back of the courtroom?
THE COURT: I'll give you permission - I think
so that everyone is not moving around. I mean, one is
entitled, at least when questioning the witness and is
handling that aspect of it, to move where they can see
what's happening. You don't have to seek permission for
that. I think everyone else should remain pretty well
seated and let the examination continue without — we'll
pay the courtesy, I think, to both sides.
MR. O'NEILL: Thank you.
(Jury enters.)
THE COURT: The jury has returned into the
courtroom. Cross-examination, Mr. Emblem?
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you put it in drive and it starts rolling — I j ust want
to get it straight
A Doors have to be closed, wheels rolling.
Q Now, in this photograph 478-29 we also see an
exemplar latch, the opening in the fish mount looks like
the latch all the way open?
A That's correct.
Q And I believe that you said in your sworn
testimony yesterday that if the Clayton latch was all the
way open, like that, that would be evidence of rod
operation?
A That's correct.
Q And the Clayton latch, in your photograph,
depicts a different position than all the way open, as you
described.
A It's short of all the way open.
Q One side is all the way open, but the lower side
lacks a little bit?
A Correct.
Q And we can tell up from down because there's two
mounting holes at the top of the latch, and only one
mounting hole at the bottom?
A That's right.
Q This is 477-8. I'll show you that. Are you
familiar with that?
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Q I'm going to mark one of those 328 — 328 A and
place that infrontof you.
(Exhibit 328A marked for identification.)
Q (BY MR. EMBLEM) Now in the Morse test conducted
by Andrew Giiberg, the effect of what you call point
loading — is this true, what we're looking atrighthere?
A That's correct.
Q And the inside of the door is pushed out, oh,
right about between the door handle and the latch; is that
correct?
A Correct
Q So that's about between — can you see that?between the door handle and the latch. In this area right
here?
A Thafs correct.
Q And ifs your testimony that Mr. Clayton would
not have been able to push on that exact spot?
A You can't push on an exact spot. That's point
loading. He'll distribute across the door.
Q So you would expect a different shape in the
door once ifs bent out than we see here? It wouldn't be
quite as sharp?
A For point loading compared to body loading, yes.
Q In fact, there's no bow-out in the Clayton
vehicle?
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A Yes.
Q On 477-8 this was - your testimony, I believe,
was this was just before you cut the latch out.
A Correct. Or unscrewed the latch. We cut the
metal and unscrewed the latch.
Q And in this photograph, can you see that that
bottom - what do you call it?
A It's a fork tooth.
Q Fork tooth. The bottom fork tooth is not fully
opened?
A Fully opened, correct.
Q And that was the condition j ust before you sawed
the latch out?
A Correct.
Q Would you use your laser there to point out that
exact spot that's important?
A Yeah. Turn the picture over, if you will. Cue
more time. Okay. Now it's up and down correct. There's
the tooth right there which is not fully released.
Q The tooth - we talked about the Morse testing.
I'm going to put Exhibit 328 in front of you that's been
admitted. And those are the photographs — you can look
at them - of the Morse test done by Andrew Giiberg. Do
you recognize that to be true?
A Yes.
">~tj?s* ,-*S-J?&-.-.
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A I disagree with that. It's clearly pulled away
from the anchor where the striker anchors to the hitch.
It's deformed there. And it is bowed out at that
location.
MR. EMBLEM: We'll mark the next photo in this
series 328B.
(Exhibit 328B marked for identification.)
MR. EMBLEM: May I display 328B?
THE COURT: Any objection to that?
MR. LARSEN: No objection. I think it's been
admitted for demonstrative purposes.
THE COURT: This 328B is a photograph within
another exhibit.
MR, EMBLEM: Within 328.
THE COURT: Well, I'm not quite sure why you
won't display the actual photograph.
MR. EMBLEM: Because it's this large.
THE COURT: It's a blowup. You may display it.
Q (BY MR. EMBLEM) There we go. 328B is
displayed. And in this case, you see, sir, that the —
first time I've asked you this: You didn't do this test?
A No.
Q And you haven't done a test like this?
A Giiberg did this test, and I haven't done one
like it.
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A That would be me.
Q And that shows that little tang in the opening?
A Let me see. My one eye isn't that good. That
shows the tang.
Q So those — that kind of highlights one of the
main pieces of evidence that it didn't open by rod
operation?
A Thafs not the main piece. The main piece is
the striker. That's a corroborating piece.
Q The other thing that you mentioned as being
evidence, which is 478-37, was the fact that the jaws were
no longer parallel?
A You mean the forks?
Q The forks.
A The forks are no longer parallel. They're
misaligned.
Q And that misalignment, then - referring to
here, right?
A Correct.
Q ~ was another piece of evidence that
corroborated your belief that the door did not open with
rod operation?
A That's correct.
Q And then you've got an exhibit, 956B, where
you've compared the subject latch, the Clayton latch, with
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Q Okay. And the fact that the B pillar is bowed
as it's bowed?
A The B pillar is bowed outward.
Q And did you take into consideration the fact
that the roof received an impact above the B pillar?
A I realized that, but it didn't load the striker.
Q But did it bend the B pillar?
A It bent the B pillar outward.
Q And when you pulled on the striker in 471 -5, you
pulled the pillar outward and rotated it?
A No, we just rotated the striker. We didn't pull
the pillar outward.
Q You didn't bend the pillar outward?
A Let me check. No, I don't think we did.
THE COURT: You're referring to which exhibit?
THE WITNESS: I'm referring to 475.
Q (BY MR. EMBLEM) The latch pin is attached to
the pillar kind of like Fve stuck it in this cup?
A We're on something different now?
Q The latch pain, the striker.
A Well, a little bit stronger than that.
Q Okay. But the pillar is tubular in shape?
A It's rectangular.
Q Rectangular in shape.
A It'sabox.

Page 7 9
1 an exemplar, correct?
2
A That's correct. The subject latch and a new
3 exemplar.
4
Q And your reason for pointing out in the Clayton
5 latch evidence that the door didn't open by foreshortening
6 was this misalignment in this center photograph?
7
A Well, thafs one of the pieces. The misaligned
8 pin, the bowed latch, they're all evidence of overload.
9
Q Right, and the third thing was the latch pin?
10
A The latch pin?
11
Q Well, you said it was - the latch pin was the
12 other piece of evidence.
13
A The tong that wasn'tfollyreleasedfromthe
14 fork is another piece of evidence.
15
Q What do you close the door on? What do you call
16 that?
17
A The striker. You were calling it the latch pin,
18 I call it the striker. That's the biggest piece of
19 evidence.
20
Q Some people call it latch pin, right?
21
A Ithinkso.
22
Q And that was your 470-34. A component of that
2 3 was rotation, correct?
24
A The striker being rotated out 25 degrees, that's
2 5 the biggest piece of evidence.
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Q And if you put weight on the top of it and push
it down, is there any possibility that the weight coming j
down on the top of that pillar, rectangular in shape, will |
also rotate it?
A No.
Q Noway?
A No.
Q But if you add a rearward component, it starts
to push that latch pin out, as Mr. Gilberg has testified
to. Wouldn't that actually create that?
A No.
Q Noway?
A The loads came. in through the latch pin, not on
the other side of it.
Q There's a few more photographs I want to show
you. I'm going to put 467 in front of you again.
A I think these are yours from Gilberg.
Q These go in the Morse test. Well put them
back.
Inspection photos taken by — it was taken by
Mr. Bosburgh, right?
A Correct, on July 21st, 2005.
Q Exhibit 467 - we put little tabs on them so
they're easy for you to find. We're going to start with
this one here.
21

(Pages

78

to

81

Page 109
1
Q. And when you open the latch it looks like
2 that, correct?
3
A. Correct.
4
Q. Okay. That's 464-A-l. Now, we can see the
5 fork bolt up here, can't we?
6
A. Correct.
7
Q. And over here?
8
A. Correct.
9
Q. Okay.
10
A. But they're both always tucking down below
11 these edges. And in the Corrigan pictures it's still
12 sticking up. In our pictures and Gilberg's pictures
13 it's still sticking up. It moves from inspection to
14 inspection by the experts.
15
Q. This 464-A-l that you brought with you today
16 is another mini latch, just like the Clayton latch;
17 isn't that true?
18
A. That's correct.
19
Q. So when these two pins line up here in the
2 0 center, that's all the way open, those two pins One
21 up in the center?
22
A. Say that again.
23
Q. Right here in the center, these two pins
2 4 right here that we saw here in the Corrigan
2 5 photographs?
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THE WITNESS: It had to b e THE COURT: Dr. Caulfield, there's an
objection. I need to have pause to deal with that..
Your objection?
MRLARSEN: Argumentative.
THE COURT: Sustained.
Q. (By Mr. Emblem) I'm gonna show you 320-D.
These were admitted this morning. These are
photographs of an inspection done by Mr. Vosburgh, of
your company.
A. Okay.
MR EMBLEM: Three twenty-D, please.
Q. (By Mr. Emblem) Do you remember, in the
photographs we looked at this morning, Mr. Larsen and
I were out front when Mr. Vosburgh was taking the
photographs from inside the parking garage?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.
MR. EMBLEM: Three twenty-D? Okay. Can we
close in on the door latch? Right there. Back up a
little.
Q. (By Mr. Emblem) Is that door latch fully
open?
A. No.
Q. No?
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A. I judge it more whether that nose is tucked
under that side piece, rather than looking at the
center location.
Q. Yeah. So you've changed your testimony then
about the latch being jammed and it won't move?
A. No. You can forcibly move it. It is jammed.
Q. Well, I'm sorry. I don't quite understand
you. Are you saying that when Mr. Vosburgh went to
the site in July of'05 that he moved it and then took
a picture of it?
A. Fm saying all the experts can move these.
It is jammed. They can forcibly move them. But I can
show you from picture to picture that you can force
the movement of these. Tm gauging that it was in
this position that we have from the damage on the
striker. That's where it had to be.
Now, if you want to force this or put a tool
on there, you can move it. But the experts are moving
these to see how jammed they are from inspection to
inspection.
Q. You weren't there. Youdon*tknowifthe)^
moved them. You are just making that wild guess.
Admit it.
A. I'm not making a wild guess.
MR. LARSEN: Objection, argumentative.
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1
A. See the tab?
2
Q. It's a little fuzzy because we've blown it up
3 quite a bit, but isn't it true that these two pins are
4 lined up exactly?
5
A. Well, there's a tab sticking its nose up
• 6 right there. That will tell you immediately it's not
7 tucked in under here, under the side plate, so it's
8 not fully open. Same thing ~
9
Q. Well, it's sticking out over here too, isn't
10 it?
11
A. Same thing with the top. They should be
12 completely snugged away.
13
Q. Isn't it true that the sheet metal has been
14 torn along here?
15
A. I don't think so.
16
Q. Okay.
17
A . I think that the latch has slid down a bit.
18
MR. EMBLEM: Okay. Then we go to 320-E.
19 Three twenty-E. Would you close in on that, please?
2 0 Okay, back out just a little. Okay.
21
Q. (By Mr. Emblem) Is that the same?
22
A. I don't know if it's the same picture. Same
23 answer. It's not fully open.
24
MR. EMBLEM: Three twenty-F. Yeah, they
2 5 don't ~ let me go back. Let me go back to E one more
29
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1
Q. (By Mr. Emblem) This is a photograph taken
2 by Mr. Vosburgh on July, is it 5th, 2005?
3
A. Yes.
4
Q. And it's your testimony that the sheet metal
5 on this side over here has not been deformed and does
6 not explain the appearance of that little cog in that
7 upper window?
8
A. Say that again.
9
Q. Is it your testimony — a moment ago you
10 couldn't remember that the sheet metal was torn. Does
11 this help you recall that the sheet metal was torn in
12 the side of that latch opening?
13
A. I don't think it's torn. First you said
14 deformed. It is deformed. I don't believe it's torn.
15 But the sheet metal I was talking about is that latch
16 sheet metal which that nose has to stick down below.
17 There's a rim on that latch. Not the sheet metal on
18 the vehicle.
19
Q. I'm gonna show you a photograph that's been
2 0 marked as Exhibit 541. Do you recognize that as being
2 1 a photograph of the Clayton door?
22
A. Yes.
23
Q, And if s focused on the latch; is that
2 4 correct?
25
A. Focused from below into the latch, yes.
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Q. Did you — do you have any reason to believe
that Mr. James moved those fork bolts around?
A. I can't show where he did from photograph to
photograph. I can only show that they are being moved
around by the experts, in and out, under tremendous
resistance because they're bound.
Q. Tm gonna show you two photographs that have
been marked as Plaintiff s 302-AA and 302-BB. I'll
ask you if you recognize those photographs being
photographs of the Clayton automobile door and latch?
A. I recognize them.
Q. All right. And that latch is the focus of
your investigation; is that correct?
A. That's correct.
MR. EMBLEM: All right. Your Honor,
plaintiffs would move 302-AA and 302-BB.
THE COURT: Any objection?
MR. LARSEN: Foundation, cumulative.
THE COURT: Overruled. HI receive P-302-AA
and 302-BB.
(Plaintiff Exhibit Nos. 302-AA and 302-BB were
received.)
Q. (By Mr. Emblem) Do you know an engineer
named Ragan?
A. Larry Ragan? Yes.
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MR EMBLEM: Your Honor, plaintiffs would
move Exhibit 541.
MR. LARSEN: Objection, your Honor.
THE COURT: It'sP-541?
MR EMBLEM: Right.
MR LARSEN: Objection, foundation,
cumulative.
THE COURT: Overruled. I'll receive P-541.
(Plaintiff Exhibit No. 541 was received.)
Q. (By Mr. Emblem) Okay. May I see that for a
second?
A. Sure.
Q. Do you know an engineer named James that made
an inspection on behalf of Ford Motor Company?
A. Yes, I know of him. I didn't know he was on
the case.
Q. You have the photograph infrontof you.
Mr. James' photograph. Do we see that the, the inside
of the fork bolts are completely aligned as the latch
isfollyopen?
A. I don't think the fork bolts are completely
aligned. I think they're still misaligned and always
have been. You don't have the right view for it to
determine that, as they show up in this physical
evidence I have here of the latch.
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Q. I want to get his name right. Larry Ragan.
You recall him?
A. I'm sorry?
Q. You recall his name is Larry Ragan?
A. Yes.
Q. He's an engineer?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall that he was assigned to do an
investigation in this case?
A. Yes.
MR. EMBLEM: Are we looking at 302-AA?
Q. (By Mr. Emblem) Mr. Ragan's photographs,
taken February 3,2003. Isn't it true, sir, that that
door latch is wide open?
A. Is that his photo?
Q. Do you have it there in front of you?
A. Was it 302-AA? No, 302-BB.
MR. EMBLEM: Do you have BB up?
OLAV EMBLEM: AA.
THE WITNESS: It's not that one either.
Which one is Ragan's?
Q. (By Mr. Emblem) The 302s.
A. Well, that's not the photo up on the THE COURT: Let's avoid the - questions and 1
answers, that's all we want to entertain here.
§

^^^^^^^mi^mi^msmim^^^^mmem^mm^^mmim^i

31

(Pages

117

to

120)

Addendum 15

?

Addendum 16

M PACKER
ENGINEERING

September 15,2005

VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS
Mr. Dan Larsen
SneU&WilmerLLP
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Gateway Tower West
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Re:

Clayton et al v Utah Auto Collection (Ford Motor Company)
Packer Engineering Project No. 102342
Case No. 35577.1124

Dear Mr. Larsen:
The following constitutes a report regarding the above captioned matter, hi preparation for this report my
review has included the material contained in Appendix A. Also attached is my curriculum vitae. In
addition to this activity, Packer Engineering personnel inspected the subject 1997 Ford Explorer on July
21, 2005 and also an exemplar 1998 Ford Explorer on September 12, 2005. All my conclusions and
opinions contained in the report are stated to a high degree of engineering certainty based on my analysis
of this file material and engineering analysis to date as well as my background, training, and experience.
The background surrounding this incident may be stated as follows. A 1997 Ford Explorer was traveling
eastbound on 1-80 when it drifted off the road into the median and lost control. Subsequently, the Ford
Explorer rolled over multiple times before coming to rest in the westbound lanes of travel on 1-80. The
driver was ejected during the rollover collision.
I have drawn the following opinions and conclusions regarding this matter:
L

2.

The driver's door came open during the rollover as a result of collision related forces, including
loading from the unrestrained driver impacting the door outward Damage to the inner door panel
supports the fact that there was high occupant loading to the door. The physical evidence of the
subject door latch demonstrates there was overload in a bending direction about the horizontal
axis of the latch plate which caused the pawl mechanism to be misaligned with the fork bolts
allowing the fork bolts to move freely. Some of the residual deformation causing this condition
remains. Due to interaction between fee door and the ground after fee door opened during the
rollover event, some of the physical deformation to fee latch and door was changed and obscured.
The striker on the subject vehicle also exhibits evidence of excessive occupant loading. The
overload evidence on the striker consists of approximately 25*30 degrees of outward residual
rotation caused by occupant loading to the door with the latch connected to the striker.

P.O. Box 353 (60566-0353)
1950 N. Washington St (60563-1366)
Napervilfe, IL
630.505.5722 Fax: 630,505.1986
www.packereng.com

6700 Alexander BeH Drive
Suite 100
Columbia, MD 21046
443.545.2000 Fax: 443.545.2001
www.packereng.com

1050 Highland Drive
Suite B
Ann Arbor, Ml 48108-2262
734.786.5000 Fax: 734.786.50D1
www.packereng.com

Mr. Dan Larsen
September 15, 2005
Page 2 of 2

3.

The door did not come open due to a foreshortening of the door resulting in the inside handle
compression rod movement. There is no evidence of longitudinal loading to the driver's door
during this lateral rollover event The driver's door opening is foreshortened residually by
approximately lAtf at the top hinge level and is increased by an equal amount at the lower hinge
level. This is due to collision damage to the vehicle's roof structure occurring during the rollover
collision. There is no evidence of outside handle activation due to ground contact

4.

The driver's door inside handle is missing from the vehicle. Activation of the inside handle
during the rollover collision would also result in actuation of the latch allowing the door to open.
This situation is a possibility, though less likely, scenario of how this door came open during this
rollover collision.

In summary, I find no defects in the subject 1997 Ford Explorer from the manufacturing or design
standpoints. The vehicle is safe and not unreasonably dangerous as it relates to the areas investigated by
tin's author.
This concludes my report to date. My investigation into this matter continues. If new information
becomes available, I will give it consideration. If I arrive at additional opinions or if my opinions change,
I will notify you immediately and modify my report accordingly.
If you need any additional information or need further clarification, please contact me.
Sincerely,
PACKER ENGINEERING, INC.

Edward M Caulfielo^ml)., P.E.
President and Chief Technical Officer
EMC/cls
Enclosures:

Appendix A
Curricidwn Vitoe
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FILEB DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District
Thor O. Emblem (Admitted Pro Hac Vice)
LAW OFFICES OF THOR O. EMBLEM
205 West Fifth Ave., Suite 105
Escondido, CA 92025
Telephone: (760) 738-9301
Fax: (760) 738-9409

N0V2 9 2P06
SALT LAKE O

* —

Matthew H. Rary (#6635)
LAW OFFICE OF MATTHEW H. RATY, PC
New England Professional Plaza
9677 South 700 East, Suite D
Sandy, Utah 84070
Telephone: (801) 495-2252
Fax:(801)495-2262
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
Case No. 000909522

DOLORES CLAYTON, et al.
Plaintiffs,

UTAH AUTO COLLECTION, et al.

PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO FORD'S
LIMINE MOTION NO. 26
TO EXCLUDE REFERENCE TO
WITNESSES NOT CALLED BY FORD

Defendants.

Judge Joseph C. Fratto

v.

PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE OF FORD'S
EXPERT DOOR LATCH ENGINEER THOMAS TIEDE'S OPINIONS ON
THE CAUSE OF THE DOOR OPENING SINCE MR. TIEDE'S OPINIONS
WERE RELIED UPON BY FORD'S NEW DOOR LATCH EXPERT, ED
CAUFIELD, IN FORMING HIS EXPERT OPINION IN THE CASE.
Ford first hired Thomas Tiede, a former Ford engineer to inspect the Clayton Explorer
and provide an expert opinion regarding the cause of the door opening in the rollover. In some
critical aspects, Mr. Tiede does not disagree with the opinions of Plaintiffs' door latch
engineering expert, Andrew Gilberg. Ford's then hired another expert, Ed Caufield to provide
1

them with a different opinion. Mr. Caufield relied on Mr. Tiede's photographs taken and
reviewed Mr. Tiede's report and considered it in forming his expert opinion. (See, Exhibit A, p.
8, 9, 16, 18, 20 22-24.) Mr. Caufield agreed with Mr. Tiede as to some aspects of the Tiede
report, but disagreed with him on the roof crush contributing to the door opening (Exhibit A, p.
20) and the lack of bolt deformation. (Exhibit A, pp. 23, 24.) Unlike Tiede, Mr. Caufield did not
know whether the exterior handle activating rod had been displaced in a tensile fashion. (Exhibit
A, p. 24-25.)
The circumstances in this case are different than those cited in Hoffman v. Caterpillar,
Inc., 368 F.3d 709, 716 (7th Cir. 2004). In that case, the court refused to give a "missing
witness" instruction and allow an adverse inference from an expert not called at trial. Because
the expert was not called, there could be no adverse inference. Here, however, since Ford's own
expert relied on Tiede's photographs and report in part and in forming his opinion, Plaintiffs
have a right to examine Caufield on the differences of opinion and should be free to comment on
Ford's decision to rely on Mr. Caufields' opinion rather than Mr. Tiede's. MUJI No. 2.13
permits Plaintiffs to demonstrate the surrounding circumstances as to how an opinion was
made.1/ (See Exhibit B.) Consequently, Ford's Motion should be denied.
Dated: November 28, 2006.

Respectfully submitted.

THOR O. EMBLEM
MATTHEW H. RATY

1

Ford may state that Plaintiffs have made a similar motion, Plaintiffs' Limine Motion
No. 21. However, Plaintiffs experts never relied on anything Larry Kashur did in forming their
opinion.
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The deposition of EDWARD M. CAULFIELD,
Ph.D., P.E., called for examination, taken before WENDY
M. STRICKLER, a Notary Public within and for the County
of cook, State of Illinois, and a Certified Shorthand
Reporter of said state, at 3031 Finley Road, Downers
Grove, Illinois, on the 17th day of February, A.D.,
2006, at 9:00 o'clock a.m.
RSA/VERITEXT COURT REPORTING COMPANY
1845 Walnut Street, 15th Floor
^^^^^^W^mWA^^^'^^J^^.a

(215) 241-1000

.W'fiJfWflttWWiari^fr^^

(888) 777-6690

Page 14
1
Q. What was your area of expertise in that case?
2
A. Mechanical engineering and mechanical
3 metallurgy.
4
Q. What was the part involved?
5
A. The car involved was a Mustang, older Mustang,
6 probably in the 70s. And the allegation was the rear
7 hanger bracket for the rear bumper valence puncturing
8 the tank
9
Q. 70s, was that similar in any way to the
10 exploding gas tank in the, what was it, do you remember
11 what I am talking, in the early70s, the Ford?
12
MR- LARSEN: Pinto?
13
MR. EMBLEM: Pinto. Is that a similar issue
14 as the Ford Pinto?
15
A. No.
16
Q. On April 18,2005, in Edwardsville, Missouri,
17 you gave testimony in Jablonski, is that misspelled or
18 J-a-b-1-o-n-k-s-i or should it be s-k-i?
19
A. Probably is s-k-i.
20
Q. — versus Ford. Did you work for Ford or its
2 1 attorneys in that case?
22
A. I worked for Ford or their attorneys.
23
Q. What was your area of expertise?
24
A. Mechanical engineering as well as mechanical
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1 case?
2
A Yes, I did.
3
Q. What was your area of expertise?
4
A. Mechanical engineering and mechanical
5 metallurgy.
6
Q. What was the part involved?
7
A. The part involved was a roof, Mustang vehicle.
8
Q. Was that a "roof crushed" case?
9
A. Not as generic as that It was rear roof
10 header impact and crush.
11
Q. Rollover?
12
A. Yes.
13
Q. On February 25, 2005, in Wheaton, Illinois, a
14 case called Freedle, F-r-e-e-d-i-e, versus Ford, did you
15 give testimony in that case?
16
A. Yes.
17
Q. Did you work for Ford or its attorneys?
18
A Yes, I did.
19
Q. What was your area of expertise?
20
A. It would have been mechanical engineering and
2 1 mechanical metallurgy.
22
Q. What was the part involved?
23
A. And I dont remember the exact details of
2 4 Freedle as I sit here.
Page 17
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1 metallurgy.
Q. What was the part involved?
2
A The part involved was a fuel tank
3
Q. What was the vehicle?
4
A. Lincoln town car.
5
Q. Whatyear?
6
A I would say early '90s.
7
Q. On March 21st,'05 in Florence, South
8
9 Carolina, you gave testimony in a case called Strickland
10 versus Ford; is that correct?
A. That's correct
11
Q. Did you work for Ford or its attorneys in that
12
13 case?
14
A Yes, I did
15
Q. WTiat was your area of expertise?
16
A. Mechanical engineering, mechanical metallurgy.
17
Q. And what was the part involved?
18
A The vehicle was an Fl 50. The part involved
19 was door latch and handle assemblies.
20
Q. Turning back a page, on March 3,2005, in
2 1 Beaver Dam, Kentucky, in a case called Deno, D-e-n-o,
2 2 versus Ford, you gave testimony in that case?
23
A Yes.
24
Q. Did you work for Ford or its attorneys in that

1
Q. Do you recall the vehicle?
2
A. No, I dont
3
Q. On January 20,2005, in Knoxville, Tennessee,
4 in a case called Teets, T-e-e-t-s, versus Ford, did you
5 give testimony in that case?
6
A. Yes.
7
Q. Did you work for Ford or its attorneys?
8
A. Yes.
9
Q. What was your area of expertise?
10
A. Mechanical engineering, mechanical
1 1 metallurgy.
12
Q. What was the part involved?
13
A That was a truck, commercial truck, looking
14 for the reasons of fuel tank puncture dealing with
1 5 aftermarket connections.
16
Q. Okay. Thafs all on that one.
17
(WHEREUPON, Deposition Exhibit
18
Number 368 was marked for
19
Identification as of this date.)
2<y>
MR. EMBLEM: Okay.
2/
Q. I will give you a document that's been marked
as 368. And it says, 'Thomas Tiede" at the top,
T-i-e-d-e?
A. Yes.
5

(Pages

to
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Q. Okay. We have your raw notes from the file;
is that correct?
A. Correct
Q. Any measurements that you took?
A. Correct
Q. We have a list of your testimony and
publications?
A. Yes.
Q. And you have record of payments in this case?
A. Yes.
Q. I am going to place in front of you, but not
mark your CV, in case you to need reference it I will
just ask if this is your most recent CV?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. On the third page, you note there in the
publications, ffNon-published Corporate Reports and
Investigative Studies," Fatigue Analysis?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you learn to do fatigue analysis while in
college?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you expand upon that when you went into
practice?
A. Yes.
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Q. Fatigue analysis, is that in any way related
to value mode analysis?
A. Fracture mode analysis for metals under
continual cycle mode would be fatigue analysis.
Q. And what about failure mode analysis, do you
go in and look at metal things that have broken?
A. Yes.
Q. To determine how they are broken?
A. Yes.
Q. Does that involve any component of metallurgy?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you take metallurgy in college?
A. Yes.
Q. Was that a part of your engineering studies?
A. Yes.
Q. Is that part of a typical engineering
curriculum at the university of where you attended?
A. No, I don't believe so. I think if you took a
degree in general engineering you might not have any
metallurgic engineering course work.
Q. Is it related to general engineering? Would
metallurgy be an elective as opposed to a required
subject?
A. It could be.

Q. Have you supplemented your metallurgical
education through self-study and experience?
A Yes.
Q. The box of materials that we have here beside
you, is this your complete file?
A. Yes, except for what I have mentioned before
with the depositions and the parts.
Q. In the file here, you have some photographs
taken by a Thomas Tiede. Did you consider those in the
in reaching your expert opinions in this case?
A. I considered them as just background. I have
my own photographs of the subject vehicle and the
photographs done by Packer Engineering, I believe it was
Kevin Vosburgh. I relied primarily on those, but I used
Tiede's photographs and everybody else's photographs as
far as background.
Q. Okay. You also had a copy of Thomas Tiede's
report?
A. Correct
Q. You had a copy of Andrew Gilbert's report?
A. Correct
Q. Did you consider Andrew Gilbert's reportA. Yes.
Q. - in forming your opinions?
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A. Yes.
Q. Did you consider Tom Tiede's report in forming
your opinions?
A. I read all the reports. I considered them,
yes.
(WHEREUPON, Deposition Exhibit
Number 367 was marked for
Identification as of this date.)
Q. I am going to place an exhibit thafs been
marked as 367 in front of you. It's identified as
the "Edward M. Caulfield Testimony Record?"
A. Correct
Q. Is this record up-to-date?
A. No, it only goes up to September 21st I have
had cases since then. Let me check that
MR.LARSEN: Is this Exhibit 368?
MR EMBLEM: 367.
MR.LARSEN: Did I do something wrong with the
exhibits? Maybe I have them wrong. I thought we
started with 366.
MR. EMBLEM: We did.
MR.LARSEN: With the notice.
MR.EMBLEM: IdidntmarktheCVMR.LARSEN: Oh, okay.

3 (Pages 6 t o 9)

L Page
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Page 2 0 |

M 1
Q. A report dated January 30,2003?
forces, et cetera
2
A. Yes.
I guess I could clear it up. I don't see
3
Q. You considered this report in reaching your
roof crush — the fact that the roof is crushing or has
4 opinions in this case?
been severely impacted as one of the main contributions
to the door opening. Do you see what I'm saying?
5
A. Yes.
Q. Do you agree with the term that it's an
\
6
Q. Mr. Tiede, in his report, indicates that he
7 visited the vehicle in West Shore, Utah on July 15,
7 unintentional door opening?
8 2002. Did you obtain the photographs that he took at
8
A. It wasn't activated by the handle. I agree
9 that time?
9 with that.
10
A. Yes.
10
Q. Wasn't activated by the handle?
11
Q. And as you said earlier, you looked at those.
11
A. There was nobody that pulled on the handle.
12 And because you looked at them, you did consider them in 12
Q. Do you agree that Ford specifically designs
13 some respect?
13 these doors to stay closed in accidents?
14
A. I have looked at all the photos.
14
A. They tiy to design them that way. But it's a
15
Q. Mr. Tiede reports in the lower paragraph,
15 fact of life that everything has an overload value. The
16 about the fifth line up from the bottom, he said, "I
16 intention is to keep it closed for reasonable forces.
17 have designed many of the components and sub-systems
17
Q. Sure. So would you then agree that if it
18 associated with door latches." Have you designed any
18 opens during an accident, that that would be an
19 door latches?
19 unintentional event?
0
A. I haven*t designed any for manufacturers.
20
A. Yeah. I have put all unintentional events
iem. /
21 have analyzed a lot of them but never designed them.
21 into the category. It wasn't activated by one of the
22
Q. Mr. Tiede says that his experience began
22 handles, yes.
2 3 working at Ford Motor Company and that he worked there 23
Q. The next line, Mr. Tiede reports, "The
24 in the design analysis department Did you ever work
2 4 windshield header was caused to deform upward as the
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for Ford or Ford Motor Company?
A. No. Only as a consultant
Q. Mr. Tiede says on the second page, Inspection
Section, second line, it says, "The vehicle had
experienced severe impact to the driver roof side rail
during the rollover." Is that the fact? First of all,
do you agree with the fact?
A. I would agree with that.
Q. Is that fact important?
A. It should be rollovers, though there is more
than one. Sol would just change that to S.
Q. Is the fact that the driver's roof side rail
received severe impact, and as you say, perhaps more
than one, is that important to the door latch issue in
this case where the door - first, do you agree that the
door unintentionally opened in the Clayton case?
MR- LARSEN: Objection, vague.
THE WITNESS: I would agree the door opened,
you know, due to overload of the latch number. I would
say the fact that we have tremendous forces going on in
the vehicle to cause that type of overloading is an
important factor. But ifs not so much how the
components of the vehicle loaded the door. Ifs the
forces going on in the vehicle that cause occupant

Page 21
1 A-pillar and roof side rail were driven downward" Do
2 you agree with the fact that the A-pillar and roof side
3 rail were driven downward?
4
A. I would agree with that
5
Q. Is that important to the analysis of how this
6 door unintentionally opened?
7
A. If you drive down the header and it does
8 separate from the frame on the window, that can cause
9 some component loading on the latch because the two are
10 trying to move in different directions. Ifs a factor
11 but not, as I see it, a major factor.
12
Q. The next line, Mr. Tiede reports, "The
13 B-pillar was bowed outward by this same impact
14 mechanism." Do you agree with that statement?
15
A. I agree with that
16
Q. Is the fact that the B-pillar bowed out by the
17 same impact mechanism, is that important to the analysis
18 of how this door opened unintentionally?
19
A. If the B-pillar bows out, the door will bow
20
21
22
23
24

out with it So the two will stay together. So as far
as latch loading is concerned, I would say no as far as
the B-pillar bowing out
Q, The next paragraph Mr. Tiede reports, "The
driver door latch was found in a fully open position."
6

(Pages

18

to

21)

Page 22
.
/

1 Was it still in the fully opened position when you
2 inspected the vehicle?
3
A. I don't know what he means, fully opened. I
4 don*t think ifs fully opened. It looks like ifs been
5 crushed back into the vehicle, folded in half. But I
6 will agree it is open.
7
Q. The next sentence that he says, "Both bolts
8 were fully open and had been jammed in place by
9 subsequent impact." I think thafs what you were just
10 saying about subsequent impact. What does he mean when
11 he says "Both bolts were fully open?"
12
MR. LARSEN: Objection, fully open,
13
MR. EMBLEM: If you know.
14
A. What he means there is he means what I would
15 call forks or some people call fork bolts. And those
16 are the components inside the latch that do the
17 latching. And both bolts were fully opened and are
18 jammed, I disagree that thereby subsequent impact
19
Q. In the last sentence of that paragraph he
2 0 says, Mr. Tiede says, "The vehicle has a tubular steel
21 side beam structure in the door." I will stop right
22 there. Is that the way you would describe the side beam
2 3 structures or tubular steel side beam structures?
24
A It is tubular and ifs the side protection
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1 beam, and I agree ifs in the door.
2
Q. Do you know what weight or gauge or thickness
3 of the sheet metal is that constructs the beam that's
4 being described on this?
5
A. I don't know its weight, but ifs a tube. I
6 think it's about a tenth-of-an-inch thick wall. And I
7 believe ifs made out of high-strength steel and it's
8 about one inch, maybe a little over an inch in diameter
9 tube.
r
10
Q. On the last page of Tom Tiede's report dated ^
1 1 January 30,2003, Mr. Tiede says, "The lack of latch
12 bolt deformatioiL" First I will ask you if you agree
13 ' that is there is a lack of latch bolt deformation?
A. No. There is definitely latch bolt
14
15 deformation.
Q, And what is a latch bolt?
16
17
A. A latch bolt are the forks inside a latch that
18 do the latching on the latch pin or the striker pin.
19
Q. Was that the same as both bolts that we talked
20 about earlier?
21
A. Yes.
22
Q. Then Tom Tiede continues, "And the adjacent
2 3 latch body condition, indicates that the driver door
24 latch system had been actuated during the rollover." Do

you agree with that or do you not agree?
A. I disagree that there is no deformation. What
he is trying to say is the lack of deformation on the
adjacent latch body, there is deformation on the latch
body. He goes on to say, he indicates "The driver door
latch system had been actuated during the rollover." I
dont think it's been actuated. I think ifs been
overloaded during the rollover. In other words, I think
actuated — I think he means — I can't tell you what he
means honestly, is it was activated by some of the
activating mechanisms, such as internal rod outside
handle, but it wasn't actuated. It was overloaded
Q. And the next paragraph Mr. Tiede says, "The
outside door handle played no role in the actuation."
Do you agree with that?
A I agree.
Q. It continues a little further in the
paragraph, "The outside handle actuating rod is a
compression design." Do you agree with that?
A. Correct I agree with that
Q. And "It had been displaced in a tensile
fashion during the rollover impact" Do you agree with
that?
A. Don't know whether to agree or disagree on
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that I dont think ifs been displaced. I cant see
how he would get tension out of that.
(WHEREUPON, Deposition Exhibit
Number 369 was marked for
Identification as of this date.)
MR. EMBLEM: Q. I am going to mark only the
front cover page of a booklet that you have in your file
thafs called the "Photographic Log. Clayton versus
Ford." And it has, "Exemplar Vehicle Inspection, 1998
Ford Explorer."
What was the purpose of having an
Exemplar Vehicle Inspection?
A. Actually the first purpose here for this photo
log was to establish the so-called foreshortening of
A-piilar to B-pillar on this particular vehicle.
Q. And you wanted to know what the actual
measurements are of the vehicle that had not been
racked?
A. Correct, not been rolled over.
Q. I want to discuss the photos for a second, if
I can locate them. I didnt have a bound copy of the
Exemplar Vehicle Inspection, did you? I do have some
colored photographs. Is there a way to identify which
photographs showed the measurements that you actually

7 (Pages 22 t o 25)

Exhibit B

2.13

MODEL UTAH JURY INSTRUCTIONS — CIVIL
M U J I 2.13
STATEMENT OF OPINION

An opinion is the expression of a conclusion or judgment which does
not purport to be based on actual knowledge. In determining whether a
particular statement was a statement of fact or merely an expression of
opinion, you may consider the surrounding circumstances under which
it was made, the manner in which the statement was made and the
ordinary effect of the words used. You may also consider the relationship
of the parties and the subject matter with which the statement was
concerned.
References'
BAJI No. 9.51 (1986). Reprinted with permission; copyright © 1986
West
Publishing Company
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DOLORES CLAYTON, et al.

Case No. 000909522

Plaintiffs,

PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION REGARDING
IMPEACHMENT EVIDENCE OF THE
OPINION OF FORDS ENGINEERING
EXPERT THOMAS TIEDE

v.
UTAH AUTO COLLECTION, et al.
Defendants.

Judge Joseph C. Fratto

Plaintiffs respectfully submit the following authority and argument in support of
Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration regarding presenting evidence of Ford engineer Thomas
Tiede's opinion regarding the door latch.

1

J

INTRODUCTION
Ford's limine motion No. 26 to exclude evidence of witnesses not called was previously
granted in a pre-trial motion. According to the Court's statement to the parties' counsel at oral
argument, all motions were ruled on without prejudice of later establishing relevance.

Plaintiffs

move for reconsideration because Ford has made the issue of its expert, Thomas Tiede's door
latch opinions relevant by opening the door in both opening statement and in extensive crossexamination of Plaintiffs' expert David Ingebretsen in front of the jury as to the differences in
Plaintiffs' engineering opinions regarding the door latch. Ford argued to the jury that Plaintiffs
"shopped" around to get another door latch expert opinion as follows:
"Now the interesting part though they had an expert or had an expert Mr. Ingebretsen who
has testified that well what happened here was there was crush of the roof around the
door and it pushed the door kind of bowed the door out and the vertical rod that actuates
the level open in the door latch and that's how the door came open. Well, folks it turns
out that this has an automatic block system so the minute you put get in the vehicle and
put it drive and start driving the doors lock, and door cannot come open, even when
there's that kind of crush. And the vertical rod kind of theory doesn't work. So guess
what? They got another expert. They changed their theory. Instead of the vertical rod
being actuated and the door latch opening now it's a horizontal rod on a different piece.
They kind of ran into some problems and they just got a different expert. And that's
what you're going to hear."
In this case, the Court's pre-trial ruling will allow Ford to make an inference to the jury
that the Plaintiffs were "shopping" for another engineering expert, when Ford itself, has
"shopped around" and previously retained Ford engineering expert, Thomas Tiede to opine on
the door latch and door opening. Tiede did NOT disagree with many aspects of Plaintiffs' door
latch expert, Andrew Gilberg's and David Ingebretsen's testimony. Plaintiffs should be
permitted to cross-examine Ford's new door latch expert, Edward Caufield (as the Court allowed
Ford to do) about the former opinions of Mr. Tiede, a Ford engineer for over 30 years.

">

ARGUMENT
PLAINTIFFS SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO CROSS-EXAMINE FORDS NEW
DOOR LATCH EXPERT, ED CAUFIELD ON THE OPINIONS OF MR.
THOMAS TIEDE.
MUJI 2.13 instructs the jury that it may "consider the surrounding circumstances1' on
which an opinion was made. Utah R. Evid. 703 has broadened the basis for an expert's testimony
by specifying that facts or data used in forming an opinion or inference need not be admissible if
of the type reasonably relied on by experts in the witness1 field of expertise. (Patey v. Lainhart,
1999 UT 31, P30 (Utah 1999).) Utah Evid 705 states:
"The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give reasons therefor without
first testifying to the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise. The
expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on
cross-examination."
In Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp,, 801 P.2d 920, 924 (Utah 1990)
Defendants contend that there were several instances where the trial court's limiting of
cross-examination prevented them from examining the basis of opinions offered by plaintiffs"
experts. The Court held that the defendants were entitled to conduct cross-examination into the
basis of the opinions offered by plaintiffs' expert witnesses and to probe the comparisons they
had made on direct examination. {Ibid,) The Whitehead court remarked:
"Here, defendants were repeatedly cut off during their attempts to cross-examine
plaintiffs' experts. The numerous objections of plaintiffs' counsel, many of which were
improperly sustained, prevented defendants from probing the basis of opinions given by
plaintiffs' experts on comparisons they had made in their direct examination. As a result,
the issues were presented to the jury without the added light that thorough
cross-examination sheds. We find, therefore, that the trial court erred in limiting
defendants' cross-examination of plaintiffs' expert witnesses. The trial court did not limit
those experts to comparisons to utility vehicles on their direct examination. Hence
cross-examination should not have been so restricted."
Here, Mr. Caufield considered ALL of the reports including Tom Tiede's report dated
January 30, 2003, in reaching his conclusion in the case. (Exh A, Depo, pp. 9, 18.) Mr. Tiede

3

said in his report that "both bolts were fully open and had been jammed in place by subsequent
impact." (Exh A, Depo, p. 22.) Ford's new expert, Ed Caufield, disagreed that there was
subsequent impact. (Ibid.) Mr. Tiede said there was a "lack of latch bolt deformation." (Exh A,
Depo, p. 23.) Ford's new expert stated that "there is definitely latch bolt deformation/' (Ibid,)
Mr. Tiede opined that the driver's door latch system had been actuated during the rollover. (Exh
A, Depo, p. 24.) Ford's new expert, Mr. Caufield disagrees the door latch was "actuated," and
contends the latch was "overloaded." (Ibid.)
These differences in Ford's own door latch experts' opinion should be brought out to
present the jury with a fair and complete picture of the party's evidence. Accordingly, Plaintiffs
should not be prohibited from eliciting on cross-examination information reviewed and evaluated
by Ford's new door latch expert, Ed Caufield.
Dated: January 31, 2007.

Matthew H. Raty
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Q. Okay. We have your raw nptes from the file;
is that correct?
A. Correct.
Q. Any measurements that yoij took?
A. Correct.
Q. We have a list of your testimony and
publications?
A. Yes.
Q. And you have record of payments in this case?
A. Yes.
I
Q. I am going to place in frontjof you, but not
mark your C V, in case you to needlreference it. I will
just ask if this is your most recent CV?
A. Yes, it is.
I
Q. On the third page, you note [there in the
publications, ,rNon-published Corporate Reports and
Investigative Studies," Fatigue Analysis?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you learn to do fatigue janalysis while in
college?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you expand upon that \j/hen you went into
practice?
A. Yes.
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1
Q. Have you supplemented your metallurgical
2 education through self-study and experience?
3
A. Yes.
4
Q. The box of materials that we have here beside
5 you, is this your complete file?
6
A. Yes, except for what I have mentioned before
7 with the depositions and the parts.
8S* Q. In the file here, you have some photographs
taken by a Thomas Tiede. Did you consider those in the U
1 (| in reaching your expert opinions in this case?
i
A. 1 considered them as just background. I have
I
1
I
U my own photographs of the subject vehicle and the
1 photographs done by Packer Engineering, I believe it was|[
1 Kevin Vosburgh. I relied primarily on those, but I used If
11
asii
1 Tiede's photographs and everybody else's photographs as
14 far as background.
1 TV. Q. Okay. You also had a copy of Thomas Tiede's
18 report?
19
A. Correct.
20
Q. You had a copy of Andrew Gilbert's report?
21
A. Correct.
22
Q. Did you consider Andrew Gilbert's report —
23
A. Yes.
24
Q. — in forming your opinions?

Page 7

Page 9

Q. Fatigue analysis, is that in aiW way related
to value mode analysis?
i
A. Fracture mode analysis for metals under
continual cycle mode would be fatigue analysis.
Q. And what about failure modje analysis, do you
go in and look at metal things that have broken?
A. Yes.
Q. To determine how they are broken?
A. Yes.
j
Q. Does that involve any component of metallurgy?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you take metallurgy in college?
A. Yes.
Q. Was that a part of your engineering studies?
A. Yes.
Q. Is that part of a typical engineering
curriculum at the university of where you attended?
A. No, I don't believe so. I think if you took a
degree in general engineering you might not have any
metallurgic engineering course work.
Q. Is it related to general engineering? Would
metallurgy be an elective as opposed to a required
subject?
A. It could be.

1
A. Yes.
2
Q. Did you consider Tom Tiede's report in forming
3 your opinions?
4
A. I read all the reports. I considered them,
5 yes.
6
(WHEREUPON, Deposition Exhibit
7
Number 367 was marked for
8
Identification as of this date.)
9
Q. I am going to place an exhibit that's been
10 marked as 367 in front of you. It's identified as
11 the "Edward M. Caulfield Testimony Record?"
12
A. Correct.
13
Q. Is this record up-to-date?
14
A. No, it only goes up to September 21 st. I have
15 had cases since then. Let me check that.
16
MR. LARSEN: Is this Exhibit 368?
17
MR. EMBLEM: 367.
18
MR. LARSEN: Did I do something wrong with the
19 exhibits? Maybe I have them wrong. I thought we
20 started with 366.
21
MR. EMBLEM: We did.
22
MR. LARSEN: With the notice.
23
MR. EMBLEM: I didn't mark the C V 24
MR. LARSEN: Oh, okay.
»^-j»* J!!MJ^*W
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I

Q. A report dated January 30,2003?
A 1
A. Yes.
1 2
0 You considered this report in reaching your
1 3
opinions in this case?
1 4
A. Yes.
1 5
Q. Mr. Tiede, in his report, indicates that he
1 6
visited the vehicle in West Shore, Utah on July 15,
1 7
2002. Did you obtain the photographs that he took at
1 8
that time?
I 9
A. Yes
J 10
Q And as you said earlier, you looked at those.
J 11
And because you looked at them, you did consider them in J 12
some respect?
1 13
A. I have looked at all the photos.
J 14
Q. Mr. Tiede reports in the lower paragraph,
15
about the fifth line up from the bottom, he said, "I
16
have designed many of the components and sub-systems
17
associated with door latches." Have you designed any
18
door latches?
19
A. I haven't designed any for manufacturers. I
20
have analyzed a lot of them but never designed them.
21
Q. Mr. Tiede says that his experience began
| 22
working at Ford Motor Company and that he worked there 2 3
in the design analysis department. Did you ever work
24
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for Ford or Ford Motor Company?
A. No. Only as a consultant.
Q. Mr. Tiede says on the second page, Inspection
Section, second line, it says, "The vehicle had
experienced severe impact to the driver roof side rail
during the rollover." Is that the fact? First of all,
do you agree with the fact?
A. I would agree with that.
Q. Is that fact important?
A. It should be rollovers, though there is more
than one. So I would just change that to S.
Q. Is the fact that the driver's roof side rail
received severe impact, and as you say, perhaps more
than one, is that important to the door latch issue in
this case where the door ~ first, do you agree that the
door unintentionally opened in the Clayton case?
MR. LARSEN: Objection, vague.
THE WITNESS: I would agree the door opened,
you know, due to overload of the latch number. I would
say the fact that we have tremendous forces going on in
the vehicle to cause that type of overloading is an
important factor. But it's not so much how the
components of the vehicle loaded the door. It's the
forces going on in the vehicle that cause occupant
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\
forces, et cetera.
r
I guess I could clear it up. I don't see
[
roof crush — the fact that the roof is crushing or has
1
been severely impacted as one of the main contributions [
to the door opening. Do you see what I'm saying?
I
Q. Do you agree with the term that it's an
[
unintentional door opening?
f
A. It wasn't activated by the handle. I agree
|
with that
|
Q. Wasn't activated by the handle?
r
A. There was nobody that pulled on the handle.
[
Q. Do you agree that Ford specifically designs
|
these doors to stay closed in accidents?
L
A. They try to design them that way. But it's a
j
fact of life that everything has an overload value. The [
intention is to keep it closed for reasonable forces.
|
Q. Sure. So would you then agree that if it
|
opens during an accident, that that would be an
|
unintentional event?
l
A. Yeah. I have put all unintentional events
F
into the category. It wasn't activated by one of the
1
handles, yes.
r
Q. The next line, Mr. Tiede reports, "The
F
windshield header was caused to deform upward as the |
Page 21 I
A-pillar and roof side rail were driven downward " Do t
you agree with the fact that the A-pillar and roof side
\
rail were driven downward?
f
A. I would agree with that.
fc
Q. Is that important to the analysis of how this
L
door unintentionally opened?
1
A. If you drive down the header and it does
r
separate from the frame on the window, that can cause f
some component loading on the latch because the two are j
trying to move in different directions. It's a factor
r
but not, as I see it, a major factor.
|
Q, The next line, Mr. Tiede reports, "The
1
B-pillar was bowed outward by this same impact
c
mechanism." Do you agree with that statement?
f
A. I agree with that.
f
Q. Is the fact that the B-pillar bowed out by the
t
same impact mechanism, is that important to the analysis I
of how this door opened unintentionally?
|
A. If the B-pillar bows out, the door will bow
|
out with it. So the two will stay together. So as far
|
as latch loading is concerned, I would say no as far as
|
the B-pillar bowing out.
[
Q. The next paragraph Mr. Tiede reports, "The
1
driver door latch was found in a fully open position."
[
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Was it still in the fully opened position when you
inspected the vehicle?
A. I don't know what he means, fully opened. I
don't think it's fully opened. It looks like it's been
crushed back into the vehicle, folded in half. But I
will agree it is open.
Q. The next sentence that he says, "Both bolts
were fully open and had been jammed in place by
subsequent impact." 1 think that's what you were just
saying about subsequent impact. What does he mean when
he says "Both bolts were fully open?"
MR. LARSEN: Objection, fully open.
MR. EMBLEM: If you know.
A. What he means there is he means what I would
call forks or some people call fork bolts. And those
are the components inside the latch that do the
latching. And both bolts were fully opened and are
jammed, I disagree that thereby subsequent impact.
Q. In the last sentence of that paragraph he
says, Mr. Tiede says, "The vehicle has a tubular steel
side beam structure in the door." I will stop right
there. Is that the way you would describe the side beam
structures or tubular steel side beam structures?
A. It is tubular and ifs the side protection

Page 2^
\
1 you agree with that or do you not agree?
2
A. I disagree that there is no deformation. What
3 he is trying to say is the lack of deformation on the
4 adjacent latch body, there is deformation on the latch
5 body. He goes on to say, he indicates "The driver door
or 11
6 latch system had been actuated during the rollover."
7 don't think it's been actuated. I think ifs been
8 overloaded during the rollover. In other words, I think
9 actuated — I think he means - I can't tell you what he
1 0 means honestly, is it was activated by some o f the
1 1 activating mechanisms, such as internal rod outside
1 2 handle, but it wasn't actuated. It was overloaded.
13
Q. And the next paragraph Mr. Tiede says, "The
1 4 outside door handle played no role in the actuation."
1 5 D o you agree with that?
16
A. I agree.
17
Q. It continues a little further in the
1 8 paragraph, "The outside handle actuating rod is a
19 compression design." Do you agree with that?
20
A. Correct. I agree with that.
21
Q. And "It had been displaced in a tensile
2 2 fashion during the rollover impact." Do you agree with
2 3 that?
24
A. Don't know whether to agree or disagree on

Page 2 3
1 beam, and I agree it's in the door.
2
Q. D o you know what weight or gauge or thickness
3 o f the sheet metal is that constructs the beam that's
4 being described on this?
5
A. I don't know its weight, but ifs a tube. I
6 think it's about a tenth-of-an-inch thick wall. And I
7 believe it's made out o f high-strength steel and it's
8 about one inch, maybe a little over an inch in diameter
9 tube.
L0
Q. On the last page o f Tom Tiede's report dated
L1 January 30, 2003, Mr. Tiede says, "The lack o f latch
L 2 bolt deformation." First I will ask you if you agree
L 3 that is there is a lack o f latch bolt deformation?
L4
A. No. There is definitely latch bolt
L 5 deformation.
L6
Q. And what is a latch bolt?
L7
A. A latch bolt are the forks inside a latch that
L 8 d o the latching on the latch pin or the striker pin.
L9
Q. Was that the same as both bolts that we talked
y
- 0 about earlier?
>1
A. Yes.
?
- ?f*
Q. Then Tom Tiede continues, "And the adjacent
y
- f latch body condition, indicates that the driver door
? f latch system had been actuated during the rollover." D o
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that. I don't think it's been displaced. I can't see
how he would get tension out o f that.
(WHEREUPON, Deposition Exhibit
Number 369 was marked for
Identification as o f this date.)
MR. EMBLEM: Q. I am going to mark only the
front cover page of a booklet that you have in your fde
that's called the "Photographic Log. Clayton versus
Ford." And it has, "Exemplar Vehicle Inspection, 1998
Ford Explorer."
What was the purpose o f having an
Exemplar Vehicle Inspection?
A. Actually the first purpose here for this photo
log was to establish the so-called foreshortening o f
A-pillar to B-pillar on this particular vehicle.
Q. And you wanted to know what the actual
measurements are of the vehicle that had not been
lacked?
A. Correct, not been rolled over.
Q. I want to discuss the photos for a second, if
I can locate them. I didn't have a bound copy of the
Exemplar Vehicle Inspection, did you? I do have some
colored photographs. Is there a way to identify which
photographs showed the measurements that you actually
7
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MR. EMBLEM: We'll mark the rod as 316B. And
we'll move for those exhibits strictly for demonstration
purposes.
MR. LARSEN: No objection to being used for
demonstrative purposes.
THE COURT: So we have 316 and 316A and 316B?
There's no objection?
MR. LARSEN: For them being used for
demonstrative purposes.
THE COURT: For that purpose then they are
received.
Q (BY MR. EMBLEM) And the only thing that we
haven't looked at yet is the pin, the latch pin; is that
correct?
A As far as the inside handle system goes, yes.
Q And do you also have an outside handle?
A Yes, I brought one of those along as well.
Q Does the outside handle factor in in any way to
the reasons that the latch failed, if it failed in this
case?
A Not in my opinion? 1 think Mr. Ingebretsen had
a theory related to the outside handle and how that may
have caused the unwanted opening.
Q I see. Did you determine that one theory
predominated based upon the forensic evidence over the
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original VIN number is here, manufactured 01/97.
Q So this door is exactly like the Clayton door
before the crash?
A Except for the color.
Q Okay, proceed. What are you going to show us?
MR. LARSEN: I'd rather go by question and
answer and j ust proceed.
THE COURT: I think we should proceed by
question and answer.
Q (BY MR. EMBLEM) Explain first to us what you
want to demonstrate for the jury, and with permission
we'll do the demonstration.
A First of all, the door demonstrates how the
latch operates normally. And with the Court's permission
I would just like to repeat the demonstration I did
holding the latch out in the air, just to show it
functions the way it's supposed to.
THE COURT: Well, it's a question-and-answer
format. Let mr. Emblem ask the questions. Go head.
Q (BY MR. EMBLEM) Mr. Gilberg, would you please
demonstrate how the door operates in its unmodified
condition as we see here Exhibit No. 317?
A Yes, sir. First of all, to make this a little
more compact, what we've done is mount the striker bolt,
which is here on the latch, on a spring-loaded plunger, so
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other?
A Not only with forensic evidence, but also
knowledge of how the system works.
Q What is your conclusion as to which methodology
opened this latch during this event?
A It's my opinion that the inside handle system is
the source of the unwanted door opening. And I built some
exemplar doors to demonstrate how I think that happened.
Q Is this a good time to demonstrate those doors?
A As good as any.
MR. EMBLEM: Okay. The doors have been marked
for identification purposes and for demonstrative purposes
only as 317, an unmodified door, and 318, a modified door.
We would move those for that purpose.
THE COURT: Any objection?
MR. LARSEN: No objection to them being used for
demonstrative purposes.
Q (BY MR. EMBLEM) Mr. Gilberg, if you step down,
I'll assist you. Should we start with the unmodified
door, 317?
A I think that would be best.
Q Before we go any further in the demonstration,
can you explain what this door is? Is this a 1997
Explorer door?
A This is a 1997 Ford Explorer driver's door. The
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that when I open up the handle the striker bolt moves
instead of the door. But the latch and door operate as
normal.
Q Maybe when we do this you can turn it and show
it to the THE COURT: It's not necessary to do that.
THE WITNESS: Okay. And so we have the outside
handle control. Lifting the outside handle causes the rod
to push down a release lever inside the door and trigger
the release on the latch. (Demonstrating.)
There's also the inside handle that I showed you
earlier. Same situation. If I pull this handle, it
causes the latch to release by giving the lever on the
latch a push. (Demonstrating.) So those are the two ways
that the door operates normally.
Now, if I lock the door and lift up on the
outside handle, nothing happens. But, remember, we talked
about override locking. If I pull on the inside handle
now, it first unlocks the latch and causes the latch to
release. (Demonstrating.) And that creates the situation
that I feel is responsible for the unwanted opening.
MR. LARSEN: Objection, narrative.
Q (BY MR. EMBLEM) Does this create the situation
that you feel caused the unwanted door opening in this
case?
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A Yes, sir.
Q How far does the push rod have to move to
|
release the latch?
A It's on the order of a half an inch. It depends
I
on adjustments inside the door, upon sheet metal variation
between where the handle mounts and where the latch
|
mounts, but it's approximately a half inch.
J
Q Is there a little bit of tolerance say in the
manufacture of a door like this in the manufacturing
|
process, do you know?
I
A There's tolerance in the manufacture of
everything.
Q What does that mean?
A There's always going to be — for example, if
you're stamping a part on a steel die, stamping a steel
part, and you do it a hundred times, the first part and
100th part are going to look very much alike, but they
won't be identical.
Q Is that due to what?
A Could be due to all kinds of things, like wear,
properties of the materials involved, free play in
machinery that punches holes in the steel.
Q Is that the reason there are adjustments
available within the system, so that you can adjust these
latches to fit to deal with those tolerances or those
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Q We've talked a little bit about how the door
should operate, the latch should operate, assuming
everything is okay. We've also created an exhibit. First
let me ask you: What went wrong with the Clayton vehicle?
I
MR. LARSEN: Objection, vague.
Q (BY MR. EMBLEM) If you have an opinion on that.
THE COURT: Overruled.
Q (BY MR. EMBLEM) Did something go wrong with the
Clayton vehicle that caused the door to come open?
A In my opinion, yes, something went wrong.
I
Q What is it that went wrong?
A The door was subjected to crushing, endwise
I
crushing or longitudinal crushing. And that caused the
I
handle to give this rod a push, and that caused the latch
I
to release. And we designed this exhibit to demonstrate
j
how that happens.
I
MR. EMBLEM: Permission to do the demonstration?
r
THE COURT: This is the other door?
MR. EMBLEM: He's going to show it here. Please
explain to the judge what you're going to demonstrate.
I
THE COURT: Keeping in mind that of course we
I
have a record here that doesn't capture on video what we:
|
have here. We need to refer to these by their number.
I
MR. EMBLEM: Exhibit 317.
THE WITNESS: I've already demonstrated how this
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differences?
A Yes, that's why there's some free play in the
system, and why there's some adj ustability in the system.
Q Is there a particular name for the adjustment
component of rod that operates the door latch in a case
like this? Is it a clip? Or what is it?
A Well, in the case of the inside handle link, the
free play is positioned in this lever. It's contained
within this lever. So there's kind of a range of motion
available to it where nothing happens.
THE COURT: You're referring to which exhibit?
THE WITNESS: I'm referring to Exhibit 316. And
I'm wiggling the inside handle release lever.
Q (BY MR. EMBLEM) And that adjustment, is there
such a thing as a Mazda clip? Is that a factor to this?
A The outside handle lever has what's called a
Mazda clip, and that has like a threaded body to it. The
rod that inserts in here has a thread on it and you can
adjust it up and down. And you clip it like that so it's
secure.
Q Do you have enough knowledge of the
manufacturing process of Ford to say whether those
adjustments are done by machine or by human?
A The assembly of the door, at least of the
Explorer, is done by human.
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door can open through the normal mechanism in it, and
I
that's the way you want it to open. There's another way
I
it can open, and that's through crushing from this
|
direction. What we've done to demonstrate that is we've
I
made a cut in the door panel that surrounds the handle and I
comes out here. So there's — the inner door panel is now
two pieces.
And the reason we did this cut is because if I
I
was Charles Atlas I might be able to demonstrate it one
I
time, but that would be the only time we would be able to
I
demonstrate it, because you would bend the sheet metal and I
it wouldn't recover. So what we've done is make some
accommodations for the fact that I'm not strong enougji to
repeatedly bend this thing, and also it won't recover
I
afterldothat.
|
So let me demonstrate what happens in a
V
collision whereby the door is crushed in between the A
I
pillar and B pillar. (Demonstrating.) What did I do? I
I
just moved the handle about 5/8thsofan inch towards; the
j;
latch. And you might be able to pick that up by looking
|
at the handle when I operate this lever. (Demonstrating.)
v
And what this simulates is collapse of the door in this
[
region of about half an inch.
p
Q (BY MR. EMBLEM) Maybe we could turn it around I
so the judge could see it.
J
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incremental damage that accrues over a distance — a
distance and a time that should be survivable by the
occupants.
Q. So if s — is it true — or let me ask you,
what is the ~ if a person is contained as opposed to
ejected, is he more likely to live or not live? I
mean, is it more likely that he'll live if he's
contained?
MR. LARSEN: Objection, foundation.
THE COURT: Sustained.
Q. (By Mr. Emblem) Do you have a basis upon
which to explain to the jury the reasons, either
statistical or otherwise, why containment is important
to survivability?
A. Yes.
Q. What is that?
A. Well, there are a number of, of both public
and, and in-house records related to Ford that say as
much. I brought a, an advertisement from a 1956 Ford
that references that.
Q. Okay. That was a public statement by Ford
regarding containment is better for the occupant than
ejection?
MR. LARSEN: Objection, facts not in
evidence, and leading.
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an exhibit. It's untimely.
THE COURT: Let me have you come to the.
MR. EMBLEM: Uh-huh (affirmative.)
(A private bench conference was held on the
record.)
Q. (By Mr. Emblem) Concerning the opinions
which you have expressed regarding the, the facts of
this 1997 Explorer, do you hold that opinion to a
reasonable degree of engineering certainty?
A Yes, I do.
Q. Is it your opinion that it is defective and
unreasonably dangerous to drivers and passengers?
MR. LARSEN: Objection, leading.
THE COURT: Sustained.
Q. (By Mr. Emblem) What is your opinion
concerning the reasonable degree of danger to drivers
and occupants?
A. As I stated in my report, I think it's, it's
unreasonably dangerous to both drivers and passengers.
Occupants of vehicles. And it's beyond the
contemplation of, of the consumer.
Q. Now, we talked about one other reasonable
alternative, and that was the cable release system as
you demonstrated with your exhibits, right?
A. Yes.
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THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. EMBLEM: Let me have that 1956 Ford
exhibit.
Q. (By Mr. Emblem) While I'm pulling the
exhibit, Mr. Gilberg, you just testified that you have
a foundation based upon your education, experience,
and background to make the statement that containment
is better for survivability than ejection, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Did I restate that correctly? I want to show
you an exhibit that's been marked as 388-B.
THE COURT: Thank you.
Q. (By Mr. Emblem) I'll ask you what that
document is that you are looking at. Without
describing the content, just tell us what it is.
A. It's part of a leaflet that was passed out by
Ford dealers in 1956. And it represents some of the
things that were told to consumers in that year about
door latches and the importance of them.
Q. Okay.
MR. LARSEN: Objection your Honor.
MR. EMBLEM: T h e MR. LARSEN: This document that they're
laying foundation for was never disclosed. Not
even - not until just today. Pretrial disclosures as
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Q. I want to show you a document that's been
marked as 346. And I'll ask you what that is without
disclosing the contents, please.
A. Thank you. This is a United States patent.
Q. What is the patent concerning?
A. The title is "Latch Actuating Means."
Q. And it bears what date, sir?
A. It was filed in June of 1963, and granted in
August of 1965.
Q. Does this document represent a reasonable
alternative design which would have made the 1997 Ford
Explorer door system safe, in your view?
MR. LARSEN: Objection, leading.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: I don't know whether it would
have made the Explorer safe. It certainly shows that
Mr. Priest - Priestman, who was the applicant, was
considering the specific problem we were — which
caused the unwanted door opening in this accident.
So it gives a, a feel for the, the amount of
time that the engineer ~
MR. LARSEN: Objection, nonresponsive.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. EMBLEM: Okay. Your Honor, plaintiffs
would move this exhibit. Whafs the number?

mmsmi^^^mmmmm^m^!imm^^>m^msmmmmmm!mmf
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FILEQ DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

FEB 0 8 2007
SALT LAKE

By.

THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DOLORES CLAYTON, et al.

Case No. 000909522

Plaintiffs,

PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED SPECIAL
VERDICT FORM

v.
FORD MOTOR COMPANY

Judge Joseph C. Fratto
Defendants.

MEMBERS OF THE JURY:
Except as otherwise instructed, please answer the following questions from a
preponderance of the evidence. If you find the evidence preponderates in favor of the
issue presented, answer "Yes." If you find the evidence is so equally balanced that you
cannot determine a preponderance of the evidence, of if you find that the evidence
preponderates against the issue presented, answer "No."
We, the jury, answer the questions submitted to us as follows:
1.

At the time the 1997 Explorer was sold was the safety (anti) sway bar link
defective?
Yes

No

If you answered YES, was the defect a proximate cause of
Tony Clayton's death?
Yes

No

If you answered YES, was the defect a proximate cause of
Kellie Montoya's injuries?
Yes

2.

No

At the time the 1997 Explorer was sold did it have a defect in its front
suspension geometry in the area in which the steering and sway bar must
operate, that allowed metal to metal contact leading to reverse bending of
the tie rod and breaking of the tie rod?
Yes

No

If you answered YES, was the defect a proximate cause of
Tony Clayton's death?

Yes

No

If you answered YES, was the defect a proximate cause of
Kellie Montoya's injuries?

Yes

3.

No

At the time the 1997 Explorer was sold did it have a defect in its overall
stability because it did not have a sufficient margin of safety?
Yes

No
If you answered YES, was the defect a proximate cause of
Tony Clayton's death?
Yes

No

If you answered YES, was the defect a proximate cause of Kellie
Montoya's injuries?
Yes

No

At the time the 1997 Explorer was sold was the door frame, including the A
and B pillars and roof rail, defective in that they did not protect the door
from opening?
Yes

No

If you answered YES, was the defect a proximate cause of
Tony Clayton's death?

Yes

No

At the time the 1997 Explorer was sold was the door-latch rod operating
system defective in that it did not prevent the door from opening?

Yes

No

If you answered YES, was the defect a proximate cause of
Tony Clayton's death?
Yes

No

At the time the 1997 Explorer was sold did Ford fail to adequately warn
Tony Clayton and Fred Clayton about a substantial danger that would not
have been recognized by the ordinary consumer related to the sway bar
link?
Yes

No

If you answered YES, was the failure to adequately warn a
proximate cause of Tony Clayton's death?
Yes

No

If you answered YES, was the failure to adequately warn a
proximate cause of Kellie Montoya's injuries?
Yes
7.

No

At the time the 1997 Explorer was sold did Ford fail to adequately warn
Tony Clayton and Fred Clayton about a substantial danger that would not
have been recognized by the ordinary consumer its front suspension
geometry?
Yes

No
If you answered YES, was the failure to adequately warn a
proximate cause of Tony Clayton's death?
Yes
No

If you answered YES, was the failure to adequately warn a
proximate cause of Kellie Montoya's injuries?
Yes

8.

No

At the time the 1997 Explorer was sold did Ford fail to adequately warn
Tony Clayton and Fred Clayton about a substantial danger that would not
have been recognized by the ordinary consumer related to the inadequate
margin of stability?
Yes

No
If you answered YES, was the failure to adequately warn a
proximate cause of Tony Clayton's death?
Yes

No

If you answered YES, was the failure to adequately warn a
proximate cause of Kellie Montoya's injuries?
Yes

No

At the time the 1997 Explorer was sold did Ford fail to adequately warn
Tony Clayton and Fred Clayton about a substantial danger that would not
have been recognized by the ordinary consumer related to the A and B
pillars and the Explorer door frame?
Yes
•

No
If you answered YES, was the failure to adequately warn a
proximate cause of Tony Clayton's death?
Yes

No

At the time the 1997 Explorer was sold did Ford fail to adequately warn
Tony Clayton and Fred Clayton about a substantial danger that would not
have been recognized by the ordinary consumer related to the door-latch rod
operating system?
Yes

No
If you answered YES, was the failure to adequately warn a
proximate cause of Tony Clayton's death?
Yes

No

Was Ford negligent in designing the 1997 Explorer:
A.

The safety (anti) sway bar link design?
Yes

B.

The front suspension geometry design?
Yes

C.

No

No

The inadequate margin of stability design?

Yes
D.

No

The design of the A & B Pillars and the roof rail?
Yes

E.

No

The door operating rod system?
•

If you answered YES, was the failure to adequately warn a
proximate cause of Tony Clayton's death?
Yes

No

If you answered YES, was the failure to adequately warn a
proximate cause of Kellie Montoya's injuries?
Yes

No

Do you find that Tony Clayton is comparatively at fault for the cause of the
crash?
Yes

No

If "Yes, consider that 100 percent amounts to all of the fault
in the crash. How much do you assign? [The Total must add
up to 100 %]
To Ford?

%

To Tony Clayton?

%

Did Ford breach an express warranty to the Plaintiffs?
Yes

No

If you answered YES, was the breach a proximate cause of
Tony Clayton's death?
Yes

No

14.

Did Ford breach an express warranty to the Plaintiffs?
Yes
•

No

If you answered YES, was the breach a proximate cause of
Tony Clayton's death?
Yes

•

If you answered YES, was the beach a proximate cause of
Tony Clayton's death?
Yes

15.

No

Do you find by {clear and convincing) evidence that Ford acted with a
knowing and reckless disregard for the safety of Tony Clayton?
Yes

1*7.

No

Do you find that Kellie Montoya timely filed her lawsuit against Ford?
Yes

16.

No

No

Do you find by {clear and convincing) evidence that Ford acted with a
knowing and reckless disregard for the safety of Kellie Montoya?
Yes

Signed:

No

Dated:
Presiding Juror

After this Verdict Form has been answered and completed, please sign and date,
and deliver this verdict form to the Court's Bailiff.
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Tim O'Neill (Pro Hac Vice)
Dan R. Larsen (4865)
Kimberly Neville (9067)
Snell & Wilmer L.L.P.
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1004
Telephone: (801)257-1900
Facsimile: (801)257-1800
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Attorneys for Ford Motor Company

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DEE CLAYTON, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

FORD MOTOR COMPANY'S PROPOSED
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM
REGARDING LIABILITY

v.
Case No. 000909522
UTAH AUTO COLLECTION, et al.,

Judge Joseph C. Fratto

Defendants.
Defendant Ford Motor Company respectfully submits the following proposed special
verdict form regarding liability for the Court's consideration.
DATED this Q "flay of February, 2007.
Snell & Wilmer L.L.P.

Tim O'Neill
Dan R. Larsen
Kimberly Neville
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DEE CLAYTON, et al.,

SPECIAL VERDICT

Plaintiffs,
Case No. 000909522
v.

Judge Joseph C. Fratto

UTAH AUTO COLLECTION, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMBERS OF THE JURY:
Please answer the following questions from a preponderance of the evidence. If you find
the evidence preponderates in favor of the issue presented, answer "Yes." If you find the
evidence is so equally balanced that you cannot determine a preponderance of the evidence, or if
you find that the evidence preponderates against the issue presented, answer "No." At least six
jurors must agree on the answer to each question, but they need not be the same six on each
question.
L

DEFECT

1.

Was the subject 1997 Ford Explorer defective and unreasonably dangerous?
Yes

No

If you answered "No" to Question No. 1, skip to Question No. 7. If you answered
Yes" to Question No. 1, move on to Question Nos. 2 and 3.

44

2.

If you answered "Yes" to Question 1, please identity the nature of the defect in the 1997
Ford Explorer:

3.

Was the defect in the vehicle a proximate cause of Plaintiffs' injuries?
Yes

No

If you answered "No" to Question No. 3, skip to Question No. 7. If you answered
"Yes" to Question No. 3, move on to Question No. 4

1

II.

NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
Only answer this question if you answered "Yes" to Question No. 3.

4.

Did Defendant Ford Motor Company negligently inflict emotional distress upon Plaintiff
Kellie Montoya?
Yes

No

III.

COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE

5.

Considering all of the evidence, was Tony Clayton negligent, in any way, for causing the
accident and plaintiffs' injuries?
Yes

6.

No

Assuming the combined fault of everyone involved in causing the accident must total
100%, you must determine the percentage of fault attributed to each responsible party.
Tony Clayton

%

Ford Motor Company

%

Total:

100 %

IV.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

1.

Please identify the date upon which a reasonable person knew, or through the exercise of
reasonable diligence should have discovered, both the nature of his/her injuries and the
cause?
'
Date

V.

PUNITIVE FINDING

8.

Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of Ford's office
or managing agent were a result of willful and malicious conduct, or conduct that
manifested a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of the rights of,
plaintiffs and that punitive damages should be assessed against Ford?
Yes

Dated this _ day of

No

, 2007.

Foreperson

2
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
Case No. 000909522

DOLORES CLAYTON, et al.

SPECIAL VERDICT FORM

Plaintiffs,
v.
FORD MOTOR COMPANY

Judge Joseph C. Fratto

Defendants.

MEMBERS OF THE JURY:
Except as otherwise instructed, please answer the following questions from a
preponderance of the evidence. If you find the evidence preponderates in favor of the
issue presented, answer "Yes." If you find the evidence is so equally balanced that you
cannot determine a preponderance of the evidence, of if you find that the evidence
preponderates against the issue presented, answer ccNo."
We, the jury, answer the questions submitted to us as follows:
1.

When the Explorer was sold, was it in a defective condition, unreasonably
dangerous to the Plaintiffs?
Yes

No

2.

If you answered Question 1 "Yes/5 then answer the following questions:
Was such defective condition a proximate cause of Tony Clayton's death?
Yes

No

Was such defective condition a proximate cause of Kellie Montoya's
injuries?
Yes
3-

Was Ford Motor Company negligent in the design of the 1997 Explorer?

Yes
4.

No

No

If your answer to Question 3 is "Yes/ 5 answer the following questions:
Was the negligence of Ford Motor Company a proximate cause of Tony
Clayton's death?
Yes

No

Was the negligence of Ford Motor Company a proximate cause of Kellie
Montoya's injuries?
Yes
5,

No

Did Ford Motor Company fail to warn the Plaintiffs of a defective condition
in the 1997 Explorer?
Yes

No

Was the failure to warn a proximate cause of Tony Clayton's death?
Yes

No

Was the failure to warn a proximate cause of Kellie Montoya's injuries?
6.

Did Ford Motor Company breach a warranty to the Plaintiffs that the
Explorer was fit for its intended purposes?
Yes

No

If your answer to Question 6 is "Yes," answer the following questions:
Was the breach of warranty a proximate cause of Tony Clayton's death?

Yes

No

Was the breach of warranty a proximate cause of Kellie Montoya's
injuries?

Yes

No

If you found the Explorer defective and that such defective condition
caused Kellie Montoya's injuries, did Ford Motor Company negligently
inflict emotional distress upon Plaintiff Kellie Montoya?
Yes

No

Considering all of the evidence, was Tony Clayton negligent for causing the
rollover and plaintiffs' injuries?

Yes

No

If you answered Question 9 "Yes," and find Tony Clayton was negligent,
assuming the combined fault of the parties involved in causing the accident
must total 100%, you must determine the percentage of fault attributable to
each party at fault:
Tony Clayton was

Ford Motor Company was
[Total must equal 100%]

% at fault.

% at fault.

11.

What is the date Kellie Montoya knew or through the exercise of reasonable
diligence, should have discovered any harm and the cause?
Date:

12.

Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that Ford Motor Company
acted with knowing and reckless indifference toward the safety and rights
of the Plaintiffs?
Yes

Signed:

No

Dated:
Presiding Juror

After this Verdict Form has been answered and completed, please sign and date,
and deliver this verdict form to the Court's Bailiff
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT hXftfc ^OUMTI
STATE OF UTAH
DEE CLAYTON, et aL,

SPECIAL*rERDICT

Plaintiffs,
Case No. 000909522
v.

Judge Joseph C. Fratto

FORD MOTOR COMPANY
Defendants.
MEMBERS OF THE JURY:
Unless otherwise indicated, please answer the following questions from a preponderance
of the evidence. If you find the evidence preponderates in favor of the issue presented, answer
"Yes." If you find the evidence is so equally balanced that you cannot determine a
preponderance of the evidence, or if you find that the evidence preponderates against the issue
presented, answer "No." At least six jurors must agree on the answer to each question, but they
need not be the same six on each question.
L

When the subject 1997 Ford Explorer left Ford Motor Company was it in a defective
condition, unreasonably dangerous to the plaintiffs?
Yes

No

^

If you answered "No" to Question No. 1, skip to Question No. 11. If you answered
"Yes" to Question No. 1, move on to Question No. 2.
Was this defect the proximate cause of the accident and Tony Clayton's injuries?
Yes

No

Was this defect the proximate cause of the accident and Kellie Montoya's injuries?
Yes

No

1

4.

Was the subject 1997 Ford Explorer reasonably suitable for the purpose for which it is
ordinarily used?
Yes

No

If >ou answered "No" to Question No, 4, skip to Question No. 7. If you answered
"Yes" to Question No. 4, move on to Question No. 5.
5.

If you found that that the subject 1997 Explorer was not reasonably suitable for the
purpose for which it is ordinarily used, was this condition the proximate cause of the
accident and Tony Clayton's injuries9
Yes

6.

If you found that that the subject 1997 Explorer was not reasonably suitable for the
purpose for which it is ordinarily used, was this condition the proximate cause of the
accident and Kelhe Montoya's injuries?
Yes

7.

No

Did Defendant Ford Motor Company negligently inflict emotional distress upon Plaintiff
Kelhe Montoya?
Yes

8.

No

No

Considering all of the evidence, was Tony Clayton negligent?
Yes

No

If you answered "No" to Question No. 8, skip to Question No. 11. If you answered
"Yes" to Question No. 8, move on to Question No. 9.
9.

If your answer to Question 8 is "Yes", answer the following question Was Tony
Clayton's negligence a proximate cause of the accident and the injuries suffered by the
Plaintiffs?
Yes

No

If you answered "No" to Question No. 9, skip to Question No. 11. If you answered
"Yes" to Question No. 9, move on to Question No. 10.
10.

Assuming the combined fault of the parties in causing the accident and injuries to total
100%, what percentage of fault do you attribute to:
Tony Clayton

%

Ford Motor Company

%

Total:

100 %

11.

Please identify the date upon which Kellie Montoya knew, or through the exercise of
reasonable diligence should have discovered, both her harm and its cause:

Date: j^^^^^ol^fZ^

3

If you answered "No" to Question No. 1, stop here, and sign and date this verdict.
Do not answer Question No. 12. If you answered "Yes" to Question No. 1, proceed
to Question 12.
12.

Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that Ford acted with a knowing and
reckless indifference toward and a disregard of the safety and rights of the Plaintiffs?
Yes
Dated this ^/ day of

No
F ^ b r t ^ ^ A u - , 2007.

Foreperson

i
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INSTRUCTION NO. 2fk_

A manufacturer of a product that is in a defective and unreasonably dangerous
condition for its anticipated or reasonably foreseeable use is liable for damages resulting
from physical harm to the ultimate user or consumer, or to the user's or consumer's
property, provided:
1.
At the time the product was sold by the manufacturer or other initial seller,
there was a defect or defective condition in the product, which made the product
unreasonably dangerous, that is, dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be
contemplated by the ordinary and prudent buyer, consumer or user of that product in the
community, considering the product's characteristics, propensities, risks, dangers and uses
together with any actual knowledge, training or experience possessed by the particular
buyer, user or consumer; and
2.
The manufacturer, wholesaler, retailer or distributor is engaged in the
business of selling the product.
One who manufactures or sells a defective and unreasonably dangerous product is
liable for injury and damage to the ultimate user or consumer under the above
circumstances even though:
1.
The product manufacturer or seller who placed the product in the stream of
commerce has exercised reasonable, or the utmost, care in the manufacture and/or
inspection of the product; and
2.
The user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the product manufacturer or seller.

INSTRUCTION NO

.,21

A product is defective in design:
1.
If it fails to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer or user would expect
when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner; or
2.
If there is a risk of danger inherent in the design which outweighs the
benefits of that design.
In determining whether the benefits of the design outweigh the risks to which the
product exposes the consumer or user, you may consider, among other things:
1.
2.
damage;

The gravity of danger posed by the design;
The likelihood that such danger posed by the design would cause injury or

3.
The usefulness and desirability of the product to the consumer or user and
the public in general;
4.
The availability of a substitute product that would serve the same function
but would not be as dangerous;
5.
The ease or difficulty with which the unsafe character of the product could
be eliminated without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its
utility; and
6.
The adverse consequences to the product and the consumer that would
result from an alternate design.

INSTRUCTION NO. 27

The manufacturer has a duty to design and manufacture a product to eliminate any
unreasonable risk of foreseeable injury.
However, there is no duty to make a safe product safer. A manufacturer has no duty
to refrain from marketing a non-defective product when a safer model is available, or to
inform the consumer of the availability of the safer model.

INSTRUCTION NO. J O
The law provides that any person in a motor vehicle on a public highway shall keep a
proper lookout. A "proper lookout" means maintaining the lookout that an ordinarily careful
person would use in light of all conditions existing at the time and those reasonably to be
anticipated.
A "proper lookout" includes a duty to see objects and conditions in plain sight, to see that
which is open and apparent and to realize obvious dangers. This duty does not merely require
looking, but also requires observing and understanding other traffic and the general situation.

INSTRUCTION NO. ^ \
The driver of any vehicle has the duty to exercise reasonable care at all times to avoid
placing others in danger.

INSTRUCTION NO. J j ^

An automobile manufacturer can be held liable if it has not exercised reasonable
care in designing and constructing a vehicle, having in mind the protection of the
passengers, it if fails to eliminate an unreasonable risk of foreseeable injury. The
manufacturer may be held liable for negligence that has caused injuries, even if found not
liable for the initial accident.
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New England Professional Plaza
9677 South 700 East, Suite D
Sandy, Utah 84070
Telephone: (801) 495-2252
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DOLORES CLAYTON, et al.

Case No. 000909522

Plaintiffs,

PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTAL
OBJECTIONS TO FORD'S PROPOSED
JURY INSTRUCTIONS

v.
UTAH AUTO COLLECTION, et al.

Judge Joseph C. Fratto
Defendants.

INTRODUCTION
At the time Plaintiffs' filed their initial objections to Ford's proposed jury instruction,
Plaintiffs did not know the source of some of Ford's proposed jury instructions. The parties met
on Friday, February 2,2007, to agree on the submitted jury instructions. At that time, Plaintiffs'
counsel was informed that some of the objected to proposed jury instructions were actually drafts
1

presented of Ford's design changes in later model year Explorers. This instruction would
unfairly confuse the jury.
IL
PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTIONS TO FORD'S NEGLIGENCE INSTRUCTIONS.
Plaintiffs object to Ford's proposed jury instructions (SEE EXH Z) on negligence as
follows:
RIGHT TO RECOVER FOR NEGLIGENT CONDUCT - The first sentence should
be modified to add "or entity" so the instruction does not unreasonably focus on Tony Clayton,
the driver of the Explorer.
NEGLIGENCE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF CLAIM - Objection. This instruction
says manufacturer. MUJI 12.16 should be given in addition to Ford's proposed instruction on the
elements of negligent design as its states the defendant's duty under the law.
NEGLIGENT - DUTY OF DESIGNER/MANUFACTURER - Objection. Plaintiffs
object to the dicta in the second paragraph that states:
"However, there is no duty to make a safe product safer. A manufacturer has no duty to
refrain from marketing a non-defective product when a safer model is available, or to inform
the consumer of the availability of the safer model."
The jury instruction would confuse the jury.
PROXIMATE CAUSE DEFECTIVE DESIGN ESSENTIAL TO NEGLIGENCE CLAIM - Objection. Ford's
proposed jury instruction impermissible singles out their theory and the court may place weight on
that instruction. The jury is already instructed on the essential elements of the claim of design
negligence under other instructions. This instruction is improper.

III.
FORD'S DRIVER JURY INSTRUCTIONS ADVISING THE JURY THAT A
DRIVER HAS A DUTY TO USE "REASONABLE CARE" ARE CUMULATIVE.
ADDITIONALLY, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT SUPPORTS FORD'S
PROPOSED "LOOKOUT" INSTRUCTION.
Ford has proposed four driver jury instructions (SEE EXH AA) which essentially instruct
the jury as follows:
'The driver of any vehicle has the duty to exercise reasonable care at all times to
avoid placing others in danger." (Driver or Operator Duty/MUJI 5.1.)
"Even if a driver complies with an applicable statute, ordinance or safety rule, this does
not excuse that driver from the duty to act with reasonable care in other respects.
One must always maintain a proper lookout for other traffic and hazards
reasonably anticipated on the highway, and keep one's car under proper control."
(Duty of Reasonable Care for all Drivers/MUJI 5.10.)
"It is the duty of every person upon a public highway to exercise reasonable care at
all times to avoid placing oneself or others in danger, and to use reasonable care to
avoid causing an accident." (Duties of Persons on Public Highways/MUJI 5.21.)
"The law provides that any person in a motor vehicle on a public highway shall keep a
proper lookout. A "proper lookout" means maintaining the lookout that an ordinarily
careful person would use in light of all conditions existing at the time and those
reasonably to be anticipated, [f ] A "proper lookout" includes a duty to see objects and
conditions in plain sight, to see that which is open and apparent and to realize
obvious dangers. This duty does not merely require looking, but also requires observing
and understanding other traffic and the general situation. (Lookout/MUJI 5.14.)
The only jury instruction that should be given is MUJI 5.1. Repetitive instructions on this
issue will tend to reemphasize the defendants case, are confusing, and might amount to an
inappropriate judicial comment on the evidence. (See Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329, 13351336 (Utah 1993).)
There is no evidence that supports a "lookout" jury instruction. No one testified that
there were any hazards, such as a deer in the road or oncoming car, to leave the road. No one
testified that Tony Clayton should have seen objects and conditions in plain sight. The only

12

evidence was that it was a clear day, mid afternoon and there were good road conditions.
Consequently, MUJI 5.10 and 5.14 should not be given.
IV.
FORD'S PROPOSED STATUTE OF LIMITATION JURY INSTRUCTIONS DO
NOT FAIRLY STATE THE LAW.
Ford proposed statute of limitations jury instruction (SEE EXH BB) asking the jury to
find a "date" should be rejected because it contains an unfair summary of statement of the law.
Utah Ann. Code, § 78-15-3, that defines the statute of limitations period in which to file a
product's liability action states:
"A civil action under this chapter shall be brought within two years from the time the
individual who would be the claimant in such action discovered, or in the exercise of due
diligence should have discovered, both the harm and its cause."
The Complaint as it pertains to Kellie Montoya's causes of action allege: (1) the 1997
Explorer was defectively due to the safety (anti) sway bar link design; (2) it was defective due to
a front suspension geometry defect design in the area in which the steering and sway bar must
operate that allowed metal to metal contact leading to reverse bending of the tie rod; (3) it was
defective in its overall stability design because it did not have a sufficient margin of safety; (4)
and Ford failed to adequately warn about the defects.
Ford has the burden of proof to present evidence of the facts essential to the defense of
the statute of limitations. {Stevens v. Rogers, 16 Utah 105, 109 (Utah 1897).) Ford's proposed
jury instructions shifts the burden of proof from Ford having to prove its statute of limitations
defense. Additionally, Ford's proposed instruction omits any mention of the delayed discovery
rule. The policy behind this rule is that a potential plaintiff should not be barred from suit if he
or she did not know and could not reasonably have known of the underlying facts giving rise to a
cause of action. (See, Utah Ann. Code, § 78-15-3; Robinson v. Morrow, 2004 UT App 285, P10
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DOLORES CLAYTON, et al.
Plaintiffs,
v.
UTAH AUTO COLLECTION, et al.

Case No. 000909522
PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO FORD'S
MOTION TO BIFURCATE THE TRIAL
Judge Joseph C. Fratto

Defendants.

I.

BIFURCATION OF THE OCCUPANTS' INJURIES WOULD CAUSE
REVERSIBLE ERROR AND SHOULD BE DENIED.

Bifurcated trials remain the exception, not the rule. (Cf., Angelo v. Armstrong World
Indus., 11 F.3d 957, 964 (10th Cir. 1993) [separation of issues for trial is not to be routinely
ordered]; Laitram Corporation v. Hewlett-Packard Company, 791 F. Supp. 113, 114 (E.D.La.
1992); See also, Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 137 (5th Cir.

1976) (bifurcation is the exception rather than the rule); Sunenblick v. Harrell, 145 F.R.D. 314,
317 (S.D.N. Y. 1993) (separation of issues is not the usual course under Rule 42(b).) The moving
party bears the burden of establishing that separate trials are necessary to prevent prejudice or
confusion and serve the ends of justice. (Buscemi v. Pepsico, Inc., 736 F. Supp. 1267, 1271
(S.D.N. Y. 1990).)
The two Utah cases Ford relies upon are not on point. SCFCILC, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A.,
Inc., 801F. Supp. 517, 528 (D. Utah 1992) involved bifurcation of the antitrust issues and the
non-antitrust issues - - not liability and damages. In Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr. v. Smith's
Food & Drug Ctrs., 889 P.2d 445, 462 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), the trial court reasoned that
testimony concerning diminution in value of the property was too "speculative" because it had to
assume too much over a period beginning with a possible jury verdict requiring forfeiture and
ending twenty-five years of a lease.
While Ford has presented evidence in its moving papers that a District Court recently
granted bifurcation, courts also routinely reject bifurcation motions given the circumstances.
(See Plaintiffs' Exhibits A [Aldous v. Honda, et al] and B [Bowers v. Navistar International
Transportation Corp, et al] attached.) To rebut Ford's contention that bifurcation is proper,
Plaintiffs have submitted Exhibits A and B, two other cases where bifurcation was NOT granted.
Nonetheless, keeping in mind that bifurcation is the exception, not the rule, the issue of
bifurcation should be reviewed on a case-by-case basis (Cf, Spectra-Physics Lasers, Inc. v.
Uniphase Corp., 144 F.R.D. 99,101 (D. Cal. 1992)), i.e., based on the pleading allegations and
testimony anticipated at trial.
In determining whether to grant Ford's request for bifurcation, this Court must be
satisfied that the decision to bifurcate does not unfairly prejudice the Plaintiffs who are the

non-moving party. (See Angelo v. Armstrong World Industries, supra, 11 F.3d 957, 964
["Regardless of efficiency and separability, however, bifurcation is an abuse of discretion if it is
unfair or prejudicial to a party."] Prejudice is the Court's most important consideration in
deciding whether to order separate trials under Rule 42(b). (See, Laitram Corp. v.
Hewlett-Packard Co., supra, 791 F. Supp. 113,115.) Regardless of efficiency and separability,
bifurcation is an abuse of discretion if it is unfair or prejudicial to a party. (Angelo v. Armstrong
World Indus., supra, 11 F.3d 957, 964; see also, Hines v. Joy Mfg. Co., 850 F.2d 1146, 1152 (6th
Cir. 1988); Martin v. Bell Helicopter Co., 85 F.R.D. 654, 658 (D. Colo. 1980).)
Ford has not met its burden of establishing lack of prejudice to Plaintiffs. The decision to
bifurcate centers on a balance of equities. Plaintiffs have spent six years and hundreds of
thousands of dollars investigating this case. Plaintiffs have alleged that the Explorer's design
and manufacture was defective and was unreasonably dangerous because it did not adequately
protect its occupants from injury during the crash and crash worthiness of the vehicle. (See
Amended Complaint, 112 (b).)
Ford argues that the injuries/damages should be bifurcated because if Tony is more than
50 percent liable, then Ford is not responsible for any damages. (Ford Memorandum, p. 7.) This
is not a correct application of the law. An automobile manufacturer can be held liable if it has
NOT exercised reasonable care in designing and constructing a vehicle, having in mind the
protection of the passengers. Under the crash worthiness doctrine, a manufacturer can be held
responsible for failing to eliminate unreasonable risks of foreseeable injury. (See, Fox v. Ford
Motor Co., 575 F.2d 774, 780 (10th Cir. 1978) citing Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d
495 (8th Cir. 1968).) The fact that a negligent driver may be the initial cause of an accident does
not abrogate the manufacturer's duty to use reasonable care in designing an automobile to

reduce the risk of "secondary impact" injuries. (See, Binakonsky v. Ford Motor Co., 133 F.3d
281, 288 (4th Cir. 1998), citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A com.) The crash
worthiness theory is a theory describing liability for negligence that has caused injuries, but not
the initial accident. {Binakonsky v. Ford Motor Co., supra, 133 F.3d 281, 288, citing Seese v.
VolkswagenwerkA. G., 648 F.2d 833, 839 (3d Cir. 1981).) Thus, the injury evidence is relevant
to whether the occupant's injuries were enhanced by the lack of crash worthiness of design.
Citing a lengthy string of cases, Ford has characterized this trial as being capable of
divisible phases, the "liability" and "damage" phases. (Ford's Memorandum p. 4.) It cannot be
characterized as such. "Injuries" are not synonymous with "damages." Bifurcation is improper if
the issues are not separable. {Angelo v. Armstrong World Indus., supra, 11 F.3d 957, 964.) The
injury issues are not separable from the damage issues. Evidence of Tony Clayton and Kellie
Montoya's injuries should be tried concurrently because the injuries have an important bearing
on the question of liability and reasonableness of design.
Ford's argument that bifurcation would not substantially prejudice Plaintiff Kellie
Montoya (because of the statute of limitations summary judgment issue that was previously
denied) should be rejected. In order to prove the Explorer's defective design, Kellie must show
her injuries occurred even though the product was used in a reasonably foreseeable manner (she
was seat belted) and the likelihood that such danger posed by the design would cause injury.
Thus, the jury must consider: "The gravity of danger posed by the design" and "the likelihood
that such danger posed by the design would cause injury or damage. (See Exhibit C, MUJI 12.5.)
Bifurcation would prejudice Kellie's claims on crash worthiness in that the jury would
not then hear about the extent of her brain injury in deliberating on the reasonableness of the
Explorer's occupant protection design. To hold otherwise, would allow the jury to infer that

Kellie merely impacted her head in the rollover, without considering the nature and the extent of
the injuries, and the reasonableness of the occupant protection design and crash worthiness of the
Explorer.
Likewise, the jury should hear of the extent of Tony Clayton's injuries in considering
whether Ford failed to warn of the defects, whether the product was used in a reasonably
foreseeable manner, occupant protection and the circumstantial evidence of the events. While
the seat belt contains only "slight" stretch marks, Plaintiffs' contend that Tony's injuries are
forensic evidence indicative that he was belted because he did not hit Kellie's body during the
rollover sequences. Thus, Ford has not met its burden of establishing that the damage/injury
issues are severable.
II.

BIFURCATION OF THE INJURY EVIDENCE OF THE TRIAL WOULD
PREJUDICE THE PLAINTIFFS AND CONSUME UNNECESSARY TIME.

In Utah, bifurcation of the punitive damages issue is automatic. Bifurcation of the
general damage/injury issues would require the jury to deliberate three times, and is therefore not
an expedient solution to the jury's use of time. The jury will be impaneled for at least six weeks,
therefore, causing them to deliberate on two more occasions (and scheduling two more trials on
damage and punitive damage issues) would cause an unreasonable and unnecessary delay and
burden. Under the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, the Plaintiffs are
entitled to their day in court and are entitled to present their complete cause to the jury.
Ford has not established that the injury/damage portion of Plaintiffs' expert testimony
will be unduly time consuming. Ford knows that Dr. Justin Fair is unavailable for trial and
therefore, only a portion of his testimony will be read to the jury. (See Plaintiffs' Motion in
Limine No. 18.) Ford's expert, John Hoffman, M.D., should not be able to testify at trial as he
was NOT previously named by Ford in the expert witness exchange pursuant to the court's order.

(See Ford's motion, p. 2, footnote 2, but see Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine No.26.)
Plaintiffs do not plan on calling all fifteen "potential" fact witnesses as portrayed in
Ford's motion, page 2, footnote 3. In fact, Plaintiffs' have filed a motion to exclude the treating
testimony identified by Ford in its Rule 26 (a)(4) disclosure exchanged on November 10, 2006.
(See Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine No. 27.) Plaintiffs believe that much of the medical testimony
about Kellie's initial injuries can be discussed through Dr. Hewitt's testimony. Plaintiffs intend
to call Dr. Joyce Anis, a neuropsychologist; Dr. Elena Hewitt, a neurologist and Dr. Joseph Wu
to testify regarding Kellie's severe brain shearing injury and permanent brain damage.
The only expert that Plaintiffs anticipate examining with exhibits, is Dr. Wu. Dr. Wu's
testimony is limited to the physiological evidence consistent with the brain injury suffered by
Kellie Montoya, and is anticipated to take no more than a couple of hours on direct. Based on
the previous depositions by Ford, it is anticipated that Dr. Hewitt and Dr. Anis's testimony
(together) would probably take approximately one day. It is anticipated that Plaintiffs' economic
expert, Robert Johnson would take approximately 2 hours, to present the economic damages.
"[E]ven if bifurcation might somehow promote judicial economy, courts should not order
separate trials when bifurcation would result in unnecessary delay, additional expense, or some
other form of prejudice. Essentially, then., courts must balance the equities in ruling on a motion
to bifurcate." (Laitram Corp. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., supra, 791 F. Supp. 113, 115, citations
omitted.)
Here, bifurcation will not save weeks of trial. (See Ford's Memorandum, p.5.) Contrary
to Ford's claim that only two witnesses (Kellie Montoya and her twin sister) could be expected to
testify at both stages of the trial, bifurcation would require Fred Clayton and Phil Van Orden

who went to the scene of the rollover and observed the Clayton Explorer the day after Tony
Clayton died to testify in both phases of the case.
Equally unavailing is Ford's suggestion that Plaintiffs "present some limited medical
evidence during the liability phase." (See, Ford's Memorandum, p. 8.) This would also require
Plaintiffs' to attempt to sort out what evidence constitutes injury and what constitutes damages
and incur the burden of an unnecessary expert witness costs. In the meantime, Plaintiffs, Fred
and Dolores Clayton and counsel may have the tremendous expense of living in a motel during
the trial while the jury is instructed three time to deliberate. Rule 42(b) permits courts to phase a
case into separate trials if it is convenient. Central to that question is whether the issues would
involve many of the same witnesses and documentary evidence. If the proof overlaps
substantially, the parties, the witnesses and the court are inconvenienced. {Laitram Corp. v.
Hewlett-Packard Co., supra, 791 F. Supp. 113,117.)
Ford's argument that the presentation of Plaintiffs' injuries and damages would prejudice
their case is without merit. Ford's Motion is merely another effort to sanitize the trial to avoid
liability. As argued, bifurcation is the exception, not the rule. Cases are routinely tried without
bifurcation into phases. Jurors are adequately instructed that the case must be decided without
regard to sympathy, passion or prejudice. (Exhibit D, MUJI 2.3.) Ford can always argue this
instruction to the jury. It is presumed that the jury deliberates as instructed.
For all of the above reasons, Ford's Motion to Bifurcate the case into three separate
phases should be Denied.
Dated: November 28, 2006.

Respectfullyjj^mittedrN
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separate trial . . . of any separate issue." At the [*2]
threshold, the Court notes that for bifurcation to be
appropriate, the issues to be bifurcated must be separate:
bifurcation is inappropriate where the "same witnesses
may be needed to testify as to both the issues of liability
and damages, and . . . evidence pertaining to these issues
may very well overlap." Hardin Group, Inc. v. Village of
Solvay, 1990 WL 164694 *1 (N.D.N.Y. 1990) (denying
bifurcation in the face of evidentiary overlap "in an effort
to promote efficiency"). The decision whether or not to
bifurcate lies within the sound discretion of the trial court
and turns primarily on the Court's assessment of "the
various considerations of convenience, prejudice to the
parties, expedition, and economy of resources." Witherbee
v. Honeywell 151 F.R.D. 27, 29 (N.D.N.Y. 1993). The
burden of demonstrating that bifurcation is appropriate,
however, rests with the party seeking same.

OPINION BY: Thomas J. McAvoy
B. The Analysis Applied:
OPINION:
MEMORANDUM
DECISION & ORDER
On May 24, 1992, plaintiff suffered severe injuries
while operating an all-terrain vehicle manufactured by
defendants. Plaintiff has since commenced this action
against defendants on the theories of strict product
liability, negligence and breach of warranty. Defendants
now move for an order bifurcating the pending trial of
plaintiffs action into separate liability and damages phases
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b). Plaintiff opposes
bifurcation.
I. DISCUSSION
A. The Bifurcation Analysis:
Rule 42(b) provides that "the court, in furtherance of
convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials
will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a

i. Separability:
Turning first to separability, while defendants claim
(somewhat conclusorily) that the issues of liability and
damages are clearly distinct and separate, plaintiff responds
that a great deal of the evidence, particularly as to the
medical [*3] proof, of the nature, the extent, and the
pattern of plaintiffs injuries will be necessary to
substantiate plaintiffs account of how the accident
occurred. Furthermore, plaintiff claims that medical proof
of plaintiff s injuries is necessary to prove the actual force
of the impact and resulting injuries. Finally, if the Court
correctly understands plaintiffs arguments opposing
defendants' defense based on their "separation" theory,
evidence of plaintiffs injuries will be necessary to show
that defendants' vehicle was defectively designed.
Defendants have made no showing contradicting
plaintiffs averments that his injuries will need to be
explored by the jury in deciding liability issues, and again
considered by the jury in deliberating on plaintiffs

damages, nl On this showing, then, while it appears to the
Court that the issues are conceivably severable, it does not
appear that the issues of liability and damages are distinctly
separate, compare Witherbee, 151 F.R.D. at 29 (granting
bifurcation because "it appears to the Court as though the
evidence required to establish liability on the part of the
defendants is separate and distinct from the evidence that
the [*4] plaintiffs must proffer in establishing their
damages.") (emphasis added).

nl While defendants indicate that they are
prepared to stipulate that plaintiff sustained certain
personal injuries as a result of the accident, they
also acknowledge that evidence relating to the
biomechanics of plaintiff s injuries, and the manner
in which they were sustained, will be offered during
the liability phase and admitted as necessary and
relevant.

possible"). Additionally, [*6] unless the Court employs a
trial schedule which incorporates a period of delay between
the two phases, whether the trial is bifurcated or not the
parties and the Court will nevertheless have to conference,
and the Court will have to prepare in advance, full charges
for both phases. Furthermore, the Court notes that the
projected savings will only be realized upon the
contingency of a liability verdict favorable to defendants.
While the Court expresses no opinion as to the outcome of
this trial, it is safe to say that defendants' projected savings
are by no means guaranteed.
Finally, the overlap of the injury evidence and
testimony discussed supra poses the problem of whether to
allow those witnesses to testify twice, or to simply rely on
the jury's ability to "carry-over" that evidence from the
liability phase to the damages deliberations. The former
obviously taxes the Courts (and plaintiffs) resources, while
the latter raises fairness concerns regarding plaintiffs
opportunity to fully litigate both these issues.
iii. Prejudice to Defendants:

ii. Judicial Economy:
Defendants claim that the parties anticipate calling
nine separate damages experts and that if bifurcated, at
least fifty percent of the trial time will be saved (assuming
a liability verdict in defendants1 favor). Plaintiff (who
presumably is in a better position to estimate his own
intentions) responds that defendants' estimates are greatly
exaggerated. Plaintiff indicates that he anticipates he will
probably call four experts in connection with the damage
phase of his case, together with several fact witnesses
(some of whom will have already testified [*5] as to
liability if bifurcation is ordered). n2 Plaintiffs bottomline
is that the damage phase of his case, if consolidated with
the liability phase, will take two to three days.

n2 While plaintiff is careful to couch his
estimates in terms ofprobability, the Court assumes
that plaintiff does not make these representations
lightly or without full and careful consideration of
his case. Plaintiff is no doubt likewise mindful that
any significant expansion of his damages proof
beyond the estimates that the Court bases its
decision on today could well support a preclusion
motion by defendants.
While the avoidance of three to four trial days is not an
insignificant savings, it represents a less compelling
economy when balanced against the inevitable lost time in
conducting two openings and closings, two charges, and
twice empaneling the jury. See Sunenblick v. Harrell, 145
F.R.D. 314, 317 (S.D.N. Y. 1993) ("efficient judicial
administration... favorfs] having only one trial whenever

Finally, defendants argue that they will be prejudiced
by the trial of liability and damages together. While there
is certainly [*7] the possibility of prejudice by trying the
issues together, such prejudice is not unavoidable in the
absence of bifurcation. Indeed, the conclusion that
defendants actually point to only a possibility of prejudice
is underscored by the reality that one trial for liability and
damages is the rule — bifurcation is the exception.
Defendants point to no particular factors specific to this
case that distinguish the potential for prejudice here from
the potential prejudice which is normally and customarily
dealt with through an appropriate charge and curative
instructions where necessary. n3 The Court does not go so
far as to demand herein a showing of extraordinary
prejudice before it will order bifurcation in any case.
Where, however, as here, the issues are not cleanly separate
and the economies are not exceedingly substantial, the
Court will look for a showing of more than that prejudice
"that is normally experienced by a defendant who is found
liable in a personal injury action . . . where the issues of
liability and damages are tried to a single jury." Monaghan
v. SZS 33 Assoc, L.P., 827 F. Supp. 233, 244 (S.D.N.Y.
1993). Defendants have not shown that level of prejudice
[*8] here.

n3 Likewise the Court perceives no unusual
danger of jury confusion from trying the issues
together.

n. CONCLUSION
Defendants have not established either that the issues

to be tried are cleanly separable, that bifurcation will yield
a significant conservation of judicial resources, or that in
the absence of bifurcation they will be subjected to
extraordinary undue prejudice. As such, defendant's Motion
for an Order of Bifurcation is DENIED.

Binghamton, New York
May 30, 1996
Thomas J. McAvoy
Chief U.S. District Judge

IT IS SO ORDERED.
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ROBERT BOWERS and JILL BOWERS, Plaintiffs, v. NAVISTAR
EVTERNATIONAL TRANSPORTATION CORP., formerly known as
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HARVESTER CORP., PRECO, INC., and SOMERSET WELDING AND
STEEL INC., Defendants. NAVISTAR INTERNATIONAL
TRANSPORTATION CORP., formerly known as INTERNATIONAL
HARVESTER COMPANY INC., formerly known as NAVISTAR
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HARVESTER CORP., Third-Party Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF NEW YORK and
THE NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, ThirdParty Defendants. SOMERSET WELDING & STEEL, INC., Second Third-Party
Defendants, v. METROPOLITAN INTERNATIONAL TRUCKS, INC., Second
Third-Party Defendants.
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NEW YORK
1993 U.S. Dist LEXIS 6129
May 10,1993, Decided
May 10,1993, Filed

JUDGES: [*1] SOTOMAYOR
OPINION BY: SOMA SOTOMAYOR
OPINION:
OPINION AND ORDER
Third-party defendants the City of New York and the
New York City Department of Transportation (together
"the City") move, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. ("Rule")
42(b), for separate trials of the product liability claim and
negligence claims brought against it. The City maintains
that separate trials will further judicial economy, expedite
the trial of the case, avert confusion of the issues by the
triers of fact, and prevent substantial prejudice to it.
Plaintiffs Robert Bowers and Jill Bowers (together
"plaintiffs") and defendants Navistar International
Transportation Corp. ("Navistar"), Preco, Inc. ("Preco"),
and Somerset Welding & Steel, Inc. ("Somerset") (together
"defendants") oppose the motion maintaining, inter alia,
(1) that the product liability claim is inextricably
intertwined with the third-party negligence claim asserted
against the City, (2) that substantially the same witnesses
and documentary evidence will be necessary to determine
liability and damages, and (3) that the incentive for
settlement of the case will be eliminated if separate trials
are ordered. For the reasons stated below, the City's motion
for separate [*2] trials is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

This is a personal injury case stemming from an
accident at a repaving work-site in Brooklyn, New York.
On September 2, 1986, plaintiff Robert Bowers
("Bowers"), a member of a repaving crew in charge of
cleaning hot asphalt from the tail-gates of asphalt trucks,
was injured by a dump truck driven by a fellow co-worker
which reversed into him. The truck initially hit Bowers in
the neck, pushing him down to the pavement and rolling
over part of his body before other co-workers alerted the
driver to the accident. Bowers suffered severe and
permanent injuries, necessitating long periods of
hospitalization and a host of surgical interventions.
On November 17, 1988, plaintiffs commenced an
action against Navister in state court. The case was
removed to federal court on December 15, 1988 and on
March 10, 1989, the Complaint was amended to assert
product liability actions against (1) Navistar, the
manufacturer of the dump truck's cab and chassis; (2)
Preco, the manufacturer of the truck's electronic audible
back-up system ("back-up alarm system" or "alarm
system"); and (3) Somerset, the installer of the alarm
system. Defendants Navistar, Preco and [*3] Somerset
filed third-party complaints against the City as well as
cross-claims against each other, alleging that any
malfunction or improper installation of the back-up alarm
system was due to the other parties' negligence and seeking
indemnification and contribution with respect to any sums
that ultimately might be adjudged against any of them.
Bowers essentially contends that the back-up alarm

systems' audibility was inadequate given the noise level
prevalent at the work-site where the accident occurred. In
particular, Bowers maintains that the location and direction
of the alarm, i.e., at the rear, "underneath the cab and
chassis," and facing the front of the vehicle, compromised
its audibility. In the alternative, Bower asserts that the
alarm failed to work properly on the day in question.
Defendants contest Bowers' assertion that the back-up
alarm system failed to work as required by the City's
specifications or that its installation under the cab and
chassis or its direction rendered it inaudible to Bowers.
Defendants claim that the accident resulted in whole or in
part from Bowers' contributory negligence and assumption
of risk in working despite diminished sensory and [*4]
auditory capacities induced by a perception-inhibiting drug
Xanax. Moreover, defendants maintain that Bowers' preexisting hearing loss caused or contributed to his inability
to hear the back-up alarm.
The City moves for separate trials on the products
liability and negligence claims on the grounds of prejudice,
complexity of the issues and judicial economy. Generally,
the City argues that separate trials are proper because this
case presents "two significantly different claims, the first
for products liability and the second for negligence. And,
the witnesses and proof concern either the products claims
or the second group of claims, with little or no overlap." A
careful review of the record, however, reveals that far from
two distinct and separate claims involving substantially
different sets of witnesses, this case presents fundamentally
intertwined claims, necessitating extensive testimony by
the same factual and expert witnesses with respect to both
theories of liability.
DISCUSSION
Rule 42(b) states:

Separate Trials. The Court, in furtherance
of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or
when separate trials will be conducive to
expedition and economy, may order a [*5]
separate trial of any claim, crossclaim,
counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any
separate issue or of any number of claims,
crossclaims, counterclaims, third-party
claims, or issues, always preserving the
inviolate right of trial by jury as declared by
the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution
or as given by a statute of the United States.

28 US.C Rule 42(b) (1990).
The aim and purpose of the Rule is aptly summarized
in C. Wright and A Millers' Federal Practice and

Procedure:

The provision for separate trials in Rule
42(b) is intended to further convenience,
avoid delay and prejudice, and serve the
ends of justice. It is the interest of efficient
judicial administration that is to be
controlling, rather than the wishes of the
parties. The piecemeal trial of separate
issues in a single suit is not to be the usual
course. It should be resorted to only in the
exercise of informed discretion when the
court believes that separation will achieve
the purposes of the rule.

9 § 2388, at 279 (1971) (emphasis supplied); see also,
Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 42(b).
As explained recently by the Second Circuit in United
States [*6] v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., Nos. 92-6158,
6160, 1993 WL 100100, * 1 (2d Cir, April 6, 1993), the
purpose of separate trials under Rule 42(b) is to "isolate
issues to be resolved, avoid lengthy and perhaps needless
litigation... [and to] encourage settlement discussions and
speed[] up remedial action." Id., at * 5 (citing, Amoco Oil
v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 668 (5th Cir. 1989);
Katsaros v. Cody, 744F.2d270, 278 (2dCir.), cert, denied
sub nom., 469 U.S. 1072, 105 S. Ct. 565, 83 L. Ed. 2d 506
(1984) (separate trials are proper to further convenience or
to avoid prejudice); Ismail v. Cohen, 706 F. Supp. 243, 251
(S.D.N. Y. 1989) (quoting, United States v. International
Business Machines Corp., 60 F.R.D. 654, 657 (S.D.NY.
1973) (separate trials under Rule 42(b) are appropriate,
although not mandatory, to "(1) avoid prejudice; (2)
provide for convenience, or (3) expedite the proceedings
and be economical"). Separate trials, however, remain the
exception rather than the rule. See, e.g., Response of
Carolina, Inc. v. LeascoResponse, Inc., 537F.2d 137 (5th
Cir. 1976) [*7] (bifurcation is the exception rather than
the rule); Sunenblick v. Harrell, 145 F.R.D. 314, 317
(S.D.N. Y. 1993) (separation of issues is not the usual course
under Rule 42(b)). The moving party bears the burden of
establishing that separate trials are necessary to prevent
prejudice or confusion and serve the ends of justice.
Buscemi v. Pepsico, Inc., 736 F. Supp. 1267, 1271
(S.D.NY 1990).
Bifurcation rests within the sound discretion of the
court. Katsaros, 744 F.2d at 278 (quoting, In re Master
Key Antitrust Litigation, 528 F2d 5, 14 (2d Cir. 1975),
cert, denied, 469 U.S. 1072, 105 S. Ct. 565, 83 L. Ed. 2d
506 (1984)). When confronted with a motion for separate
trials, a court must pay particular attention to the nature and
relation of the claims and the evidence necessary to
establish each claim. Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v.

McNary, 144 F.R.D. 191, 192 (S.DMY. 1992); see also,
Zofcin v. Dean, 144 F.R.D. 203 (S.D.N. Y. 1992). When the
evidentiary proof necessary [*8] to establish two or more
distinct claims is different for each claim, see Haitian
Centers, 144 F.R.D. at 192, or prejudice will result to one
of the parties from the admission of evidence on one of the
claims, set Ismail, 706 F. Supp. at 251, separate trials may
be appropriate. By contrast, separate trials are inappropriate
when the issues, witnesses and documentary evidence
overlap. See In re Agent Orange Product liability
Litigation, 565 F. Supp. 1263, 1276-77 (E.D.NY. 1983)
(denying separate trials because the issue of liability and
causation merged to such an extent that there would be
substantial duplication of evidence if the separate trials
were held); see also, Drake v. Handman, 30 F.R.D. 394
(S.D.N. Y. 1962); Woburn v. Degreasing Co. of N.J. v.
SpencerKellogg&Sons, 37F. Supp. 311 (W.D.N.Y. 1941).
Thus, Rule 42(b) does not call for a bright-line test; rather,
a factual and legal analysis of each case informs the court
as to the propriety of separate trials. Haitian Centers, 144
F.R.D. at 192 [*9] (bifurcation demands a case by case
analysis of the factual and legal issues of each case).
The City has failed to demonstrate that bifurcation of
the product liability and negligence claims will result in
undue prejudice, further judicial economy or expedite the
proceedings in this case. Undue prejudice obtains when the
jury is unable to compartmentalize and isolate the evidence
of liability on a particular claim against one of the parties
and instead allows its evaluation of the evidence to
contaminate its determination of another defendant's
liability. See Ismail, 706 F. Supp. at 251. However, when
the claims, witnesses and evidence overlap, no prejudice is
visited upon the parties by joint trial of the claims. See,
e.g., In re Agent Orange, 565 F. Supp. at 1276-77. This is
so because the evidence on one claim is relevant and
necessary to establish an independent but interrelated claim
asserted against another party to the lawsuit.
In this case, it is impossible to separate the alleged
design and manufacture defect claims from the City's
negligence, because the back-up alarm system was selected
and installed according [*10] to the City's specifications;
inspected and evaluated by the City's personnel; and
maintained and operated by City's employees. Any
determination as to the alarm system's audibility and its
actual performance in this case must, perforce, include the
testimony not only of the City technicians who determined
the alarm's compliance with City specifications and the
City employees who examined the truck prior to and after
the accident, but also the testimony of those City
employees who were present at the accident. Simply put,
the alarm's performance, the effect of its installation in the
rear portion of the truck, and the City's use of the
equipment cannot be decided in a vacuum and will depend
to a substantial degree on testimony regarding its
performance in the field. Indeed, the non-moving parties

would be prejudiced by separate trials, as liability would be
impossible to ascertain without introduction of evidence on
the alarm's field performance; thus making it impossible to
determine the validity ofplaintiffs' claims product liability
claim.
Similarly, separate trials would run counter to judicial
economy. Substantially identical witness testimony will be
used to establish [*11] both the products liability and
negligence claim. In particular, virtually identical witness
testimony will be introduced regarding the alarm's
audibility, the noise level at the work-site and the safety
procedures used by the City in its operation of the asphalt
trucks. All of these issues are essential to the establishment
of both the products liability and negligence claims. Thus,
separate trials would contribute nothing but duplication and
waste of judicial resources.
The City cites In Re Beverly Hills Fire Litigation, 695
F.2d207 (6th Cir. 1982), cert, denied, 461 U.S. 929,103 S.
Ct 2090, 77L.Ed. 2d300(1983), onremand, 583F. Supp.
1163 (E.D.Ky. 1984), Reading Industries, Inc. v. Kennecott
Copper Corp., 61 F.R.D. 662, 664 (S.D.N Y. 1974), and/n
re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 69 F.R.D. 310
(CD. Cat. 1975), for the proposition that separate trials are
advisable when a court is confronted with complex legal
and factual issues that may lead to jury confusion. The
cases are inapposite to the case at bar exactly because [*12]
they involve complex factual and legal issues not present in
this case. In re Beverly Hills, 695 F.2d at 217 (complex
products liability case stemming from a major fire
disaster), Reading Industries, 61 F.2d at 664 (S.D.N. Y
1974) (complex antitrust case), and In re Paris Air Crash,
69 F.R.D. at 322 (major air crash involving hundreds of
lawsuits by 1,100 claimants against multiple defendants,
and numerous third party claims, cross-claims and counterclaims). There is simply a dearth of evidence that the issues
raised by this case are sufficiently complex to cause the
jury confusion or undue prejudicial effect inherent in those
cases.
The City also inappropriately relies upon Ismail v.
Cohen, 706F. Supp. 243 (S.DMY. 1989), affd, 899F.2d
183 (2d Cir. 1990), where the court ordered the separate
trials of plaintiffs § § 1981 and 1983 claims against a
police officer. In Ismail, the court ordered separate trials
after finding that adjudication of plaintiff s § 1983 claim
was not only independent from the § 1981 claim. By
contrast, [* 13] resolution of the product liability claim in
this case is inextricably intertwined with the negligence
claim asserted against the City.
Finally, separate trials in this case would truncate
settlement negotiations, encourage lengthy and duplicative
litigation, and postpone adjudication of liability for Bower's
severe injuries. This result would run counter to the Second
Circuit's recent pronouncement in United States v. Alcan
Aluminum Corp., Nos. 92-6158, 6160,1993 WL100100, *

1,5 (2d Cir., April 6,1993). Contrary to the City's position,
separate trials in this case is likely to eviscerate any
incentive the parties may have to settle this already
protracted and costly litigation. Bifurcation would force
primary defendants to proceed to trial and have the claims
reduced to a verdict in order to pursue indemnification and
contribution from the City. Thus, rather than expedite the
proceedings in this case and foster judicial economy,
separate trials would have the negative effect of
lengthening and duplicating litigation.
CONCLUSION
This Court finds that the factual and legal questions
raised by plaintiffs1 product liability and negligence claims
are interdependent and [*14] fundamentally intertwined.

Because separate trials at the product liability and
negligence claims in this action would result in substantial
duplication of testimony and would not result in prejudice
to the City, the City's motion for separate trials is
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: New York, New York
May 10, 1993
SONIA SOTOMAYOR
U.S.DJ.
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12.5

MODEL UTAH JURY INSTRUCTIONS — CIVIL
MUJI 12.5
DEFINITION OF DEFECTIVE DESIGN
(Alternate B)

A product is defective in design:
1. If it fails to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer or user
would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable
manner," or
2. If there is a risk of danger inherent in the design which outweighs
the benefits of that design.
In determining whether the benefits of the design outweigh the risks
to which the product exposes the consumer or user, you may consider,
among other things"
1. The gravity of danger posed by the design,"
2. The likelihood that such danger posed by the design would cause
injury or damage,"
3. The usefulness and desirability of the product to the consumer or
user and the public in general,"
4. The availability of a substitute product that would serve the same
function but would not be as dangerous,"
5. The ease or difficulty with which the unsafe character of the
product could be eliminated without impairing its usefulness or making
it too expensive to maintain its utility," and
6. The adverse consequences to the product and the consumer that
would result from an alternate design.
Comments
The definition of defective design, Alternate A, is an alternative
definition of design defect that has been adopted by a number of courts and
jurisdictions based upon Barker v. LullEng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978).
The Utah Supreme Court has not had occasion to address whether it would
adopt Alternate B, which allows the trial court to submit one or both
alternative definitions of design defect to the jury. Under Alternate B, if
the plaintiff claims that the risk of danger inherent in the design
outweighs the benefit of the design, then the plaintiff must make a prima
facie showing that the injury was proximately caused by the product's
design. The burden of proof the a shifts to the defendant to prove that the
product was not defective because the benefits of the product as a whole
outweigh the danger inherent in the product's design. Bates v. John Deere
Co., 195 Cal. Rptr. 637 (1983); Akers v. Kelley Co., Inc., 219 Cal. Rptr. 513
(1985).
References'Barker v. LullEng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978)
BAJI No. 9.00.5 (1986). Reprinted with permission? copyright © 1986
West Publishing Company
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2.3

MODEL UTAH JURY INSTRUCTIONS — CIVIL
MUJI2.3
SYMPATHY, PREJUDICE, PASSION

This case must not be decided for or against anyone because you feel
sorry for anyone or angry at anyone. It is your sworn duty to decide this
case based on the facts and the law, without regard to sympathy, passion
or prejudice.
Referenced
JIFU No. 1.5 (1957)
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EXCERPTS APPLICABLE CITED RULES

Utah R. Civ. P. 26 (a)(3)(A) - A party shall disclose to other parties the identify of any
person who may be used at trial to present evidence unde Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the
Utah Rules of Evidence.
Utah R. Civ. P. 26 (a)(3) (Advisory Comm. Note) - In effect, the report will serve in lieu
of responses to standard interrogatories.
Utah R. Civ. P. 42 - The court in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice may
order a separate trial of any claim....
Utah R. Civ. P. 47(a) - The court may permit the parties or their attorney to conduct the
examination of prospective jurors or may itself conduct the examination. In the latter
event, the court shall permit the parties of their attorneys to supplement the examination
by such further inquiry as is material and proper....
Utah R. Civ. P. 47(f)(1) - ...The juror challenged and any other person may be examined
as a witness of the hearing of such challenge. A challenge for cause may be taken on one
or more of the following grounds. On its own motion the court may remove a juror upon
the same grounds.
Utah R. Civ. P. 47(f)(6) - Conduct, responses, state of mind or other circumstances that
reasonably lead the court to conclude the jury is not likely to act impartially.
Utah R. Civ. P. 59 - ...[A] new trial may be granted ...the court may open the judgment if
one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions
oflaw....
Utah R. Civ. P. 59 (a)(1) - Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse
party...which either party was prevented from having a fair trial.
Utah R. Civ. P. 59 (a)(7) - Error in law.
Utah R. Evid. 401 - Relevant evidence means evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
Utah R. Evid. 403 - Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations or...presentation of cumulative evidence.

Utah R. Evid. 602 - A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced
sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter...
Utah R. Evid. 608 (c) - Bias, prejudice or any motive to misrepresent may be shown to
impeach the witness either by examination of the witness or by evidence otherwise
adduced.
Utah R. Evid. 701 - If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in
the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a)
rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding
of the witness's testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.
Utah R. Evid. 702 - If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified
as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise.
Utah R. Evid. 803 (8) (C) - (Public records and report) ...in civil actions and
proceedings...factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority
granted by law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of
trustworthiness.

APPLICABLE CITED STATUTE

§ 78-24-1 states: "All persons, without exception, otherwise than as specified in
this chapter, who, having organs of sense, can perceive, and, perceiving, can make known
their perceptions to others, may be witnesses. Neither parties nor other persons who have
an interest in the event of an action or proceeding are excluded; nor those who have been
convicted of crime; nor persons on account of their opinions on matters of religious
belief; although, in every case the credibility of the witness may be drawn in question, by
the manner in which he testifies, by the character of his testimony, or by evidence
affecting his character for truth, honesty or integrity, or by his motives, or by
contradictory evidence; and the jury are the exclusive judges of his credibility."
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THIRD D I S T R H T m i l K T O I ' SAI T I AKI nMINTi
STATE OF UTAH
DOLORES CLAYTON, et al.
Case No. 000909522
1 Man ,1.11 -w Appellant,
v.

NOTTCI <M AITI Al

FORD MOTOR COMPANY.

Judge Joseph C. Fratto

1

Defendants/Appellees.
Plaintiffs/Appellants, by and througl

following Judgment and Orders c r :he Third District (V^r * -f Sail Lake County:
1.

•:•• \

..-. , •

AU.*J;

;

, and filed in the District

Court, Third Judicial District on March 12, 2007.
2.

The Minute Entry and Order entered by the Hon. Joseph Fratto, dated May 22, 2007,

denying Plaintiffs' Ex -Parte Motioi I lm 1 cm v in i File AlT'uLn il 1 \IIHIIL W ( nlbni in Support of O'ral
Argument Presented on May 7, 2007.

3.

The Memorandum Decision and Order dated May 30, 2007, denying Plaintiffs'

Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and Motion for New Trial.
4.

That portion of the Memorandum Decision and Order dated May 30, 2007, denying

Plaintiffs' Motion to Tax Mediation Cost.
DATED this l ^

t

day of June, 2007.

MATTHEW H. RATY^
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UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL

MARK SHURTLEFF
\ . C SI' I I LES WITH FORD OVER EXPLORER SAFF1 \ CLAIMS
Utah Attorney General Mark Shurtleff toda> announced a S51.5 million settlement with the Ford
Motor Company to resolve allegations of making false claims about the safetv of Ford Explorers and the
replacement tires for the sports utility vehicles.
The agreement calls for $30 million from the settlement to mount a nationwide consume! education
campaign about SUV safety. Utah and the 52 other jurisdictions taking part in the settlement will each
ieceive a payment of $300,000. The remainder will be used to pa> for the costs of the investigation.
"The Attorney General's Office has a responsibility to protect consumers," said Jeff Buckner. the
assistant attorney general who represented Utah on the settlement. "One way we can do that is to stop
companies from sending out deceptive advertising."
The investigation alleged that Ford violated state laws against unfair and deceptive acts,
including:
* Foid advertised that the Explorer has "car-like" steering and handling 1 he \ chicle is a
truck and has a higher risk of rollover.
• The advertising exaggerated the Explorer's capability to earn cargo and passengers. 1 or
some models with popular options, the vehicle would exceed capacity by simply having a
person in each seat.
• After-market tires were advertised as the same as the original tires I lie a fte? market tires
had different specifications, standards and compounds.
• bord failed to disclose the known safety risk associated with I \plorers equipped with
Firestone A TX and Wilderness A1 tires. Ihord knew or should have known about the risk as
early as 1993.
Tord denies any wiongdoing and has agreed to abide by all state and federal laws governing SUV
safety. The car manufactuiet has already spent $2 billion to replace tires in the I Jnited States
"i would like io congratulate the hord Motor Company for agreeing to resolve these claims without
expenshe litigation. This settlement shows that Ford has a real commitment to educating the pubhc about
SUV safety," said Attorney General Mark Shurtleff.
The joint settlement comes a year after a $51.5 million nationw ide settlement with
Rridgestone Firestone for selling and advertising tires with high rates of tread separation.
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BENETTA BUELL-WILSGH et al , Plaintiffs and Respondents, v
FORD MOTOR COMPANY et a] , Defendants and Appellants,
D045154, D045579
COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, FOURTH APPRT.F.ATF, DISTRICT,
DIVISION ONE
2Q08 Cal.

App. LEXIS

349

March ^^, ^j:>ISTORY:
[*1]
CONSOLIDATED
APPEALS
from
judgment of the Superior Court of San
•P"[NI ;N BY: Nares
Diego County, No. GIC800836, Kevin A.
OPINION'
Enright, Judge,
Buell-Wilson
v. Ford Motor
Co.,
141
NARE S, J"
I h is case is before us
Cal.
App.
4th 525,
46 Cal.
Rptr.
3d
for a second time, after a GVR x order
14 7, 2006 Cal. App.
LEXIS 1089
(Cal.
from the United States Supreme Court
App. 4th Dist. , 2006)
directed
that
we
reconsider
our
original opinion in Buell-Wilson
v.
DISPOSITION:
Affirmed in part as
Ford
Motor
Company
(2006)
141
modified; coridi tionally reversed in
Cal.App.4th
525 [4 6 Cal. Rptr.
3d 14 7]
part.
[*2]
{Buell-Wilson
I)
in light of
Philip
Morris
USA v. Williams
(2007)
549 U.S.
[166 L. Ed. 2d 940,
127
COUNSEL:
Gibson,
Dunn
& Crutcher,
S. Ct. 1057]
{Philip
Morris) .
Philip
Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr., William E.
Morris
holds that upon request, courts
Thomson, Eileen M. Ahern and Theodore
must adopt procedures to ensure juries
B.
Olson
for
Defendants
and
do not punish defendants for harm
Appellants.
caused
to
third
parties
when
determining the amount of punitive
Arnold & Porter, Ronald C. Redcay,
damages to award. The Supreme Court
Murray R. Garnick, Robert A. McCarter;
also reiterated, however, juries could
National Chamber Litigation Center,
consider harm to third parties in
Robin S. Conrad and Amar D. Sarwal for
determining
the reprehensibility of a
the Chamber of Commerce of the United
defendant's
conduct.
States of America as Amicus Curiae on
behalf of Defendants and Appellants.
Mayer Brown and Donald M. Falk for the
Product Liability Advisory Council,
Inc., as Asiicus Curiae on behalf of
Defendants and Appellants.
Howard, Rice, Nemerovski, Canady, Falk
& Rabkin, Jerome B. Falk, Jr., Steven
L. Mayer, Keith D. Kessler; Schoville
& Arnell, Dennis A. Schoville, Louis
G. Arnell and James S. Iagmin for
Plaintiffs and Respondents.
JUDGES: Opinion by
McConnell,
P. J.,

Nares, J., with
and Irion,
J.,

1
GVR is the acronym used
within the Supreme Court for "an
order
that
grants
certiorari,
vacates the judgment below, and
remands the case to the lower
court
for
reconsideration
in
light of an intervening Supreme
Court ruling ... ." (Stern et
al., Supreme Court Practice (8th
ed. 2002) § 5.12(b), p. 317
(Stern).)
Ford asserts that based on
Philip
Morris
it is entitled to a new trial
(or at least a further reduction in
the punitive damages award) because

there is a "significant risk" the
punitive damages verdict in this case
was based on improper evidence and
arguments concerning third party harm.
Ford also asserts that we should
reconsider
our original
decision's
rejection of its arguments that (1)
California's
[*3] punitive damages
statute {Civil
Code section
3294)
is
unconstitutionally vague as applied to
this case, and (2) the trial court
erred in excluding its industry custom
and practice
evidence. We granted
permission to the Chamber of Commerce
of the United States of America (the
Chamber) and the Product Liability
Advisory Council, Inc. (PLAC) to file
amicus curiae briefs to support Ford's
contentions on remand.
We

have

reconsidered

in Buell-Wilson

our decision

I in light of

Philip

Morris.
Based on our analysis of
Philip
Morris
and our review of our
original decision and the proceedings
in the trial court, we conclude
Philip
Morris
does not compel a reversal or a
further
reduction
of the punitive
damages awarded in this case. Ford has
forfeited the right to assert there is
a
significant
risk
the
punitive
damages verdict in this case was based
on improper evidence and arguments
concerning third party harm because
Ford
(1)
submitted
incorrect
and
misleading jury instructions on third
party harm; (2) did not timely object
to plaintiffs' closing argument at the
punitive damages phase of the trial;
(3)
did
not
request
a
limiting
instruction during the liability phase
of the trial; and (4) did
[*4] not
raise instructional error as an issue
on
its original
appeal. We
also
conclude our original decision reduced
the
punitive
damages
award
to a
constitutionally
permissible
amount
that does not punish Ford for harm to
third parties. We hold there was no
evidence or argument at trial that
created a significant risk that the
jury,
in deciding
the amount
of
punitive damages to award, punished
Ford for harm it caused to third
parties. Finally, we conclude
Philip
Morris
does not require that we change
any of the holdings in our original

opinion, and thus, with some changes,
"we reiterate [our original opinion]
in its entirety." {People
v.
Velasquez
(1980)
28 Cal.3d
461,
462 [111
Cal.
Rptr.
501, 622 P.2d
952].)
INTRODUCTION
B e n e t t a B u e l l - W i l s o n (Mrs. W i l s o n )
b r o u g h t t h i s a c t i o n a g a i n s t F o r d Motor
Company (Ford) a n d Drew F o r d (Drew) 2 as
a result of the rollover and roof crush of her Ford
Explorer (Explorer) that left her a paraplegic. Mrs.
Wilson's husband Barry Wilson (Mr. Wilson) brought a
claim for loss of consortium against Ford and Drew. A
jury found in favor of Mrs. Wilson and Mr. Wilson
(together the Wilsons), finding that (1) the Explorer was
defectively unstable; (2) the Explorer was not
crashworthy due to a defect [*5] in the roof; (3) Drew
failed to warn the Wilsons that the Explorer was
defectively unstable; and (4) Ford and Drew failed to
warn the Wilsons of the danger posed by the defect in the
roof. The jury awarded Mrs. Wilson $ 109,606,004 in
damages for her injuries, consisting of $ 4,606,004 in
economic damages and $ 105 million in noneconomic
damages, and awarded Mr. Wilson $ 13 million for his
loss of consortium. The jury also found that Ford acted
with "oppression, fraud or malice" and awarded the
Wilsons $ 246 million in punitive damages. The court
later reduced Mrs. Wilson's total compensatory damages
award to $ 70 million, resulting in an award of $
4,606,004 in economic damages and $ 65,393,996 in
noneconomic damages. The court reduced Mr. Wilson's
loss of consortium damages to $ 5 million. The court
reduced the punitive damages award to $ 75 million, a
one-to-one ratio to the Wilsons' total reduced award of
compensatory damages.
2 Ford Motor Company refers to itself and Drew
Ford collectively as "Ford," except where
necessary to distinguish between the two.
Accordingly, we do the same here.
On appeal Ford asserts (1) it is entitled to a new trial
because the court erroneously admitted [*6] evidence
about stability problems with a predecessor vehicle, the
Ford Bronco II (Bronco II), and erroneously excluded
evidence of the Explorer's "real-world" safety record and
comparative data; (2) the noneconomic portion of the
compensatory damages award was excessive and an
unconstitutional violation of Ford's due process rights;
(3) punitive damages were improperly awarded because
(a) at most the Wilsons proved that "reasonable people
could disagree regarding" the design decisions Ford
made, and (b) California's punitive damages law is
unconstitutionally vague as applied; and (4) the punitive

damages award was excessive and the product of
improper considerations. We granted permission to the
Chamber, the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers
(AAM) and the PLAC to file amicus curiae briefs to
support Ford's contentions on appeal.3
3
Ford separately appealed the underlying
judgment and the court's rulings on posttrial
motions. On January 26, 2005, by stipulation of
the parties, 'these two appeals were ordered
consolidated.
We hold that (1) the award of noneconomic damages
to Mrs. Wilson, as reduced by the trial court, is excessive
under California law, is the product of "passion or [*7]
prejudice," and must be reduced to $ 18 million; (2) the
reduced award for loss of consortium in the amount of $
5 million is reasonable and is affirmed; and (3) the award
of punitive damages is excessive, violates federal due
process limitations, and must be reduced to $ 55 million,
a ratio of approximately two to one to the total
compensatory damage award, after our reduction, of $
27,606,004 ($ 4,606,004 in economic damages + $ 18
million in noneconomic damages + $ 5 million for loss of
consortium). We issue a remittitur conditioning
affirmance of the judgment on the Wilsons' agreement to
those reductions. Thus, if the Wilsons accept the
remittitur, the total judgment will be reduced to $
82,606,004 ($ 4,606,004 in economic damages + $ 18
million in noneconomic damages + $ 5 million in loss of
consortium + $ 55 million in punitive damages). We
reject the remainder of the arguments made by Ford and
amici curiae.4

A. The Accident
At around 5:00 p.m. on January 19, 2002, Mrs.
Wilson, a married 46-year-old graduate student and
mother of two, was driving her 1997 four-door Explorer
within the speed limit on Interstate 8 near Alpine,
California. The road was dry and sloped slightly
(km iiliill
Suddenly,, Mrs... Wilson saw what appeared, to be a
metal object break loose from a motor home in front of
her and bounce directly toward her windshield. As she
swerved to avoid the object, the wheels on the passenger
side lifted [*9] from the road, and the Explorer went out
of control. The vehicle fishtailed multiple times across
lanes and rolled four and a half times, coming to rest on
its roof on the road's shoulder. Ford conceded at trial that
Mrs Wilson bore no fault for the accident.
A:> die Explorer rolled, its roofs pillars and rails
crumpled, and the roof crushed down more than 10
inches, causing severe injuries to Mrs. Wilson. Inside the
vehicle, she hung upside down from her seatbelt, in
"crushing ... unbelievable pain," gasping for breath and
feeling as if her life were fading away. Motorists stopped
to assist and struggled to flip the vehicle, and rescue
crews cut the roof open to remove her. An ambulance
took her from the scene to a life flight helicopter, which
flew her to Sharp Memorial Hospital (Sharp) trauma
center.
B.Mrs. Wilson's Injuries
1. Physical injuries

4 The Wilsons also appealed the judgment, but
have voluntarily dismissed their appeal.
Following briefing in this matter, the Wilsons
filed a motion to strike allegedly false statements
made in Ford's reply brief. We ordered the motion
considered concurrently with the appeal. [*8] We
deny the motion to strike, but note that in
resolving this appeal we have not considered any
statements that are not supported by the record.
The Wilsons filed a motion for judicial notice,
requesting that we take judicial notice of the
legislative history of the 1987 amendment to Civil
Code section 3294, as well as portions of the
legislative histories for unenacted Assembly Bill
No. 2880, unenacted Assembly Bill No. 2582,
and unenacted Senate Bill No. 1429. The Wilsons
also filed a motion for judicial notice requesting
that we take judicial notice of a letter Ford filed
in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit. We grant these requests.
I'ACIUAI ANni'ROCi'.hUKAl BAC M i K O l J N D

The compressive forces from the collapsing roof
fractured and severed Mrs. Wilson's spine at the T12
level, where the thoracic and lumbar regions meet. She
will never recover sensation or function below the level
of that injury. She also suffered facial injuries, fractured
ribs, a cut spleen that caused internal bleeding, a
fractured leg [*10] and torn PCL and ACL ligaments in
both knees, causing bilateral knee dislocations.
In addition to the vertebral fractures, the spinal sac
was damaged, causing leaking of cerebral spinal fluid,
and portions of the spinal cord and nerve root were
pulverized. Doctors inserted metal screws and rods into
her back to stabilize her upper body. After almost two
weeks, she was transferred to Sharp's rehabilitation
center, where she spent another two and a half months.
Mrs. Wilson's resulting paraplegia ended her active
life and forced her to painfiilly relearn basic aspects of
daily living, some of which she will never regain. She
lives in severe and constant pain that will increase over
time. Her accident left her with no sensation from the

waist down, except "phantom pain"~a constant burning
sensation below her ribs. Above her waist, she suffers
constant pain, feels painfiil pressure on her ribs fiom the
rods in her back, and has intermittent spasms of stabbing
pain.

independent person who took joy in aiding others, to
being dependent on others for almost every aspect of her
life. Her husband and children are now her caregivers.

Medication can provide temporary pain relief, but
the strong medication needed has serious side effects. It
causes her to lose alertness, which makes it impossible to
drive. It interferes with her ability to communicate
socially. [*11] It makes her unsteady in her wheelchair.
She also runs the risk of becoming addicted to the
medication. There is a constant conflict between efforts
to reduce her pain and the debilitating side effects of the
medicine itself.

The injuries to his wife dramatically changed Mr.
Wilson's [*13] life as well. The Wilsons no longer share
the physical relationship they had prior to the accident.
Instead, he is now her caregiver and must assist her with
the most personal of care, including showering and
catheterizing her. He assists her in transferring in and out
of her wheelchair and worries that she may fall if she
tries to transfer on her own. Several times per night, he
wakes to turn his wife over in bed so that she will not get
bedsores.

The spinal injury caused a total loss of bladder and
bowel control. She must now catheterize herself multiple
times daily. Her feces must be manually extracted. In
addition to the emotional pain and humiliation from
losing control over her bodily functions, she suffers
recurring urinary tract infections, which expose her to a
potentially fatal kidney disease. Mrs. Wilson is allergic
to commonly prescribed medications, including sulfa and
penicillin, and her chronic use of antibiotics to fight
infections has caused resistance to other drugs.
Mrs. Wilson also suffers severe bruising, which
takes months to heal due to diminished circulation in her
lower body. Her feet swell and are susceptible to
cracking and bleeding. The constant grinding of her
shoulder joints from wheeling her wheelchair has caused
shoulder problems, which will worsen over time. She
suffers disfigurement, with one leg smaller than the other
and large surgical scars across her back.
2. Mental and [*12] emotional injuries
Before the accident, Mrs. Wilson was an active,
athletic, outdoors woman, with a black belt in martial
arts. She often camped and hiked with her family,
backpacked with Girl and Boy Scouts, helped with the
San Diego Tracking Team, and did projects at Mission
Trails Regional Park. She and her husband took dancing
lessons, traveled and took walks.
She no longer can engage in any of the active
lifestyle she once enjoyed, including swimming, skiing,
snowboarding, dancing, backpacking and walking. Mrs.
Wilson was finishing her masters degree in education
and was about to start a second career as a teacher. These
plans also have been indefinitely delayed and it is unclear
whether they are now possible. Mrs. Wilson is unable to
visit all the rooms in her home—including her own
bedroom—because they are inaccessible to her. She and
Mr. Wilson must sleep in their laundry room.
She has changed from a giving, enthusiastic,

C.Mr. Wilson's Loss of Consortium

Mr. Wilson has had to decrease his work schedule as
an attorney to assist his wife during the day and
accompany her to medical appointments and therapy. He
performs the household work that his wife can no longer
do. The Wilsons spend most of their time trying to
accomplish the mundane chores of daily life. Every day
Mr. Wilson shares his wife's constant pain, frustration
and anxiety in living with her injuries.
D. The Explorer's Defects
The Wilsons submitted evidence at trial that the
accident and resulting injuries were caused by two
independent defects in the 1997 Explorer. They
established that the Explorer's design was dangerously
unstable and prone to rollover due to its overly narrow
track width and high center of gravity. They also
established
[*14] that the Explorer's roof was
inadequately supported and defectively weak, so that it
readily crushed into the passenger compartment when
subjected to the forces inherent in a foreseeable rollover.
Ford has not challenged on appeal the sufficiency of
the evidence supporting the jury's finding that the
Explorer was defective on either of these grounds. 5 We
therefore review the evidence in the light most favorable
to the judgment, disregarding contrary evidence
submitted by Ford. (Bickel v. City of Piedmont (1997) 16
CalAth 1040, 1053 [68 Cal Rptr. 2d 758, 946 P,2d
427].)
5 Ford does assert that the court erroneously
admitted evidence that supported the jury's
finding on liability and erroneously excluded
evidence that supported its defense. However, as
is discussed, post, those evidentiary rulings were
not an abuse of discretion.
1. Stability defects
Long before the Wilsons purchased their Explorer,

Ford's engineers knew that the vehicle's design was
unstable and prone to rollover in emergency maneuvers
due to its high center of gravity and narrow track width.
Ford had known for decades the importance of vehicle
stability in emergency maneuvers. It knew that on flat,
dry pavement, a car or truck should slide out, rather
[* 15] than roll.
The Explorer was derived from the Bronco II and
evidence of its development history was presented to the
jury to show it how and why the Explorer's instability
defect came to exist. In 1981, two years before the
Bronco II's introduction, Ford measured the stability
index (SI) of its competitor, the Jeep CJ7, which had a
widely reported rollover problem. The SI is the average
of front and rear track width, divided by the center of
gravity height. The higher the SI rating (i.e., the wider
the track and lower the center of gravity), the more stable
the vehicle. The Jeep's SI was 2.04. The Bronco II's SI
was less, measuring 1.86. The Bronco II was so unstable
it would roll over at only 30 mph on Ford's test track.
Ford engineers proposed improving its stability index by
widening its track width. Because doing so would have
delayed the vehicle's release date and impacted profits,
that proposal was rejected by management.
Ford knew that people were being seriously 'injured
in Bronco II rollovers when the Explorer was being
developed. In April 1989, a year before the Explorer
release date, Ford executives objected to and tried to stop
the release of a damaging Consumer Reports article
[*16] on Bronco II instability.
Regarding these efforts, Jerry L. Sloan of Ford's
public affairs office wrote: "We think going in we were
in deep trouble regarding our rollover rates .... [f| ... Our
rollover rate is three times higher than the Chevy S-10
Blazer. ... [T]he [Fatality Analysis Reporting System
(FARS)] data put us in a bad light.... [10 ... [f| We think,
however, that we have clouded their minds ... ."
Instead of making design improvements in stability
for the Explorer, Ford utilized the Bronco II platform.
The Explorer had almost exactly the same track width,
high engine mount and elevated center of gravity as the
Bronco II, which caused the same instability problems.
Over half the parts for the four-door and 80 percent for
the two-door Explorer were carried over from the Bronco
II.
Ford's design engineers repeatedly requested Ford to
widen the track width and lower the center of gravity on
the Explorer to increase its stability. However,
management declined to do so. As acknowledged by
Robert Simpson, a program manager for the development
of the Explorer, this was because of "the ... investment
that Ford had sunk into the Explorer," and, as the
Wilsons' expert, [*17] Dr. David Renfroe, explained, it

was also because its "directive was u> me.-i Mitk
release date]." Dr. Renfroe also explained t ... "U>engineers were proposing to make [stability indexj
changes to be consistent with their standards and they
were prevented from doing that by the management,"
Unable to pass the Consumers Union on-track
stability test because the Explorer was rolling over at
under 45 miles per hour, Ford resorted to using computer
simulations to show the vehicle's safety. Ford claimed
the validation data for its computer results did not exist,
precluding an expert from determining whether the
Explorer actually passed the computer tests. The
Explorer did pass the Consumers Union short-course test,
but that test was designed to measure its handling, not
stability.
The Explorer's instability was increased by Ford
management's decision to utilize P235 tires that further
raised the center of gravity, instead of the P215 tires
specified and requested by its engineers to provide
greater stability. Based on his review of Ford internal
documents, the Wilsons' expert, Dr. Renfroe, testified
that Ford "knew when they made that decision that the
vehicle was going to be more unstable [*18] and more
likely to rollover in an accident avoidance maneuver, and
they were ... willing to accept the risk and take it to court,
if necessary." Ford chose larger tires to fill a cosmetic
gap between the wheel well and tire in order to present a
more "robust" look. Ford's own analysis showed that
Explorers equipped with P235 tires would have an SI of
2.08, less than the then-current 1987 Bronco II's SI of
2.15. With the P235 tires, the Explorer failed basic J-turn
stability tests.
In 1988 a Firestone engineer, who was working with
* ->rd to analyze the stability effect of different tire sizes
on the prototype Explorer, wrote to Ford complaining
about the vehicle's inherent instability: "Most
importantly, the vehicle still has [two-]wheel lift no
matter what tire is on it, 225/70, 215/75 or 205/75. So
you're kidding yourself if anyone thinks going back to a
base tire of 215/75 is going to solve anything."
Unable to pass stability tests with P235 tires, Ford
executives in 1989 considered releasing the four-door
Explorer on P225 tires in order to pass the Consumers
Union test. Later, if the Explorer passed the test, Ford
could release the vehicles with P235 tires, consistent with
its marketing [*19] plan. In an internal Ford e-mail, this
was referred to as a "strawman" that would "assure good
performance in the [Consumers Union] Test and
minimize any adverse Public Relations risk." Ford's
decision to accept the risk of using the P235 tires is
shown in an internal e-mail from Ford employee Roger
Stornant to Charles White, a senior design engineer for
the Explorer: "OGC [the office of general counsel] is

concerned we will be the only OEM [original equipment
manufacturer] with a vehicle that has a significant chance
of failing the CU [Consumers Union] test. I believe that
management is aware of the potential risk w/P235 tires
and has accepted risk."
Instead of using smaller tires, Ford executives
decided in February 1989 to underinflate the P235 and
P245 tires to 26 pounds per square inch (psi), as opposed
to the tire's specification of 35 psi. Explorer owners were
not informed of the need to underinflate the tires, nor
were they told they were exposed to the risk of a rollover
by complying with the tire's higher inflation
specifications.
Ford had an opportunity to improve the Explorer's
stability when it changed its suspension design for the
1995-1998 models. But again financial considerations
[*20] prevailed and, according to a 1990 internal Ford
document, Ford decided "not [to] take advantage of the
fact that the engine could be lowered with a[n] SLA 6
type suspension. This decision was driven by early
implementation and program cost." As a result, the
Wilsons' 1997 Explorer was no more stable than the
original model or its prototypes. According to the
Wilsons' experts, the Explorer's inherent instability
caused it to roll in response to Mrs. Wilson's emergency
avoidance maneuver, resulting in her injuries.

such as the depressed weld groove, eliminating holes
and/or using foam filling. Ford had used safer closed
section front headers in other vehicles. These
modifications would have cost about $ 20 per vehicle.
3. Ford and Drew's failure to warn the Wilsons of the
defects
The Wilsons testified that Ford and Drew did not
provide notice of the Explorer's roof crush risk. The
Wilsons also submitted evidence that Drew failed to
warn them of the instability danger posed by inflating the
P235 tires to the tire manufacturer's recommended psi.
Drew did not disclose that their Explorer was equipped
with larger P235 tires instead of smaller P225 or P215
tires, nor that underinflation was required for the larger
tires. The salesmen [*22] at Drew were unaware of an
underinflation requirement. Although Ford directed its
dealers to use no more than 26 psi in P235 tires, Drew
never warned the Wilsons of this fact. Because of this,
the Wilsons never knew to instruct attendants to
underinflate the tires below the specified 35 psi when the
vehicle was serviced.
The Wilsons testified they never would have bought
the Explorer if the rollover and tire pressure risks had
been disclosed.
E. Trial and Jury Verdict
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"SLA" is short for "short/long arm"
suspension, also known as "double wishbone"
suspension.
2. Roof strength defect
As Mrs. Wilson's Explorer rolled, the roof crushed
nearly a foot into the passenger compartment. The
Wilsons' biomechanical expert, Dr. Anthony Sances,
testified that Mrs. Wilson's spinal injury was caused by
1,000 to 2,000 pounds of force crushing down onto her
shoulder. Dr. Frank Coufal, her neurosurgeon, confirmed
that compressive force caused the spinal injury. The
Wilsons' experts testified that a stronger roof would not
have crushed and would have prevented Mrs. Wilson's
injuries.
The Wilsons presented evidence that rollovers are
relatively nonviolent events [*21] for the occupants
when they are properly restrained and there is minimal
roof intrusion, and occupants are killed or disabled only
when the roof crushes inward.
The Wilsons also presented testimony from their
engineering expert Stephen Forrest as to why the
Explorer's roof was defectively weak. The evidence
showed that Ford could have provided the Explorer with
a roof that would not have crushed by using high strength
steel, adding reinforcements, eliminating open sections

The jury deliberated for five days before reaching a
verdict. It found nine to three the Explorer had a stability
design defect that was a substantial factor in causing the
Wilsons' injuries. The jury found 11 to one that there was
a crashworthiness design defect in the roof and that this
defect was also a substantial factor in their injuries.
As to Drew, the jury found 10 to two that Drew
failed to warn the Wilsons of the stability defect. It found
in favor of Ford on this count. The jury found 10 to two
that both Ford and Drew failed to warn the Wilsons of
the Explorer's crashworthiness defect.
The jury awarded Mrs. Wilson $ 573,348 for past
economic loss, $ 4,032,656 for future economic loss, $ 6
million for past noneconomic [*23] loss and $ 99
million for future noneconomic loss.
The jury found nine to three that Ford acted with
oppression, fraud or malice. The court's poll of the jury
confirmed each of the nine jurors had found fraud,
malice or oppression by clear and convincing evidence.
In a separate phase of trial, the parties presented
evidence and arguments on punitive damages. During
closing argument, counsel for Ford said: "It's impossible
not to be angry at Ford, Ford Motor Company, for what
decisions that in marketing and selling this Ford Explorer
it knowingly put a defective product out on the market

[sic] and caused the family tragedy that you see before
you now. ... Hf] ... [%\ ... We are sorry. I don't think--I
know it rings hollow, but I am going to say it anyway.
We are sorry. We are sorry that we let you down. I k
engineers are sorry that they let the rest of the comp;tn\
down."
I !u ;ur\ awarded $ 246 million in punitive damages.

Ford filed motions for nevA
notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV
The JNOV motion attacked the evidence supporting
the punitive damages award. The court reexamined tlv
evidence and concluded that the Wilsons had met [*? ' ;
their burden of producing clear and convincing evidem
that Ford acted with malice, a conscious disregard
safety, and engaged in despicable conduct.
Ford's motion for new trial challenged the si/e i»: •
compensatory and punitive damages award. The CJU:.
found "the damages awarded are excessive," but also
stated, "The Court does not find that the jury rendered its
verdict due to passion or prejudice." The court
conditionally granted a new trial unless the Wilsons
consented to a reduction of Mrs. Wilson's compensatory
damages award to $ 70 million, Mr. Wilson's loss of
consortium award to $ 5 million and the punitive
damages award to $ 75 million. Subtracting the jury's
award of economic damages in the amount of $
4,606,004, the court's remittitur left Mrs. Wilson with an
award of noneconomic damages in the amount of $
65,393,996.
In assessing the propriety of the amount of
compensatory damages awarded to Mrs. Wilson, the
court stated: "The evidence, in the Court's opinion, is
insufficient to support a compensatory damage verdict in
favor of [Mrs. Wilson] in the amount of $ 109,606,004.
In reaching that finding and the other findings on the
verdict on damages, the Court has weighed [*25] the
evidence, including reasonable inferences therefrom, and
is convinced from the entire record the jury clearly
should have reached a different verdict on damages. That
same evidence, however, ... is sufficient to support a
compensatory damage award in favor of [Mrs. Wilson] in
the amount of [$ 70 million]."
In assessing the proper amount of punitive damages
to be awarded the court stated: "In considering these
factors, the evidence showed Ford had a pattern of
deficient design regarding safety in favor of increased
financial returns and was a result of the conscious
disregard of Ford executives. That evidence was
primarily adduced through Ford's own internal
memoranda and correspondence. This conduct was

reprehensible and weighs in favor of punitive damages,
[f] The remittitur reduces the punitive damage award to a
one-to-one ratio relative to the compensatory award. This
is well within the second guidepost set forth by the
Supreme Court. Even as reduced, the compensatory
damage award is large. When compensatory awards are
substantial, a ratio of [punitive damages] equal to the
compensatory damages is within the limits of the due
process guarantee. [Citation.] The punitive damages
[*26] are fair and reasonable and proportionate to the
mount of harm suffered by the [Wilsons],"
re W ilsons accepted the remittitur and an amended
:ent was entered on September 3, 2004. Ford's
inch appeals followed.
\RGUMENT

ttronco II Evidence
Ford asserts it is entitled to a new trial because the
..;al court erroneously admitted evidence regarding the
f bronco II vehicle. This contention is unavailing.
iiackground
Ford contends the court erred in denying its motion
• -• limine that sought to exclude as irrelevant "all
evidence relating to the Bronco II and Ford's decision to
cease manufacture of the Bronco II." In response, the
Wilsons submitted evidence that the Explorer's relevant
design characteristics were derived from the Bronco II
and that Ford had knowledge of the rollover risk posed
b> that design.
The trial court denied Ford's motion, finding the
Explorer's development was "intimately tied" to the
Bronco IPs development, as shown by Ford's internal
documents.
Ford's motion for new trial asserted the court erred
by allowing evidence of the Bronco II. The court rejected
this argument, finding that the Wilsons "presented
substantial evidence of the design carry-over [*27] from
the Bronco II to the Explorer, evidence of the
intermingling of the development and testing of the
Bronco II and the Explorer and the similar source of
rollover problems between the Bronco II and Explorer
for the Court to find the two vehicles are substantially
similar,"
2. Analysis
" 'Broadly speaking, an appellate court applies the
abuse of discretion standard of review to any ruling by a
trial court on the admissibility of evidence' " (City of

Ripon v. Sweetin (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 887, 900 [122
Cal Rptr. 2d 802]) " ' "The burden is on the party
complaining to establish an abuse of discretion, and
unless a clear case of abuse is shown and unless there has
been a miscarriage of justice a reviewing court will not
substitute its opinion and thereby divest the trial court of
its discretionary power." ' " {Dorman v. DWLC Corp.
(1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1808, 1815 [42 Cal. Rptr. 2d
459].)
The court did not abuse its discretion in admitting
evidence of similar design flaws in the Bronco II to those
alleged to exist in the Explorer. The Wilsons' expert, Dr.
Renfroe, testified that the Explorer and the Bronco II
shared the specific dangerous design characteristics that
created instability. In fact, it would have been impossible
not [*28] to have evidence on the similarities of the
Explorer and Bronco II's stability characteristics as Ford
itself assessed the stability of the Explorer by comparison
to the Bronco II.
(1) Ford asserts that it was error to introduce
evidence of the Bronco II because they were different
vehicles, citing many differences in design. However, the
evidence went to similarities in a particular design flaw,
not the vehicles as a whole. Where a plaintiff intends to
adduce evidence of the functioning of related products to
prove that the product in question was defective,
identical conditions need not be present between the two
systems. Substantial similarity is sufficient. (See Hasson
v. Ford Motor Co. (1982) 32 CaUd 388, 403-404 [185
Cal. Rptr. 654, 650 P.2d 1171] {Hasson), disapproved on
other grounds in Soule v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 8
CalAth 548, 574 [34 Cal Rptr. 2d 607, 882 P.2d 298]
(Soule).) Thus, in an action against an automobile
manufacturer to recover damages arising out of an
automobile accident caused by brake failure in a 1966
model vehicle, the California Supreme Court held that
the trial court had a reasonable basis for admitting
evidence of numerous failures occurring in 1965 models
for the purpose of showing that 1966 models were
similarly defective, [*29] even if plaintiffs did not prove
that the 1965 system was exactly the same as the 1966
system. (Hasson, supra, at pp. 403-404.)
Ford argues that the Explorer's and Bronco II's
stability characteristics were not sufficiently similar to
allow the evidence concerning the Bronco II. The trial
judge in the first mstance must determine if the design
characteristics are sufficiently similar. (Hasson, supra,
32 Cal. 3d at p. 404.) As discussed, ante, the court found
that the Bronco II's and Explorer's relevant design
characteristics were substantially similar, and we must
give substantial deference to that finding. (See BadoSantana v. Ford Motor Co. (D.P.R. 2005) 364 F. Supp.
2d 79, 92-94 [in rollover case involving Explorer, court
denied Ford's motion in limine to exclude evidence of

design and development history of Bronco II as too
dissimilar to Explorer, finding such evidence relevant to
Ford's knowledge of and failure to correct stability
design flaws].)
Moreover, "[w]hen evidence is offered to show only
that defendant had notice of a dangerous condition, the
requirement of similarity of circumstances is relaxed: '
"[A]U that is required ... is that the previous injury should
be such [*30] as to attract the defendant's attention to the
dangerous situation." ' " (Hasson, supra, 32 Cal. 3d at p.
404.) Here, the evidence was relevant to prove that Ford
knew it was designing and manufacturing a vehicle with
the same stability design defects as the Bronco II.
(2) The Bronco II evidence was also relevant to
show Ford's malice in order to support an award of
punitive damages. "Marketing a product that is known to
be defective and dangerous to consumers supports an
inference of malice for purposes of punitive damages."
(Karlsson v. Ford Motor Co. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th
1202, 1230 [45 Cal Rptr. 3d 265] (Karlsson); Grimshaw
v. Ford Motor Co. (1981) 119 Cal App. 3d 757, 814
[174 Cal. Rptr. 348] (Grimshaw); Taylor v. Superior
Court (1979) 24 CaUd 890, 895 [157 Cal Rptr. 693,
598 P.2d 854] (Taylor) [malice may be shown by fact the
defendant had acted with a "conscious disregard of the
safety of others"].)
Ford knew that to increase a vehicle's stability, it
needed to widen the vehicle's track width and lower the
center of gravity. The Wilsons presented evidence that
Ford engineers requested such changes in the Explorer's
design, but the changes were rejected. The Explorer's
center of gravity, track width and SI were substantially
similar to that of the Bronco [*31] II.
The court did not abuse its discretion in admitting
evidence concerning the Bronco II's stability problems,
as the Explorer's stability characteristics were
substantially similar. The evidence was relevant to prove
the cause of the Explorer's stability defect, to show notice
on Ford's part at the time it was designing the Explorer
and to establish malice on the part of Ford.
B. Exclusion of Ford's Comparative Rollover Statistics
Ford asserts that the court erred by excluding Ford's
"real-world safety record and comparative data" relating
to Explorer rollover rates. We reject this contention.
1. Background
Ford cites several evidentiary rulings it asserts were
erroneous regarding the Explorer's comparative rollover
rates. First, the court ordered stricken from the trial court
record testimony offered by Ford that the Explorer "had
one of the best rollover rates compared to other SUV's

[sports utility vehicles] in its class." Hie court also
refused to allow Ford's automotive engineering expert,
Don Tandy, to testify as to whether the Explorer had a
higher rollover rate than other SUV's. Ford asserts that
the court erred in refusing to allow its statistical expert,
William Wecker, Ph.D., [*32] to testify that the Explorer
had a rollover rate comparable to other SUV's. The court
also refused to allow Ford's stability expert, Lee Carr, to
testify concerning accident statistics and rollover rates of
other vehicles.
Ford also contends that the court "compounded its
errors" by allowing several of the Wilsons' witnesses to
testify concerning their involvement in other Explorer
rollover cases.
2. Waiver
Hie Wilsons assert that Ford waived the riti.hi ••*
assert error regarding the testimony of its expert ! >:
Wecker concerning the Explorer's rollover rate compared
to other vehicles. The Wilsons point out that they
brought a motion in limine to exclude his opinion, but the
court reserved ruling on his testimony pending a
foundational showing by Ford, and thereafter Ford did
not attempt to lay a foundation for his testimony.
Ford responds that the court ruled Dr. Wecker's
testimony inadmissible in an unreported sidebar
conference and that counsel for the Wilsons
acknowledged this ruling on the record when it argued
against admission of other similar evidence that Ford
could not "get in from the Wecker types." Ford also
asserts that it objected on several occasions more
generally that it [*33] should have been allowed to
present evidence of the Explorer's safety record as
compared to other vehicles.
We conclude that there was no waiver. First, a
review of the trial transcript indicates that counsel for the
Wilsons did acknowledge on the record that Dr.
Wecker's testimony was previously excluded by the
court. Moreover, " '[w]here an entire class of evidence
has been declared inadmissible or the trial court has
clearly intimated it will receive no evidence of a
particular class or upon a particular issue, an offer of
proof is not a prerequisite to raising the question on
appeal ... .' [Citation.]" (Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice
Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2005)
18:275.6, p. 8-154.)
3. Analysis
Ford asserts the expert testimony concerning the
Explorer's comparative rollover rate was admissible to
demonstrate that the Explorer "is a reasonably safe
vehicle that is not unusually prone to roll over in
comparison to other vehicles." However, such evidence

was irrelevant and inadmissible.
(3) A manufacturer cannot defend a product liability
action with evidence it met its industry's customs or
standards on safety. (Grimshaw, supra, 119 Cal App. 3d
at p. 803; Foglio v. Western Auto Supply (1976) 56 Cal.
App. 3d 470, 477 [128 Cal Rptr. 545].) [*34] In fact,
admission of such evidence is reversible error. {Heap v.
General Motors Corp. (1977) 66 Cal App. 3d 824, 830832 1136 Cal Rptr. 304]; see also Use Note to BAJINo.
3.16 (Fall 2007-2008 ed.) p. 78 [entitled "Evidence of
Custom in Relation to Ordinary Care"; "It is error to give
this instruction in a cause of action limited to strict
liability"].) This is because in strict liability actions, "the
issue is not whether defendant exercised reasonable
care." (Foglio, supra, 56 Cal. App. 3d at p. 477.) Rather,
the issue is whether the product fails to perform as the
ordinary consumer would expect. (Barker v. Lull
Engineering Co. (1978) 20 Cal3d 413, 435 [143 Cal
Rptr. 225, 573 P.2d 443] (Barker).)
In Grimshaw, supra, 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, the
defect at issue was the Ford Pinto's gas tank. There, Ford
requested the court instruct the jury that, in considering
whether the gas tank was defective, it was to consider "
'the extent to which its (Pinto's) design and manufacture
matched the average quality of other automobiles and the
extent to which its design and manufacture deviated from
the norm for automobiles designed and manufactured at
the same point in time.' " (Id. at p. 803.) The Court of
Appeal held that the trial court properly [*35] refused
the instruction as improper evidence of industry custom
or practice. (Ibid.)
Here, the trial court properly excluded evidence Ford
proffered to prove the Explorer's rollover rate was
comparable to other vehicles on the road. That evidence
impermissibly sought to show that it met industry
standards or custom for rollovers.
Ford asserts that the comparative rollover rate was
relevant to the "risk/benefit" analysis that must be
considered in determining if a product is defective, citing
Barker, supra, 20 Cal.3d 413. However, as explained in
Grimshaw, the Barker risk/benefit analysis does not
allow admission of such evidence: "The Barker court's
enumeration of factors which may be considered under
the risk-benefit test not only fails to mention custom or
usage in the industry, the court otherwise makes clear by
implication that they are inappropriate considerations."
(Grimshaw, supra, 119 Cal App. 3d at p. 803.)
Ford also contends that the comparative rollover
evidence was relevant to prove it did not act with
oppression, fraud or malice and therefore was admissible
to rebut the Wilsons' claim for punitive damages.
However, as will be discussed in more detail, post, the
Court, of [*36] Appeal in Grimshaw, supra, 119 Cal

App. 3d 757, held that compliance with industry
standards or custom was irrelevant not only to the issue
of defect, but also to the issue of punitive damages. (Id.
at pp. 792, 803, 807-822.) Indeed, counsel for Ford
acknowledged at trial that the Wilsons' punitive damages
allegations did not change Grimshaw's prohibition on
industry custom and practice evidence.
Even if the comparative rollover data were not
inadmissible as a matter of law as improper industry and
custom evidence, it would still be inadmissible as
unreliable and misleading. Ford's statistics from which
the comparable rollover rate testimony would flow were
drawn from two databases, FARS and a state database
tracking state accident information. FARS only included
fatal rollover accidents and did not compare the relative
stability of vehicles, included all vehicle types, not just
SUV's, and did not track the cause of rollovers or the
resulting injuries. The state database encompassed
accidents from only 10 states, did not include the two
most populous states, California and Texas, and did not
detail causes of the rollovers.
In Ford's offer of proof for its expert Carr, it
acknowledged [*37] his proposed testimony compared
the Explorer's rollover performance to a variety of
dissimilar vehicles, including Greyhound buses and
passenger cars. The court excluded only that portion of
his testimony. Carr opined that the Explorer's design did
not contribute to the rollover. Rather, according to Carr,
the Explorer rolled because Mrs. Wilson steered it onto
the dirt shoulder, which, because of the loose soil and
uneven terrain, would make any vehicle, not just the
Explorer, susceptible to rolling over. Carr also testified
that the Explorer complied with stability guidelines
related to steering. Over the Wilsons' objection, Carr was
allowed to show a video of the rollover response of a
1992 Chevrolet van to challenge the testing methodology
used by the Wilsons' expert, Dr. Renfroe. Over the
Wilsons' objection, he was also allowed to testify
concerning the number of rollovers of various vehicles
around the country. According to Carr, the vast majority
of rollovers for all types of vehicles happened off the
paved surface of the road.
Further, while the court excluded evidence of the
Explorer's comparative safety, accident or injury rates, it
did not exclude the Explorer's own "real-world [*38]
safety record." Indeed, Ford never proffered such
evidence at trial.
The court did not abuse its discretion by excluding
Ford's proffered evidence on comparative rollover rates.
The court also did not "compound its errors" by allowing
several of the Wilsons' witnesses to testify as to their
involvement in other Explorer rollover cases. Ford did
not object to this testimony as improper. The only

objection to this testimony overruled by the court was
Ford's "asked and answered" objection.
II. NONECONOMC DAMAGES
Ford asserts that the noneconomic damages award of
approximately $ 65 million to Mrs. Wilson, and the $ 5
million award to Mr. Wilson, as remitted by the court,
are excessive as a matter of law, are the result of passion
and prejudice, are extreme when viewed against awards
that have been upheld in comparable cases, and violate
its due process rights. Amicus curiae AAM also asserts
that the award violates due process principles. We
conclude that the noneconomic damage award to Mrs.
Wilson is excessive, the result of passion or prejudice,
and that the substantial evidence in this case supports an
award of $ 18 million. We also conclude, however, that
Mrs. Wilson's award did not violate [*39] due process
principles. We conclude the award to Mr. Wilson of $ 5
million in damages for loss of consortium is reasonable
and we affirm that award.
A. Size of the Award
1. Standard of review
(4) "The amount of damages is a fact question, first
committed to the discretion of the jury and next to the
discretion of the trial judge on a motion for new trial.
They see and hear the witnesses and frequently ... see the
injury and the impairment that has resulted therefrom. ...
The power of the appellate court differs materially from
that of the trial court in passing on this question. An
appellate court can interfere on the ground that the
judgment is excessive only on the ground that the verdict
is so large that, at first blush, it shocks the conscience
and suggests passion, prejudice or corruption on the part
of the jury." (Seffertv. Los Angeles Transit Lines (1961)
56 CaUd 498, 506-507 [15 Cal. Rptr. 161, 364 P.2d
337], citation omitted (Seffert).)
"The reviewing court does not act de novo, however.
As we have observed, the trial court's determination of
whether damages were excessive 'is entitled to great
weight' because it is bound by the 'more demanding test
of weighing conflicting evidence than our standard of
review [*40] under the substantial evidence rule
'
[Citation.] All presumptions favor the trial court's
determination [citation], and we review the record in the
light most favorable to the judgment [citation]."
(Fortman v. Hemco, Inc. (1989) 211 Cal. App. 3d 241,
259 [259 Cal. Rptr. 311] (Fortman).)
Further, " '[w]here the trial court has required a
remission as a condition to denying a new trial "a verdict
is reviewed on appeal as if it had been returned in the
first instance by the jury in the reduced amount." ' "

(West v. Johnson & Johnson Products, Inc. (1985) 174
Cal. App. 3d831, 877 [220 Cal Rptr. 437] (West).)
2. Analysis
(5) In reviewing a noneconomic damage award
"[t]here are no fixed or absolute standards by which an
appellate court can measure in monetary terms the extent
of the damages suffered by a plaintiff as a result of the
wrongful act of the defendant. The duty of an appellate
court is to uphold the jury and trial judge whenever
possible. [Citation.] The amount to be awarded is fa
matter on which there legitimately may be a wide
difference of opinion' [citation]. In considering the
contention that the damages are excessive the appellate
court must determine every conflict in the evidence in
respondent's favor, and [*41] must give him [or her] the
benefit of every inference reasonably to be drawn from
the record [citation]. [%\ While the appellate court should
consider the amounts awarded in prior cases for similar
injuries, obviously, each case must be decided on its own
facts and circumstances. Such examination demonstrates
that such awards vary greatly. [Citations.] Injuries are
seldom identical and the amount of pain and suffering
involved in similar physical injuries varies widely. These
factors must be considered." (Seffert, supra, 56 Cal.2d at
p. 508.)
Further, "[t]he fact that an award may set a
precedent by its size does not in and of itself render it
suspect. The determination of the jury can only be
assessed by examination of the particular circumstances
involved." (Rodriguez v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.
(1978) 87 Cal. App. 3d 626, 654-655 [151 Cal. Rptr.
399].)
"An appellate court should not assume to substitute
its appraisal, for that of a jury, of the amount of damages
for physical pain and mental suffering sustained by a
party in a case where trial by jury was had as a matter of
right [citation], but in a case where it appears that a
verdict is so grossly disproportionate to any reasonable
limit of compensation [*42] warranted by the facts as to
shock the sense of justice and raise at once a strong
presumption that it is based on prejudice or passion
rather than sober judgment [citations] the appellate court
may reverse the judgment and remand the case for a new
trial either on all the issues or on the issue of damages
alone [citations], or it may, in the interests of justice and
with the consent of the party against whom the
modification is made, modify the judgment as to the
amount of damages, and affirm it as modified
[citations]." (Deevy v. Tassi (1942) 21 Cal.2d 109, 120121 [130 P.2d 389] (Deevy); see also Hunton v.
California Portland etc. Co. (1944) 64 Cal. App. 2d 876,
882-885 [149 P.2d 471] [trial court, on a motion for new
trial, found compensatory damages award excessive and

reduced a jury verdict of $ 40,000 to $ 18,000; on appeal
the appellate court, finding the award still excessive,
reduced the damages to $ 10,000].)
Ford characterizes the jury's award to the Wilsons of
$ 118 million in noneconomic damages ($ 105 million to
Mrs. Wilson + $ 13 million to Mr. Wilson) and the courtreduced award of approximately $ 70 million
(approximately $ 65 million to Mrs. Wilson + $ 5 million
to Mr. Wilson) as "irrational, [*43] punitive, and the
clear product of passion and prejudice" and asserts that
the evidence "does not come close to supporting this
unprecedented award."7 Although Mrs. Wilson's injuries
were catastrophic, analyzing all appropriate factors,
reviewing the trial court record, and using our collective
experience, we conclude we must reduce the
noneconomic damage award as excessive and the product
of passion and prejudice. We also conclude the loss of
consortium award to Mr. Wilson is reasonable and affirm
that award. Because Ford focuses its discussion almost
exclusively on the award to Mrs. Wilson, our analysis
likewise focuses on whether that award was excessive.8
7
In making this assertion, Ford neglects to
discuss the evidence in support of the Wilsons'
damages at all, much less in the light most
favorable to the judgment. This failure in itself
would allow this court to disregard Ford's
arguments concerning damages. (Nwosu v. Uba
(2004) 122 Cal.App. 4th 1229, 1246 [19 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 416].) Nevertheless, we elect to consider
Ford's contention on the merits.
8 We also note, as discussed, ante, that we do
not review whether the jury's original award of $
118 million to the Wilsons "shocks the
conscience and suggests [*44] passion, prejudice
or corruption on the part of the jury." (Seffert,
supra, 56 Cal.2d at p. 507.) Rather, since the
court remitted the award to $ 70 million as a
condition of denying Ford's motion for new trial,
we review the noneconomic damage award " ' "as
if it had been returned in the first instance by the
jury in the reduced amount."' " (West, supra, 174
Cal. App. 3d at p. 877.)
a. Nature of Mrs. Wilson's injuries
A review of the evidence shows the substantial
nature of the Wilsons' noneconomic injuries. Mrs.
Wilson, a once vibrant and energetic wife and mother is
now a paraplegic, who is in constant and debilitating
pain, has lost all control over her bladder and bowel
movements, and now requires constant care from her
husband. She is disfigured and subject to ailments
associated with her injuries that could worsen her injuries

and shorten her life span. Mr. Wilson has lost his role as
a husband. He is now a constant caregiver.
(6) Noneconomic damages do not consist of only
emotional distress and pain and suffering. They also
consist of such items as invasion of a person's bodily
integrity (i.e., the fact of the injury itself), disfigurement,
disability, impaired enjoyment of life,
[*45]
susceptibility to future harm or injury, and a shortened
life expectancy. (Judicial Council of Cal. Civ. Jury
Instns. (2008), CACINo. 3905A.)
In this case, the noneconomic damages suffered by
Mrs. Wilson were substantial, permanent, and support a
significant award. However, the reduced award of
approximately $ 65 million is, even given the severity of
her injuries, disproportionate to those injuries so as to
"raise a strong presumption that it is based on prejudice
or passion." (Saari v. Jongordan Corp. (1992) 5
Cal.App.4th 797, 807 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 82].)
b. Amount of award versus projected life span
We also consider the amount of the damage award in
connection with Mrs. Wilson's projected life span of 35
years. 9 The damage award, as reduced by the court, still
amounts to approximately $ 1,868,399 per year over her
projected life span, an extremely high amount. Ford on
the other hand argues an award of $ 1 million is
reasonable, which would work out to $ 28,571 per year,
and only $ 78 per day. While we believe that the award
as reduced by the trial court is still excessive, we also do
not believe that Ford's suggested award fairly and justly
compensates Mrs. Wilson.
9 Mrs. Wilson's projected life span at [*46] the
time of trial was 33 years. However, we use 35
years here because the award of noneconomic
damages included an award for approximately
two years of past general damages.
c. Comparison with other awards
In support of its position the noneconomic damage
award is excessive as a matter of law, Ford attempts to
compare that award to published California decisions that
have upheld damage awards on similar facts. The
Wilsons, on the other hand, argue that it is not
appropriate to compare the award here to other cases, and
that we must review it only by looking at the particular
facts of this case. We conclude that while it is
appropriate to look at awards in similar cases, ultimately
we must determine the propriety of the award on a caseby-case basis.
In Sejfert, supra, 56 Cal. 2d at page 508, the
California Supreme Court stated, "While the appellate
court should consider the amounts awarded in prior

cases for similar injuries, [*47] obviously, each case
must be decided on its own facts and circumstances.
Such examination demonstrates that such awards vary
greatly. [Citations.] Injuries are seldom identical and the
amount of pain and suffering involved in similar physical
injuries varies widely." (Italics added.)
More recently, the California Supreme Court made
the following statements in a footnote: "Defendants have
compiled a lengthy list of judgments awarding damages
which have been reversed on appeal as excessive. Those
cases do not, in and of themselves, mandate a reversal
here. The vast variety of and disparity between awards in
other cases demonstrate that injuries can seldom be
measured on the same scale. The measure of damages
suffered is a factual question and as such is a subject
particularly within the province of the trier of fact. For a
reviewing court to upset a jury's factual determination on
the basis of what other juries awarded to other plaintiffs
for other injuries in other cases based upon different
evidence would constitute a serious invasion into the
realm of factfinding. [Citations.] Thus, we adhere to the
previously announced and historically honored standard
of reversing as excessive only [*48] those judgments
which the entire record, when viewed most favorably to
the judgment, indicates were rendered as a result of
passion and prejudice on the part of the jurors." (Bertero
v. National General Corp. (1974) 13 CaUd 43, 65, fn.
12 [118 Cal. Rptr. 184, 529 P.2d 608] (Bertero), italics
added.)
(7) The Wilsons assert that Bertero stands for the
proposition that courts of appeal should not compare the
damages in other similar cases at all in reviewing a claim
that an award is excessive. However, we do not read
Bertero so broadly. Its criticism of comparing damage
awards from other cases was limited to the statement that
judgments awarding damages in other cases "do not, in
and of themselves, mandate a reversal." (Bertero, supra,
13 Cal. 3d at p. 65, fn. 12, italics added.) In the quoted
footnote the Bertero court cited the earlier Sejfert court
as support for its conclusion. {Bertero, supra, at p. 65, fn.
12.) Therefore, we conclude a verdict is not excessive as
a matter of law simply because it exceeds the amount
awarded in other cases. Courts of appeal must make their
decisions based on the evidence in the case being
reviewed. However, evidence of other verdicts is still
relevant as a point of reference, to provide [*49] context
to the award by establishing a range of values for similar
injuries.
Ford cites five reported California decisions where
noneconomic damages for purportedly similar injuries
ranged from $ 1 million to $ 8.4 million. (Mendoza v.
Club Car, Inc. (2000) 81 CalAppAth 287 [96 Cal. Rptr.
2d 605] [50-year-old plaintiff-award of $ 1 million];
Niles v. City of San Rafael (1974) 42 Cal. App. 3d 230

[116 Cal. Rptr. 733] (Niles) [child suffered paralysis
from head trauma-award of $ 1,604,371]; Rosh v. Cave
Imaging Systems, Inc. (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1225 [32
Cal. Rptr. 2d 136] [plaintiff rendered paraplegic from
gunshot-award of $ 2.99 million]; Fortman, supra, 211
Cal. App. 3d 241 [three-year-old girl rendered paraplegic
from fall from car-$ 6 million award]; Hess v. Ford
Motor Co. (2002) 27 CalAih 516 [117 Cal Rptr. 2d 220,
41 P. 3d 46] (Hess) [plaintiff rendered paraplegic after his
truck rolled-$ 8.4 million award].)
However, the cited cases are of only small
assistance. Of the five California cases cited by Ford, in
only two were the damages claimed to be excessive, and
in both cases the damages awards were upheld. (Niles,
supra, 42 Cal. App. 3d at p. 244\ Fortman, supra, 211
Cal. App. 3d at p. 261.) In the case with the largest
noneconomic damage award, the size of [*50] the award
was not challenged on appeal. (Hess, supra, 27 Cal. 4th
at p. 520.) Ford cites no published California decisions
involving same or similar injuries where a noneconomic
damage award was reversed as excessive.
The Wilsons, on the other hand, cite an unpublished
California decision upholding an award of $ 38 million in
combined economic and noneconomic damages, reduced
by 50 percent due to the plaintiffs comparative fault, to a
quadriplegic who was 53 years old, and an award to his
wife of $ 13 million for loss of consortium. The Wilsons
also cite a published decision by an appellate court in
Indiana that upheld an award of $ 55 million in combined
economic, noneconomic, and loss of consortium
damages, already reduced by a finding that the plaintiff
was 20 percent at fault, making the total award $ 66
million. (Ritterv. Stanton (Ind.Ct.App. 2001) 745KK2d
828, 833, 857.)
A review of all of these cases shows a range
between $ 1 million and $ 66 million in compensatory
damages awards and substantial differences in the facts
of each case. This demonstrates that while a comparison
of other cases may give us a point of reference,
ultimately our decision must be based on the evidence
[*51] in this case.
d. Evidence in record that jury acted out of passion or
prejudice
Perhaps the most important factor that we must
consider in determining if the award of noneconomic
damages is excessive, other than the amount of the award
itself, is whether there is evidence in the record to
support the defendants' claim that the jury acted out of
passion or prejudice. In this case we have substantial
evidence in the record that demonstrates the jury's award
was the product of such improper emotions and therefore
must be reduced.

In discussing economic damages in closing
argument, counsel for the Wilsons argued that Mrs.
Wilson suffered "an economic loss of $ 4.6 million
dollars ... , based on the evidence that came before you."
The jury awarded Mrs. Wilson that amount, and thus the
reasonableness of her economic damages is not in
dispute on appeal.
In discussing noneconomic damages in his closing
argument, counsel for the Wilsons described some of the
matters that could be included in such an award. This
included past and future physical pain, mental suffering,
and loss of enjoyment of life. Counsel then suggested a
method for calculating these numbers, taking into
account the past injury, [*52] as well as future injuries
over her 33-year life expectancy. Following that
discussion, counsel made the following statement: "I
respectfully submit that if you look at the catastrophic
injury that we have, the numbers there, they are probably
three to four times the specials is what you are going to
find. It's going to be fair, just and reasonable. And this is
an awful lot of money. I know it is. It's a lot of money.
But when someone says it's a lot of money, why are we
doing this, you tell them it's a lot of pain. It's a loss of a
human being's dignity and worth. ... And I submit to you
that there is no higher value than a good woman who is a
good wife, a good mother, a good neighbor, that is out
there helping others. And I can't put the number on it, but
I want you to be reasonable, just and fair, recognizing the
humanity of this issue." (Italics added.) Thus, counsel
was requesting the jury award noneconomic damages to
Mrs. Wilson in an amount three to four times the amount
they awarded in economic damages, or $ 13.8 to $ 18.4
million.
As to Mr. Wilson's loss of consortium claim, counsel
argued that "it's probably going to be equated perhaps
reasonably just to what the economic [*53] loss is for his
noneconomic loss." Counsel was thus requesting that the
jury award Mr. Wilson $ 4.6 million for his loss of
consortium claim.
Next, addressing all the compensatory damages, the
Wilsons' counsel stated the following: "I invite defense
counsel to address my discussion of damages. If he does
not discuss damages in his closing, if he does not
disagree with me, you can accept these numbers as
reasonable andjust andfair." (Italics added.)
Defense counsel did not address the issue of
damages in closing argument.
When we compare these numbers to the amount the
jury awarded, it is apparent the jury disregarded the
Wilsons' counsel's own statements as to what was a
reasonable amount to award in this case. On
noneconomic damages to Mrs. Wilson, the jury awarded

$ 1 0 5 million, or approximately 13 times the amount
counsel represented was "fair, just and reasonable." The
reduced award of approximately $ 65 million is still
approximately three to five times that amount. The size
of the award provides compelling evidence that the jury
rejected what even the Wilsons' counsel believed was fair
and reasonable and acted out of passion or prejudice.
The jury's award of loss of consortium damages
[*54] also supports our conclusion. The jury awarded
Mr. Wilson $ 13 million for his loss of consortium claim,
or almost three times the amount the Wilsons' counsel
requested.
The jury's complete rejection of the damages
suggested by the Wilsons' counsel, a range for
noneconomic damages and an amount for loss of
consortium that counsel characterized as fair, reasonable
and just, is compelling evidence the jury acted out of
passion or prejudice. The fact the jury's award, and the
award as remitted by the court, far exceeded, and had no
relation to, the amounts requested by counsel suggests
the jury was not acting as a fair and neutral trier of fact.
There was also a question posed by Ford's counsel,
in light of Mrs. Wilson's catastrophic injuries, that may
well have inflamed the passions of the jury significantly
enough to result in the excessive damage award. Ford's
trial counsel, in its last question on cross-examination of
Mr. Wilson, posited the following:
"[Q] The silver lining, to the extent that there could
be one, it has brought you and [Mrs. Wilson] and the
family closer together? Of]...
"[A] I think where we were together before, we are
together after. I don't think it's done more [*55] for us. I
think it's—I don't think it's a benefit or a plus in any way.
I am sorry, I don't think I can see it that way."
This question implied that the family should find a
silver lining in what befell Mrs. Wilson. It may very well
have been viewed as callous by the jury and might
explain, in some manner, the actions of the jury in
rendering a verdict so out of line with the amounts
requested by the Wilsons' own counsel.
e. Our review of the record
In addition to considering the above factors, we have
reviewed the record to determine whether the award, as
remitted by the court, is excessive. This includes
reviewing the nature and extent of Mrs. Wilson's injuries,
the testimony of lay and expert witnesses on damages
and the damage award. Our own review of the record
reveals the noneconomic damage award was excessive
and was the product of passion or prejudice.
f. Conclusion

Based on all of the above factors, and utilizing our
collective experience, we conclude the award of
noneconomic damages to Mrs. Wilson, even as remitted
by the court, was excessive, and the facts of this case
instead support an award of $ 18 million, within the
ratio/range requested by the Wilsons' counsel. As [*56]
we have discussed, ante, the award, even as reduced by
the trial court, far exceeds the amount suggested as
reasonable, fair and just by the Wilsons' attorney. That is
compelling evidence the jury acted out of "passion amd
prejudice" in awarding noneconomic damages. Further,
although each case must be analyzed on its own facts, the
award far exceeds any award we could locate that was
upheld by a California appellate court.
However, the reduction to $ 18 million in
noneconomic damages is in the range of one recent
unreported decision in California where the award of
such damages was upheld on appeal. Moreover, utilizing
our collective experience, we conclude an award of $ 18
million in noneconomic damages is proportionate to Mrs.
Wilson's substantial injuries, and is proportionate to the
economic damages award. Considering the substantial
nature of Mrs. Wilson's injuries, we conclude $ 18
million is a just and reasonable amount and an amount "
'a reasonable person would estimate as fair
compensation' " under the circumstances of this case.
(Duarte v. Zachariah (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1652, 1665
[28Cal.Rptr.2d88].)
Ford summarily asserts the remitted award of $ 5
million for loss of consortium to Mr. Wilson [*57] was
also excessive, citing cases with loss of consortium
awards of $ 229,000 to $ 2.55 million. However, utilizing
the same factors we considered above, and noting the
devastating impact on Mr. Wilson's life that Ford's
conduct has caused, we do not find the remitted award
for loss of consortium to be excessive or the product of
passion or prejudice. The amount to which the court
reduced these damages approximates the amount
suggested by the Wilsons' counsel.
To avoid further delay and expense to the parties,
and because the record in this matter is sufficiently
definite to determine the proper amount of noneconomic
damages, we will remit the award of noneconomic
damages to $ 18 million for Mrs. Wilson, conditioned on
her acceptance of this reduced amount. If Mrs. Wilson
does not agree to the reduced amount, the matter will be
reversed and remanded for a new trial on the issue of
noneconomic damages, as specified in California Rules
of Court, rule 8.264(d).10
10 Ford asserts that if the noneconomic damages
award to Mrs. Wilson is determined to be the
product of passion or prejudice, we are required,

as a matter of law, to grant a new trial on all
issues. However, case authority demonstrates
[*58] it is appropriate to issue a remittitur under
such circumstances. (See Deevy, supra, 21 Cal.2d
at pp. 120-121; Bellman v. San Francisco H. S.
Dist. (1938) 11 Cal.2d 576, 586-589 [81 P.2d
894]; Las Palmas Associates v. Las Palmas
Center Associates (1991) 235 Cal. App. 3d 1220,
1255-1256 [1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 301]; Burnett v.
National Enquirer, Inc. (1983) 144 Cal. App. 3d
991, 1011-1012 [193 Cal. Rptr. 206].)
B. Due Process Considerations
Ford also asserts that the noneconomic damages
award is "unconstitutionally excessive as a matter of
federal due process." Amicus curiae AAM makes the
same argument, asserting that due process considerations
applicable to punitive damages awards should also apply
to compensatory damages. This contention is unavailing.
Ford and AAM ignore the fact that while the United
States Supreme Court has in several recent decisions held
that due process rights limit the amount of punitive
damages that may be imposed upon an individual, a basic
underpinning of those decisions was the very distinction
between compensatory damages, which are designed to
compensate the plaintiff, and punitive damages, which
are in the nature of fines or sanctions, designed to punish
and deter a defendant. For example, in State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell (2003) 538 U.S. 408, 416
[155 L. Ed. 2d 585, 123 S Ct. 1513] [*59] (State Farm),
the majority opinion began its analysis by making just
this distinction: "[I]n our judicial system compensatory
and punitive damages, although usually awarded at the
same time by the same decisionmaker, serve different
purposes. [Citation.] Compensatory damages 'are
intended to redress the concrete loss that the plaintiff has
suffered by reason of the defendant's wrongful conduct.'
[Citations.] By contrast, punitive damages serve a
broader function; they are aimed at deterrence and
retribution." After establishing this important distinction,
the high court concluded that the "[t]he Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the
imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments
on a tortfeasor." (State Farm, supra, 538 U.S. at p. 416,
italics added.) The court likened punitive damages to
criminal penalties, imposed without the protections of a
criminal trial: "Although these awards serve the same
purposes as criminal penalties, defendants subjected to
punitive damages in civil cases have not been accorded
the protections applicable in a criminal proceeding." (Id.
at p. 417.)
Ford and AAM cite no authority for the proposition
that constitutional due
[*60] process limitations
applicable to punitive damages awards, as recently

confirmed by the United States Supreme Court (see State
Farm, supra, 538 U.S. at p. 412), also apply to
compensatory damages awards. Nevertheless, AAM
asserts that the rule applicable to punitive damages
awards should be extended to noneconomic damage
awards because (1) defendants need notice of their
potential exposure to such liability that is imposed in a
vague and standardless manner, and (2) the lack of
concrete standards for such awards enables juries to
pursue punitive goals in rendering such awards.
(8) However, because noneconomic damages are not
a punishment that serves to deter conduct, but rather
compensation to make a plaintiff whole as a result of a
defendant's conduct, uncertainty in the proof does not
preclude their recovery: " '[0]nce the cause and existence
of damages have been ... established [with reasonable
certainty], recovery will not be denied because the
damages are difficult of ascertainment. ... The law only
requires that the best evidence be adduced of which the
nature of the case is capablef,] and the defendant whose
wrongful act gave rise to the injury will not be heard to
complain that [*61] the amount thereof cannot be
determined with mathematical precision.' " (Dallman Co.
v. Southern Heater Co. (1968) 262 Cal. App. 2d 582, 594
[68 Cal. Rptr. 873], citations omitted; see also Speegle v.
Board of Fire Underwriters (1946) 29 Cal.2d 34, 46
[172 P.2d 867] [" 'The most elementary conceptions of
justice and public policy require that the wrongdoer shall
bear the risk of the uncertainty [in fixing the amount of
damages] which his own wrong has created' "].)
As the United States Supreme Court has noted, "
'[T]he common law rule as it existed at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution' was that 'in cases where the
amount of damages was uncertain[,] their assessment
was a matter so peculiarly within the province of the jury
that the Court should not alter it.' " (Feltner v. Columbia
Pictures Television, Inc. (1998) 523 US 340, 353 [140
L. Ed. 2d 438, 118 S. Ct. 1279]; see also Barry v.
Edmunds (1886) 116 US 550, 565 [29 L. Ed. 729, 6 S
Ct. 501] ["nothing is better settled than [the principle]
that, in ... actions for torts where no precise rule of law
fixes the recoverable damages, it is the peculiar function
of the jury to determine the amount by their verdict"].)
Thus, we are loath to usurp this core function of the jury
by relying on quasi-mathematical formulas to [*62]
assess the amount of damages that may be awarded,
simply because noneconomic damages are not readily
quantifiable.
Nor does the imagined danger that vague standards
for imposing or reviewing noneconomic damage awards
will lead juries to use such awards as punishment, as
opposed to compensation, justify imposing due process
limitations on such awards. The jury here was instructed
it "must not let bias, sympathy, prejudice, or public

opinion influence [their] decision." Although the jury
was instructed that as to noneconomic damages "[n]o
fixed standard exists for deciding the amount of these
damages," it was also instructed that it "must use [their]
judgment to decide a reasonable amount based on the
evidence and [their] common sense." The jury was
instructed that for future economic damages, "[Mrs.]
Wilson must prove that she is reasonably certain to suffer
that harm." The court, in instructing the jury on
noneconomic damages, also delineated the type of harm
for which Mrs. Wilson could recover: "Noneconomic
damages may consist of the following: ffl] Past and future
physical pain, past and future mental suffering, past and
future enjoyment of life, past and future disfigurement,
past [*63] and future physical impairment, past and
future inconvenience, past and future grief, past and
future anxiety, past and future humiliation, past and
future emotional distress."
Thus, under these instructions juries are given
guidance as to the proper matters they may consider in
making an award of noneconomic damages. These
guideposts protect against the purported danger that
juries might use such an award to punish a defendant.
Moreover, to the extent that a jury's award of
noneconomic damages is challenged as excessive, the
judge, sitting as a 13th juror, will then review the
evidence to determine if the award should be remitted.
The trial judge is not limited to setting aside an excessive
damage award based on evidence the jury acted out of
passion or prejudice. Rather, " 'it is within the sound
discretion of the trial court in ruling upon a motion for a
new trial on the ground of excessive damages, to grant
the same when there is a substantial conflict in the
evidence regarding the extent of the damage.' " (Hughes
v. Hearst Publications, Inc. (1947) 79 Cal App. 2d 703,
705 [180 P.2d 419].) This rule gives defendants a further
check against excessive awards of noneconomic
damages.
Finally, the "passion [*64] or prejudice" standard
under which appellate courts review such awards also
protects against excessive awards. It is true that recent
cases have stated that awards for emotional distress can
in some instances have a punitive element. (Gober v.
Ralph's Grocery Co. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 204, 223
[40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 92] (Gober); State Farm, supra, 538
U.S. at p. 426.) However, here we reviewed the record
and determined the evidence supported an award of $ 18
million, the award was within the range for similar cases,
and it was proportionate to Mrs. Wilson's substantial
injuries and economic loss. By reducing the
noneconomic damages to $ 18 million, we have
effectively eliminated that portion of the award that was
the product of passion or prejudice, and no punitive
element remains.

AAM relies heavily upon a law review article for its
position that the vague standards for quantifying
noneconomic damage awards justify imposing federal
due process constraints on such awards. However, the
author of that article concluded that the solution to such
unchecked awards is limits or standards imposed by
legislatures, not application of due process notions to
compensatory awards. (Niemeyer, Awards for Pain and
Suffering: [*65] The Irrational Centerpiece of Our Tort
System (2004) 90 Va. L.Rev. 1401, 1414, 1417-1418.)
Ford and AAM cite one out-of-state authority that
states in a footnote "[a] grossly excessive award for pain
and suffering may violate the Due Process Clause even if
it is not labeled 'punitive.' " (Gilbert v. DaimlerChrysler
Corp. (2004) 470 Mich. 749 [685 N.W.2d 391, 400, fit
22].) However, that court expressly declined to address
this constitutional issue and therefore it is not authority
for the proposition cited. (Ibid, ["there is no need to reach
this constitutional question"].)
(9) We conclude it is not necessary to impose federal
due process principles to limit noneconomic damage
awards because (1) the Supreme Court in State Farm,
supra, 538 U.S. 408, imposed due process limits on
punitive damages awards because they are similar to
criminal penalties, without the protections afforded
defendants in criminal proceedings, and noneconomic
damages are designed to compensate, not punish, a
defendant; (2) the defendants have adequate notice of
potential awards; and (3) the review accorded damage
awards by trial and appellate courts ensures there is no
punitive element in noneconomic damage awards.
III. [*66] PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Ford asserts the punitive damages award must be
reversed because (1) the Wilsons only proved that
reasonable people could disagree regarding the design
decisions made by Ford; (2) it complied with all
applicable governmental standards; (3) it was improper
to admit evidence of Ford's overall financial condition;
and (4) the award is excessive under federal and
California law.
On remand from the United States Supreme Court,
with directions that we reconsider Buell-Wilson I in light
of Philip Morris, supra, 166 L. Ed. 2d 940, Ford asserts
(1) it is entitled to a new trial because there is a
"significant risk" the punitive damages verdict against it
was based on improper evidence and arguments
concerning third party harm; (2) the punitive damages
award was barred because Ford's conduct was
objectively reasonable; (3) Philip Morris requires a
further reduction in the punitive damages award; and (4)
we should revisit our ruling excluding industry custom
and practice evidence.

We reiterate our original holding that the punitive
damages award, as remitted by the trial court, is
excessive and reduce it to $ 55 million. We reject the
remainder of Ford's contentions. We also decline [*67]
Ford's (and amici curiaes') request that we reconsider our
original holdings on the trial court's evidentiary rulings,
the emotional distress damages, and issues related to the
punitive damages award other than whether that award
improperly punished Ford for harm to third parties. The
United States Supreme Court's direction to this court was
to reconsider our original decision "in light of Philip
Morris." (Ford Motor Co. v. Buell-Wilson (2007)
U.S.
[167 L. Ed. 2d 1087, 127 S. Ct. 2250].) The
only issue decided by Philip Morris was whether and
when third party harm could be considered in imposing
punitive damages. Based on our analysis of Philip
Morris, our review of Buell-Wilson 1, and the
proceedings in the trial court, we conclude that nothing
in Philip Morris requires us to reconsider the remainder
of our original decision.
A. The "Reasonable People Can Disagree" Argument
1. Standard of Review
We review an award of punitive damages to
determine if there is substantial evidence that supports a
finding by clear and convincing evidence that a
defendant acted with fraud, malice or oppression. (Mike
Davidov Co. v. Issod (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 597, 606 [92
Cal.Rptr.2d897].)
2. Analysis
In this case the [*68] Wilsons presented evidence,
which the jury accepted, that Ford knew of dangerous
instability defects in the Explorer. Ford's own testing
showed that the Explorer was unstable and prone to
rollover on flat dry pavement at less than highway
speeds. Ford knew before the Explorer was released for
sale that the same instability characteristics in that
vehicle led to serious injuries to Bronco II drivers. The
Wilsons presented evidence that Ford knew that the
Explorer's roof was weak and that roof crush caused
injury during rollover accidents. Ford had the technology
to make the Explorer stable and strengthen the roof, but
did not use it. The modifications to strengthen the roof
would have cost approximately $ 20 per vehicle. This
evidence constitutes substantial evidence to support the
jury's decision to award punitive damages.
Ford asserts, however, that because there was a
"reasonable disagreement" among experts concerning the
propriety of its design decisions it cannot, as a matter of
law, be subject to punitive damages. We reject this
contention.

The Wilsons presented expert testimony concerning
the design and safety issues of the Explorer. Ford
presented contrary expert testimony. The [*69] jury
rejected the testimony of Ford's experts, as it was entitled
to do. Ford's assertion that punitive damages are not
allowed unless all experts agree there were improper
design decisions is unavailing. If such an assertion were
true, punitive damages would never be allowed in cases
where the defendant simply had an expert who disagreed
with the plaintiffs expert.
Moreover, the California cases cited by Ford on this
issue do not support its position. They were cases where
there was simply a failure of proof to support a punitive
damages award. (See Lusardi Construction Co. v. Aubry
(1992) 1 CalAth 976, 996-997 [4 Cal. Rptr. 2d837, 824
P. 2d 643]; Chateau Chamberay Homeowners Assn. v.
Associated Internal Ins. Co. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 335,
348, 350, fn. 10 [108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 776] (Chateau
Chamberay); Mason v. Mercury Cas. Co. (1976) 64 Cal.
App. 3d 471, 474-475 [134 Cal. Rptr. 545]; Kwan v.
Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc. (1994) 23
Cal.App.4th 174, 184-185 [28 Cal Rptr. 2d 371];
Stewart v. Truck Ins. Exchange (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th
468, 483-484 [21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 338].)
Ford also asserts there was no evidence any of Ford's
decision makers believed the Explorer's design presented
an unreasonable risk of injury, presenting the jury with
only the "bare and illogical 'inference' that unnamed Ford
officials [*70] 'must have' acted with malice ... ."
However, the Wilsons presented direct and substantial
evidence of Ford management's recognition of the safety
implications of their design decisions. As discussed in
detail in the factual background, ante, there is substantial
evidence that Ford's decision makers knew how to make
the Explorer less dangerous, but chose not to because of
financial considerations. Ford's "reasonable people can
disagree" argument is unavailing.
PLAC supports Ford's arguments regarding
disagreements among experts as a defense to punitive
damages, asserting that where there are contemporaneous
disagreements among experts regarding design decisions,
punitive damages should be barred. However, PLAC
cites no California authority for such a proposition. The
California case law PLAC cites involves the wellestablished rule in insurance bad faith cases that an
insurer cannot be liable for bad faith if there is an
objectively reasonable dispute about coverage. (See, e.g.,
Chateau Chamberay, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at pp. 347348; Fraley v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th
1282, 1293 [97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 386].) However, these
cases state a substantive standard of liability for
insurance claims and [*71] do not address when it is
proper to impose punitive damages. Notably, PLAC has

cited no California product liability case where expert
disputes concerning design provide a defense to punitive
damage liability or, for that matter, liability in its
entirety.
In a footnote, PLAC also cites several out-of-state
cases for the proposition that a contemporaneous
disagreement among experts bars liability for punitive
damages. However, several of these cases simply do not
state such a proposition. Rather, some stand for the
proposition that expert disagreement is merely one factor
that could be considered in assessing the propriety of
punitive damages awards. (Loitz v. Remington Arms Co.,
Inc. (1990) 138 III. 2d 404 [563 N.E.2d 397, 406-407,
150 III. Dec. 510]; Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v.
Garrett (1996) 343 Md. 500 [682 A.2d 1143, 11581168]; Satcher v. Honda Motor Co. (5th Cir. 1995) 52
F.3d 1311, 1316-1317.)
PLAC does cite two cases from Iowa that hold a
reasonable disagreement among experts about the
adequacy of design was a defense to punitive damages.
{Mercer v. Pittway Corp. (Iowa 2000) 616 N. W.2d 602,
618; Hillrichs v. Avco Corp. (Iowa 1994) 514 N. W.2d 94,
100.) However, no case from [*72] any other state has
cited these cases with approval, and we could not locate
any other state that follows such a "rule." Because these
cases apply Iowa law, we are not bound by their holdings
and decline to adopt such a rule in California.
PLAC also argues that punitive damages should be
barred where there was a contemporaneous expert
opinion that a product design that caused a plaintiff
injury was necessary to avoid greater injuries of other
kinds. This contention is unavailing.
First, this argument by PLAC focuses only on Ford's
decisions regarding the Explorer's stability. There is no
assertion that Ford allowed the roof defect to exist
because changing the design would create a greater risk
of other injuries. Because the roofs crashworthiness
provided an independent basis for the award of punitive
damages, this argument fails.
Second, PLAC cites to no evidence in the record to
suggest that any member of Ford's management rejected
changes to the Explorer's stability design because to do
so would create a greater risk of injury in another
manner. Rather, it only cites to statements made in Ford's
brief that imply such a rationale, but Ford's statements
are not supported by the cited [*73] record.
As such, Ford and PLAC's "reasonable people can
disagree" argument is unavailing.
B. Compliance with Government Standards
Ford and amicus curiae the Chamber assert Ford is
not subject to punitive damages as a matter of law

because it complied with all applicable governmental
regulatory standards. In particular, Ford asserts it
complied with FMVSS (Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standard) 216, which sets the standard for crush
resistance of automobile roofs. Ford also asserts it
complied with a National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) regulation requiring all SUV's
to display a warning concerning the risk of rollovers.
(See 49 FedReg. 20016 (May 11, 1984).) Ford's and the
Chamber's contentions are unavailing for several reasons.
(10) The law in California is that punitive damages
are permitted in product liability actions precisely
because "[g]overnmental safety standards and the
criminal law have failed to provide adequate consumer
protection against the manufacture and distribution of
defective products. [Citations.] Punitive damages thus
remain as the most effective remedy for consumer
protection against defectively designed mass produced
articles." (Grimshaw, supra, 119 Cal. App. 3d at p. 810.)
[*74] Compliance with a law or safety regulation in itself
does not establish that a product is not defective or that a
defendant who sells or rents the product for use by the
public has exercised due care. (See Campbell v. General
Motors Corp. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 112, 126-127 [184 Cal.
Rptr. 891, 649 P.2d 224]; Amos v. Alpha Property
Management (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 895, 901 [87 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 34].)
The Chamber asks us to reject the rule stated above
in Grimshaw, supra, 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, that
compliance with industry standards does not bar punitive
damages, because that decision predates amendments to
Civil Code section 3294 that modified the definitions of
"oppression, fraud [and] malice" and required proof by
clear and convincing evidence. But Grimshaw did not
base its conclusions on the standard of proof for punitive
damages claims or the precise definitions of the terms
"oppression, fraud and malice." The Chamber points to
nothing in the 1987 amendments, or to any legislative
history for those amendments, suggesting the Legislature
intended to disapprove Grimshaw.
(11) The Chamber relies on the extensive federal
regulation of the automobile industry through the
NHTSA and the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act of 1966 (Safety Act) (49 U.S.C § 30101 et
seq.),
[*75] which, in conjunction with NHTSApromulgated standards, has declared the minimum safety
standards for automobiles. However, a review of the
Safety Act and its legislative history demonstrates the
federal government did not intend to preclude punitive
damages where an auto manufacturer has met minimum
safety standards.
Title 49 United States Code section 30103(e)
(section 30103(e)) of the Safety Act contains a savings

clause that provides: "Compliance with a motor vehicle
safety standard prescribed under this chapter does not
exempt a person from liability at common law." (Italics
added.)
Thus, section 30103(e) expressly provides that
compliance with federal safety standards is not a defense
to state common law products liability. Punitive damages
have long been a part of the common law, originating in
the 1763 English case Huckle v. Money (1763) 95
Eng.Rep. 768, and finding early acceptance in the United
States when the United States Supreme Court upheld
their constitutionality in Day v. Woodworth (1851) 54
U.S. 363, 370 [14 L. Ed. 181]. Thus, in enacting this
savings clause, Congress was aware that part of the
common law to which it referred in section 30103(e)
included liability for punitive damages [*76] and could
have excluded such damages from its terms.
The Chamber asserts that Congress, in enacting the
savings clause in section 30103(e), only sought to
preserve common law liability in general and did not
intend to address punitive damages. However, a review
of the legislative history of the Safety Act further
demonstrates that Congress intended through the savings
clause to leave untouched all aspects of common law
products liability actions, including awards of punitive
damages.
The House Report for the Safety Act states that
section 30103(e) "is intended, and this subsection
specifically establishes, that compliance with safety
standards is not to be a defense or otherwise to affect the
rights of parties under common law particularly those
related to warranty, contract, and tort liability."
(H.R.Rep. No. 1776-89, 2d Sess., p. 24 (1966), italics
added.) The Safety Act's Senate sponsor stated on the
Senate floor that " [compliance with Federal standards
would not necessarily shield any person from broad
liability at the common law. The common law on product
liability still remains as it was." (Remarks of Sen.
Magnuson, 89 Cong. Rec. 14230 (daily ed. June 24,
1966), italics added.) [*77] Its House sponsor, while
arguing in floor debate against the need for criminal
penalties in the Safety Act stated, "[W]e have preserved
every single common law remedy that exists against a
manufacturer for the benefit of a motor vehicle
purchaser. This means that all of the warranties and all of
the other devices of common law which are afforded to
the purchaser, remain in the buyer and they can be
exercised against the manufacturer." (Remarks of Rep.
Staggers, 89 Cong. Rec. 19663 (daily ed. Aug. 17, 1966),
italics added.)
The fact that California does not follow this
proposed rule-that compliance with federal minimum
safety standards bars claims for punitive damages—is also

demonstrated by the fact such a rule has been proposed
through legislation in California on several occasions but
has not been enacted. In 2000 the Legislature considered
a bill that would have enacted the rule that Ford
proposes. (Assem. Bill No. 2582 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.)
§ 1.) However, the bill never made it out of committee.
(Assem. Bill No. 2582, from committee without further
action, 2 Assem. Final Hist. (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) p.
1865.) A similar bill did not secure passage in 1996.
(Assem. Bill No. 2880, [*78] from committee without
further action, 2 Assem. Final Hist. (1995-1996 Reg.
Sess.) p. 1711.) Another such bill did not pass in 2006.
(Sen. Bill No. 1429 (2005-2006 Reg. Sess.) § 2.) There
would be no need for such legislation if compliance with
government standards already provided a defense to
punitive damages claims.
Ford and the Chamber's argument is also unavailing
because there are no federal standards for stability of
vehicles, one ground upon which Ford's liability for
punitive damages is based. Ford points to an NHTSA
regulation requiring all SUV's to display a warning
concerning the risk of rollovers. (See 49 FedReg. 20016
(May 11, 1984).) However, having a warning sticker is
not the same as meeting a safety standard, and, in any
event, it would not bar a state law claim alleging stability
defects.
The Chamber asserts that NHTSA's failure to
promulgate stability standards and to require only a
warning sticker represents a "policy choice" based on
difficulties in predicting rollover risk and that
compliance with the warning requirement alone should
bar punitive damages. However, this exact argument was
rejected by the Eleventh Circuit in Watkins v. Ford
Motor Co. (11th Cir. 1999) 190 F.3d 1213, 1216-1218,
[*79] a Bronco II rollover case. (See also Ford Motor
Co. v. Ammerman (Ind.Ct.App. 1999) 705 N.E.2d 539,
555-556.) We conclude Ford's asserted compliance with
federal safety regulations does not as a matter of law bar
the punitive damages award. "
11 Following oral argument in this matter, the
United States Supreme Court issued its decision
in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc. (2008)
U.S.
[128 S. Ct. 999], holding the Food and Drug
Administration's premarket approval process of a
balloon catheter used in angioplasty established
federal "requirements" under the Medical Device
Amendments of 1976 (MDA) that preempted
state common law claims for negligence, strict
liability and implied warranty. That decision has
no impact on our holding as the MDA had a
preemption clause that affirmatively barred such
claims. {Riegel, supra, at pp. 1003-1005.) As
explained, ante, section 30103(e) of the Safety

Act, by contrast, contains a savings clause that
that explicitly allows such common law claims.
C. Fair Notice of Exposure to Punitive Damages
Ford contends that if punitive damages can be
awarded on this record, Civil Code section 3294 is
unconstitutionally vague because it failed to give Ford
fair notice [*80] that its conduct could subject it to
punitive damages. This contention is also unavailing.
(12) Ford made this same argument over 25 years
ago in Grimshaw, supra, 119 Cal. App. 3d 757. The
Court of Appeal rejected it, concluding that "punitive
damages are recoverable in a nondeliberate or
unintentional tort where the defendant's conduct
constitutes a conscious disregard of the probability of
injury to others." (Id. at p. 811.)
Additionally, Ford bases this contention on the fact
that, at most, reasonable people could disagree with the
decisions it made. However, we have already discussed
and rejected this argument, ante.
D. Consideration of Ford's Overall Financial Condition
Ford asserts that the punitive damages award must
be reversed because the jury was allowed to consider its
overall financial worth (almost $ 13 billion) as opposed
to its worth tied to sales of products in California. We
reject this contention.
(13) Where the defendant's oppression, fraud or
malice has been proven by clear and convincing
evidence, California law permits the recovery of punitive
damages "for the sake of example and by way of
punishing the defendant." (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).)
As our Supreme Court recently [*81] held in Simon v.
San Paolo U.S. Holding Co., Inc. (2005) 35 CalAth
1159, 1185 [29 Cal. Rptr. 3d379, 113 P.3d 63] (Simon):
"[T]he defendant's financial condition is an essential
factor in fixing an amount that is sufficient to serve these
goals without exceeding the necessary level of
punishment. '[OJbviously, the function of deterrence ...
will not be served if the wealth of the defendant allows
him to absorb the award with little or no discomfort.'
[Citation.] '[P]unitive damage awards should not be a
routine cost of doing business that an industry can simply
pass on to its customers through price increases, while
continuing the conduct the law proscribes.' " (See also
State Farm, supra, 538 U.S. at p. 428 [use of wealth as a
factor not" 'unlawful or inappropriate1 "].)
Despite this authority, however, Ford cites People ex
rel. Lockyer v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (2004) 116
Cal.App.4th 1253 [11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 317] (RJ. Reynolds)
for the proposition that in assessing punitive damages
courts may only take into consideration the defendant's

financial figures in the state where the wrong occurred.
In RJ. Reynolds, the State of California filed a
complaint against the defendant tobacco company to
enforce a consent decree entered into as part [*82] of a
settlement agreement that prohibited targeting youth in
advertising of tobacco products. The superior court found
the defendant in violation of that agreement and entered
summary judgment, permanently enjoining the company
from continuing to violate the settlement. The court also
awarded the state sanctions in the amount of $ 20
million. The defendant appealed, and this court reversed
the award of sanctions, finding them to be excessive.
Relying on recent United States Supreme Court
precedent holding it was improper to impose punitive
damages against a defendant for conduct in one state
based on defendant's out-of-state conduct, we held the
superior court in RJ. Reynolds erred when it based its
sanctions award on the defendant's nationwide spending
on advertising, as opposed to its advertising activities in
California. (RJ. Reynolds, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at pp.
1289-1290.) This court found the sanctions award to be
error because "the People's request for $ 20 million in
sanctions was based on Reynolds's nationwide spending
on print advertising and profitability without evidence of
its advertising spending or profitability in California."
(Id. at p. 1290.) As the court stated [*83] in RJ.
Reynolds, "the award of sanctions for Reynolds's conduct
in California could not properly be based on Reynolds's
nationwide financial figures without violating Reynolds's
due process rights." (Id. at p. 1289.)
Based on the above quoted language, Ford asserts
that it was error to allow evidence of its overall financial
condition, as opposed to its financial worth in California.
This contention is unavailing.
Here, the trial court properly instructed the jury, at
Ford's request, that it could not consider Ford's out-ofstate conduct in imposing punitive damages: "In
determining the amount of punitive damages, if any, that
is necessary to achieve the proper level of punishment
and deterrence, you may consider only Ford's wrongful
conduct, if any, that has had an adverse impact on the
citizens of California. Accordingly, you may not award
any punitive damages for the purpose of punishing Ford
for the sale of vehicles in other states for any injuries that
may have occurred in other states, or for the purpose of
changing Ford's conduct in other states."
Consideration of Ford's overall financial condition
was not to punish it for out-of-state conduct as in RJ.
Reynolds, but for the broader [*84] concept of ensuring
the amount of punitive damages was sufficient to act as a
deterrent. Use of a defendant's financial condition in such
a manner is proper because " 'the function of deterrence
... will not be served if the wealth of the defendant allows

[it] to absorb the award with little or no discomfort.1 "
(Simon, supra, 35 CalAth at p. 1185.) Consideration of
only a defendant's finances as they relate to the state in
which they are sued would allow the defendant to make
them " 'a routine cost of doing business that an industry
can simply pass on to its customers through price
increases, while continuing the conduct the law
proscribes.'" (Ibid.)
E. Amount of Award
Ford argues that the amount of the punitive damages
awarded to the Wilsons is excessive under the federal
due process clause of the 14th Amendment to the United
States Constitution. We conclude that, after reducing the
noneconomic damages award to Mrs. Wilson to $ 18
million, the award of punitive damages is excessive and
is, therefore, reduced to $ 55 million, an approximate
two-to-one ratio to the total compensatory damages
award ($ 4.6 million in economic damages + $ 18 million
in noneconomic damages + $ 5 million [*85] in loss of
consortium damages = $ 27.6 million x 2 = $ 55.2
million).
1. Standard of review
(14) "In deciding whether an award of punitive
damages is constitutionally excessive ... , we are to
review the award de novo, making an independent
assessment of the reprehensibility of the defendant's
conduct, the relationship between the award and the harm
done to the plaintiff, and the relationship between the
award and civil penalties authorized for comparable
conduct. [Citations.] This '[e]xacting appellate review' is
intended to ensure punitive damages are the product of
the ' " 'application of law, rather than a decisionmaker's
caprice.' " ' [Citation.] [f] On the other hand, findings of
historical fact made in the trial court are still entitled to
the ordinary measure of appellate deference." (Simon,
supra, 35 CalAth at p. 1172, fh. omitted.)
"To state a particular level beyond which punitive
damages in a given case would be grossly excessive, and
hence unconstitutionally arbitrary, ' "is not an enviable
task.... In the last analysis, an appellate panel, convinced
it must reduce an award of punitive damages, must rely
on its combined experience and judgment." ' " (Simon,
supra, 35 CalAth at p. 1188.) [*86] Moreover, our
"constitutional mission is only to find a level higher than
which an award may not go; it is not to find the 'right'
level in the court's own view." (Ibid.)
2. Analysis
(15) The United States Supreme Court has
determined that the federal due process clause places
limits on state courts' awards of punitive damages, limits

appellate courts are required to enforce in their review of
jury awards. (State Farm, supra, 538 US. at pp. 416418.) The imposition of "grossly excessive or arbitrary"
awards is constitutionally prohibited, for due process
entitles a tortfeasor to " 'fair notice not only of the
conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also of
the severity of the penalty that a State may impose.' " (Id.
at pp. 416, 417.)
(16) In State Farm the United States Supreme Court
concluded it was improper for juries, in awarding
punitive damages, to punish a defendant for its dissimilar
actions in other states affecting individuals other than the
plaintiff. (State Farm, supra, 538 U.S. at pp. 421-423.)
However, the Supreme Court reiterated that, in
determining the reprehensibility of a defendant's actions,
juries could consider a defendant's similar repeated
conduct that affected [*87] others. (Id. at p. 423.)
(17) The United States Supreme Court and the
California Supreme Court have stated there are three
factors to consider in determining whether the amount of
a punitive damages award comports with the federal due
process clause: "(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the
defendant's misconduct; (2) the disparity between the ...
harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages
award; and (3) the difference between the punitive
damages [and comparable civil penalties where
available]." (State Farm, supra, 538 U.S. at p. 418;
Johnson v. Ford Motor Co. (2005) 35 CalAth 1191 [29
Cal Rptr. 3d 401, 113 P.3d 82] (Johnson).) We discuss
these factors in order.
a. Reprehensibility of conduct
(18) Courts utilize five factors to help determine the
degree of reprehensibility of a defendant's conduct: (1)
whether the harm was physical and not merely economic;
(2) whether the conduct demonstrated an indifference or
reckless disregard for the health or safety of others; (3)
whether the target of the conduct was financially
vulnerable; (4) whether the conduct was repeated or an
isolated incident; and (5) whether the conduct was the
result of intentional acts or mere accident. (State Farm,
supra, 538 U.S. at p. 419; [*88] Simon, supra, 35
CalAth at p. 1180.) Further, the reprehensibility of a
defendant's conduct is the most important indicator of the
reasonableness of a punitive damages award. (State
Farm, supra, at p. 419; Simon, supra, at p. 1180.)
Based on our de novo review of the record, we
conclude that the reprehensibility of Ford's conduct was
high, given the catastrophic nature of Mrs. Wilson's
injuries, Ford's reckless disregard for the safety of others,
the repeated nature of Ford's conduct, and the fact that
Ford's acts were intentional.
Focusing on the first factor, Ford's decision to

release the defective Explorer resulted in catastrophic
and permanent physical injuries to Mrs. Wilson, not
merely economic loss. She is permanently paralyzed and
in constant, debilitating pain. She is confined to a
wheelchair, without sensation or muscular control of her
lower body. She must rely on others to care for her. As
Mrs. Wilson explained it: "Me being dependent on other
people ... for me that is very difficult because I have
always been an independent sort of person. ... I have
always been the one that has done things for other
people. For me that is very hard to ... have to be in that
kind [*89] of position. ... I am in a wheelchair, I am not
going to ever be out of a wheelchair, that whole concept
is very ... difficult to ... accept.... The things that I really
love to do I can't do anymore. The list is just—goes on
and on."
As discussed, ante, and as found by the jury, Ford's
decision to release the defective Explorer without
warning consumers of the risk of injury it posed evinced
a reckless disregard for the safety of its customers. As the
trial court noted in ruling on Ford's motion for new trial
on the ground the punitive damage award was excessive,
"the evidence showed Ford had a pattern of deficient
design regarding safety in favor of increased financial
returns and was the result of the conscious disregard of
Ford executives." Our own independent review of the
record compels the same conclusion. Thus, the second
factor also supports a significant punitive damages
award.
Addressing the third factor, the target of the conduct
in this case was consumers, individuals who were
vulnerable as they would not understand vehicle design,
development and manufacture, and would rely on Ford to
inform them of risks as they made purchasing decisions.
Conduct is more reprehensible [*90] where, as here,
it is part of repeated corporate policy or practice rather
than an isolated incident. {Johnson, supra, 35 CalAth at
p. 1196.) In this case the conduct was repeated and not
an isolated incident. Ford had a pattern of deficient safety
design that was ignored in favor of increased financial
returns. As discussed in more detail, ante, that corporate
policy or practice was evidenced by Ford's refusal to
follow its engineers' recommendations to improve the
stability of the Explorer. As the trial court noted, "[T]hat
evidence was primarily adduced through Ford's own
internal memoranda and correspondence." Thus, the
fourth factor supports a large punitive damages award.
The evidence presented by the Wilsons in this case
supports a finding that Ford's actions were the result of
intentional conduct and deliberate decisions by Ford's
management, knowing the unreasonable risk of harm
posed to consumers, as opposed to a mere accident.
Moreover, the fifth factor, whether the conduct was

the result of intentional acts or mere accident, "is of little
value in assessing a California punitive damages award,
as accidentally harmful conduct cannot provide the basis
for punitive damages [*91] under our law. At a
minimum, California law requires conduct done with
'willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of
others' or despicable conduct done 'in conscious
disregard' of a person's rights." {Simon, supra, 35 CalAth
at p. 1181.) The jury's finding that Ford acted with
"oppression, fraud or malice" demonstrates Ford's actions
were intentional. In sum, the reprehensibility of Ford's
conduct supports a significant award of punitive
damages.
b. Ratio of punitive to compensatory damages
(19) In State Farm, the United States Supreme
Court, while still "declinfing] ... to impose a bright-line
ratio which a punitive damages award cannot exceed,"
held that "few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio
between punitive and compensatory damages, to a
significant degree, will satisfy due process." {State Farm,
supra, 538 U.S. at p. 425.) The high court "also
explained that past decisions and statutory penalties
approving ratios of 3 or 4 to 1 were 'instructive' as to the
due process norm, and that while relatively high ratios
could be justified when' "a particularly egregious act has
resulted in only a small amount of economic damages"
[citation] ... [t]he converse is also [*92] true[:] When
compensatory damages are substantial, then a lesser
ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory damages, can
reach the outermost limit of the due process guarantee.' "
{Simon, supra, 35 CalAth at p. 1182.)
Our high court has interpreted this language from
State Farm to mean that it established a "type of
presumption: ratios between the punitive damages award
and the plaintiffs actual or potential compensatory
damages significantly greater than 9 or 10 to 1 are
suspect and, absent special justification (by, for example,
extreme reprehensibility or unusually small, hard-todetect or hard-to-measure compensatory damages),
cannot survive appellate scrutiny under the due process
clause." {Simon, supra, 35 CalAth at p. 1182.)
Here, after our reduction of the noneconomic
damages awarded to Mrs. Wilson, the compensatory
damages, while substantial, are within a reasonable range
for the type of catastrophic, permanent and ongoing
injuries suffered by Mrs. Wilson, and the loss of her
society, comfort and companionship to Mr. Wilson. Mrs.
Wilson's recovery for noneconomic damages is
proportionate to the injuries she suffered. Similarly, Mr.
Wilson's recovery on his loss of consortium [*93] claim
is proportionate to his substantial injury. Moreover, as
discussed, ante, there was a high degree of
reprehensibility to Ford's conduct. Because the

noneconomic damages award is substantial, a low single
digit ratio is appropriate. We are mindful of the Supreme
Court's statement in State Farm, supra, 538 U.S. at page
425, that "[w]hen compensatory damages are substantial,
then a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory
damages, can reach the outermost limit of the due
process guarantee." In this case we conclude that a twoto-one ratio is warranted because the degree of Ford's
reprehensibility is also high.
c. Comparable civil penalties
Ford does not address this factor in its opening brief.
However, for the first time in its reply brief Ford asserts
that there are comparable civil penalties to compare with
the amount of the punitive damages claim. Ford cites title
49 United States Code section 30165(a), which it claims
provides penalties for designing and selling defective
vehicles, penalties that are $ 1,000 for each vehicle, up to
a maximum of $ 800,000. Ford asserts that since the
punitive damages award "dwarfs" the maximum penalties
allowed under that federal statute, [*94] the punitive
damage award is constitutionally infirm. This contention
is unavailing.
First, we do not consider matters raised by
appellants for the first time in their reply briefs. Because
Ford did not address this factor in its opening brief, thus
denying the Wilsons an opportunity to respond, it has
waived the right to assert this issue on appeal. (Julian v.
Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. (2005) 35 CalAth 747,
761, fn. 4 [27 Cal Rptr. 3d 648, 110 P.3d 903]; Shade
Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Products Sales & Marketing,
Inc. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 847, 894, fn. 10 [93 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 364].)
Second, title 49 United States Code section 30165(a)
is part of that portion of the Safety Act which provides,
as discussed, ante, only minimum safety standards.
Third, as also discussed in detail, ante, there is a
savings clause that allows common law liability
notwithstanding compliance with those standards, putting
Ford on notice it may be subject to private state actions
that result in substantially higher damage awards than
civil penalties.
Fourth, the savings clause also evidences
congressional intent that the maximum penalty allowed
under title 49 United States Code section 30165(a) is not
a sufficient penalty for all such violations because the
varying
[*95] degrees of plaintiffs' injuries and
defendants' culpability dictate a greater flexibility in
punishment. (See Ford Motor Co. v. Sperau (Ala. 1997)
708 So. 2d 111, 122.)
Finally, the sanctions amounts in title 49 United
States Code section 30165(a) were increased in 2000 to a

range of $ 5,000 to $ 15 million, indicating Congress's
belief that the original amounts were insufficient to deter
vehicle manufacturers from placing defective
automobiles on the road. The maximum penalty under
the 2000 amendments is not "dwarfed" by the punitive
damage award, as reduced.
- d. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing factors, and using our
combined experience and judgment, we conclude that a
two-to-one ratio of punitive damages to compensatory
damages is sufficient to punish Ford and deter it from
similar conduct in the future. This ratio is proportionate
to the degree of harm suffered and the substantial award
of compensatory damages. An award exceeding a two-toone ratio would exceed the constitutional maximum that
could be awarded under the facts of this case. (Simon,
supra, 35 CalAth at p. 1188 [an appellate court's
"constitutional mission is only to find a level higher than
which an award may not go; [*96] it is not to find the
'right' level in the court's own view"].) Accordingly, we
reduce the punitive damage award to $ 55 million,
approximately two times the total compensatory damage
award to the Wilsons.
F. Application of Philip Morris to Reduced Punitive
Damages Award
1. Introduction
The United States Supreme Court has remanded this
matter with direction that we reconsider our award of
punitive damages in light of the high court's decision in
Philip Morris, supra, 166 L. Ed. 2d at pages 948-949,
holding juries cannot use punitive damages to punish
defendants for harm caused to third parties.
(20) We have reconsidered our original decision in
Buell-Wilson I and have analyzed the application of
Philip Morris to our holdings in that decision. We have
also reviewed and analyzed the relevant trial court
proceedings in this matter. Based on that reconsideration,
review, and analysis, we conclude Philip Morris does not
necessitate a change in our original decision in this
matter because (1) Ford has forfeited the right to raise the
issue whether there is significant risk the jury, in
determining the amount of punitive damages to award,
punished Ford for harm it caused to third parties; (2) our
[*97] previous reduction of the punitive damages award
to two times the compensatory award eliminated any
danger the jury punished Ford for harm to third parties;
and (3) there was no evidence or argument at trial that
created a significant risk the jury here punished Ford for
harm to third parties.
2. Philip Morris

The family of Jesse Williams, a long-time smoker,
sued Philip Morris USA (Philip Morris) for negligence
and deceit. (Philip Morris, supra, 166 L. Ed. 2d at p.
946.) The jury concluded Williams's death was caused by
smoking and found for the plaintiffs on their claims for
negligence and deceit. On plaintiffs' claim for deceit, the
jury awarded $ 821,000 in compensatory damages and $
79.5 million in punitive damages. The trial judge
determined the punitive damages award was excessive
and reduced it to $ 32 million. Both parties appealed, and
the Oregon Court of Appeals reinstated the full award of
punitive damages. (Ibid.) The Oregon Supreme Court
denied review.
Philip Morris appealed to the United States Supreme
Court, and the case was remanded for further review in
light of the Supreme Court's decision in State Farm,
supra, 538 U.S. 408, which held, as we have discussed,
ante, that [*98] the due process clause of the United
States Constitution imposes limits on the amount a jury
may award for punitive damages. Philip Morris raised
two arguments on remand: (1) The jury should not have
been permitted to consider injuries to third parties not
before the court when awarding punitive damages, and
(2) the punitive damages award was excessive under
State Farm. (Philip Morris, supra, 166 L. Ed. 2d at p.
946.) The Oregon Supreme Court rejected both
arguments, and Philip Morris again appealed to the
United States Supreme Court.
(21) In Philip Morris, the United States Supreme
Court held Philip Morris's rights under the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment were violated when
the jury considered harm to third parties as a factor when
determining the amount of punitive damages, because the
"Due Process Clause forbids a State to use a punitive
damages award to punish a defendant for injury that it
inflicts upon nonparties ... ." (Philip Morris, supra, 166
L. Ed. 2d at p. 948.) The Supreme Court concluded that
such punishment violates the rule that a state must afford
a defendant an opportunity to present every available
defense. (Ibid.) A defendant "threatened with punishment
[*99] for injuring a nonparty victim" may be unable to
present defenses applicable to the nonparty victim if
those defenses do not also coincide with those relevant to
the plaintiffs claim. (Ibid.)
Philip Morris also emphasized, however, that a
plaintiff may offer evidence of "harm to other victims" to
show the reprehensibility of a defendant's conduct.
(Philip Morris, supra, 166 L. Ed 2d at pp. 949-950.)
Reiterating its holding in State Farm, the Supreme Court
held "[e]vidence of actual harm to nonparties can help to
show that the conduct that harmed the plaintiff also
posed a substantial risk of harm to the general public, and
so was particularly reprehensible." (Philip Morris, supra,

166 L. Ed. 2d at p. 949.) "[A] jury may not go further
than this and use a punitive damages verdict to punish a
defendant directly on account of harms it is alleged to
have visited on nonparties." {Id. at pp. 949-950.) Where
there is a "significant" risk that the jury might do so "-because, for example, of the sort of evidence that was
introduced at trial or the kinds of argument the plaintiff
made to the jury—a court, upon request, must protect
against that risk." (Id. at p. 951, italics added.)
3. Forfeiture [*100]
a. Jury instructions and arguments at punitive damages
phase of trial
(\)Fordfs proposed Special Jury Instruction Nos. 19 &
21
At the bifurcated punitive damages phase of the trial,
Ford proposed Special Jury Instruction No. 21,
instructing the jury not to consider third party harm for
any purpose'. "In determining the appropriate amount of
punitive damages, if any, in this case, you may consider
only the harm to the plaintiffs. Any individuals other than
the plaintiffs who might claim to have been harmed by
Ford have the right to bring their own lawsuit seeking
damages for any alleged injuries they may have incurred.
Therefore, if you decide to award any punitive damages,
your award must be limited to redressing the injuries
incurred only by the plaintiffs in this lawsuit." (Italics
added.)
In discussions regarding punitive damages
instructions, counsel for Ford made the following
argument regarding this instruction: "On [Special Jury
Instruction] No. 21, particularly State Farm, in a product
case, it tells the jury that they are only to focus on these
particular plaintiffs. The Romo [v. Ford Motor Co.
(2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 738, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 793 (Romo)]
case refers to that same principle as opposed to [*101]
trying to redress ... claims of other parties. So we would
request and argue that that instruction is required by the
due process clause and California law as it is
developing."
The court denied counsel's request it give that and
several other special jury instructions, stating that they
"are argumentative, misstate the law, or are already
covered by the instructions that we will give from
CACI." Ford at no time suggested a modification of
Special Jury Instruction No. 21 or a separate instruction
to clarify that the jury could consider harm to third
parties in deciding reprehensibility.
Ford also proposed an instruction, Special Jury
Instruction No. 19, based on State Farm, supra, 538 US.
408, that told the jury it could not consider Ford's actions

and impact outside the State of California, but also stated
that the jury could consider the impact of Ford's conduct
on individuals other than the plaintiffs inside the State of
California: "In determining the amount of punitive
damages, if any, that is necessary to achieve the proper
level of punishment and deterrence, you may consider
only Ford's wrongful conduct, if any, that has had an
adverse impact on the citizens of California.
Accordingly, [*102] you may not award any punitive
damages for the purpose of punishing Ford for the sale of
vehicles in other states for any injuries that may have
occurred in other states, or for the purpose of changing
Ford's conduct in other states." 12 (Italics added.)
12 Ford also brought a motion in limine before
trial seeking to bar "evidence or argument
concerning Ford's out-of-state sales, profits or
conduct."
Counsel for plaintiffs requested Special Jury
Instruction No. 19 be modified to state "in determining
the reprehensibility of Ford's actions, you may consider
Ford's conduct in California and elsewhere." As counsel
explained to the court, "[W]hen talking about the
reprehensibility of Ford's actions which is the chief and
primary consideration or guidepost that the jury must
consider, I believe that under the case law they are
entitled from an evidentiary standpoint to consider acts
outside of California so long as they are similar to what
we are dealing with in this case. [A]s long as when
awarding the amount of punitive damages they focus on
the harm to this plaintiff and the act that was done to this
plaintiff. When dealing with the issue of reprehensibility
though, is this an isolated [*103] act or have they done
this elsewhere, I think they can consider extraterritorial
[conduct]." The court refused the requested modification
and gave Special Jury Instruction No. 19 as proposed by
Ford.
(2) Plaintiffs proposed Special Jury Instruction No. 1
Plaintiffs proposed Special Jury Instruction No. 1,
based on State Farm, supra, 538 U.S. 408, listed the
factors to consider in determining reprehensibility,
including "whether the conduct involved repeated actions
or an isolated incident." Ford objected to that instruction.
While Ford acknowledged the proposed instruction
tracked State Farm's discussion of "factors that are
relevant to ... reprehensibility," Ford asserted those
factors were not "exclusive" and argued that if the
instruction were given, the court should add additional
factors: "First, whether the defendant's conduct was
consistent with industry standards and customs. Second,
whether defendant's conduct conformed to government
safety standards. And third, whether the defendant had a
reasonable ground for believing its conduct was lawful."

Ford also argued the repeated conduct factor was
inapplicable to a product liability case involving the sale
of vehicles because [*104] "it's inappropriate and
misleading to suggest to the jury the fact that ... the
company was engaging in its lawful business, selling
multiple automobiles, could somehow be an evil that was
punishable."
The court rejected plaintiffs Special Jury Instruction
No. 1. With regard to the reprehensibility factor and
whether the conduct was an isolated or repeated act, the
court stated: "... I think that flies in the face of what the
court will be instructing on with regard to No. 19, saying
not to consider ... injuries that have occurred in other
states." The court also stated, "The jury understands the
word 'reprehensible.' [B]oth sides are going to be able to
argue this case and you can say why it is or is not
reprehensible."
(3) Punitive damages instructions given by court
The court instructed the jury as follows on punitive
damages: "The purposes of punitive damages are to
punish a wrongdoer and to discourage it and others from
similar conduct in the future. There is no fixed standard
for determining the amount of punitive damages and you
are not required to award any punitive damages. In
deciding the amount of punitive damages, if any, you
should consider all of the following separately [*105]
for ... the defendant. A, how reprehensible was the
defendant's conduct; B, is there a reasonable relationship
between the amount of punitive damages and [the
plaintiffs'] harm; C, in view of the defendant's financial
condition, what amount is necessary to punish it and
discourage future wrongful conduct, [f] You should keep
in mind that compensatory damages, although awarded
to compensate plaintiffs for their injuries, also may ...
have the effect of punishing and deterring misconduct.
Therefore, in determining whether and in what amount to
award any punitive damages, you should consider the
deterrence and punishment imposed solely by any
[punitive] damages you may award and when added to
the sum you have already imposed as compensatory
damages. [%\ In determining the amount of punitive
damages, if any, that is necessary to achieve the proper
level of punishment and deterrence, you may consider
only Ford's wrongful conduct, if any, that has had an
adverse impact on the citizens of California.
Accordingly, you may not award any punitive damages
for the purpose of punishing Ford for the sale of vehicles
in other states for any injuries that may have occurred in
other states, or [*106] for the purpose of changing Ford's
conduct in other states, [f] Punitive damages must bear a
reasonable relationship to compensatory damages."
(4) Closing argument

As will be discussed in more detail, post, in closing
argument when discussing the reprehensibility of Ford's
conduct, plaintiffs' counsel made reference to the impact
of Ford's actions on third parties within California,
stating such things as "thousands of these vehicles were
manufactured and sold in their defective condition and
they are on our highways in California," and "they
marketed to specifically, the soccer moms, the women
with babies, the toddler seats, the families."
At no time during closing arguments did Ford object
to the statements made by plaintiffs' counsel. Further, in
its own closing arguments counsel for Ford did not
caution the jury to focus only on the injuries to plaintiffs
or on Ford's impact in California. Indeed, in responding
to plaintiffs' closing argument, Ford's counsel
emphasized plaintiffs' counsel's reference to targeting
"soccer moms," stating, "Mr. Schoville said to you that
they targeted the soccer moms. That they ... let this
vehicle out to the people out in California, knowing that
[*107] it was dangerous and defective." Ford attempted
to rebut this argument by noting the testimony of Ford's
management that they and their families drove Explorers
and commented, "[D]o you really believe that they are
going to put their own families at risk if they knowingly
put out a defective vehicle." Ford's argument focused on
apologizing for its actions and asking the jury not to
punish Ford for the fact it was a large corporation or
because the lawyers "did a lousy job defending the
company." Counsel for Ford commented about the
"David versus Goliath" nature of the case, stating, "You
saw the full wrath, if you will, Ford's power
demonstrated for you in the number of lawyers and the
amount of money they paid their experts." Nevertheless,
counsel argued the verdict was the product of Ford being
"out-lawyered. With all our money and all our power, we
were out-lawyered."
Counsel for Ford also attempted to present evidence
that was excluded at trial concerning (1) the number of
times they had successfully defended this type of case,
(2) the overall safety record of the Explorer, and (3)
comparing the risk of the Explorer to other vehicles.
Plaintiffs' counsel objected to this attempted [*108]
argument, and the court sustained the objections.
After the court instructed the jury and the jury began
deliberations, counsel for Ford belatedly objected to
plaintiffs' closing argument and requested a mistrial,
arguing it was improper for plaintiffs' counsel to argue
"this was a case not about these plaintiffs but about
soccer moms and other families." The court denied the
motion. The court also interpreted the motion as one to
strike the belatedly objected-to portions of plaintiffs'
counsel's argument, noting it was not practical to send a
note to the juiy saying that portions of the argument had

been stricken.
b. Analysis
(1) The court properly rejected Ford's Special Jury
Instruction No. 21
As discussed, ante, Philip Morris holds that "upon
request" trial courts must "provide assurance that juries
are not asking the wrong question, i.e., seeking, not
simply to determine reprehensibility, but also to punish
for harm caused to strangers." (Philip Morris, supra, 166
L. Ed 2d at pp. 951, 950, italics added.)
At the bifurcated punitive damages portion of the
trial, Ford argued Romo and State Farm required the
court to instruct the jury that, in determining the
appropriate amount of punitive [*109] damages, if any,
it could not punish Ford for harm caused to third parties.
However, Ford's Special Jury Instruction No. 21 was an
incorrect and incomplete statement of the law and
contradicted the holdings of Philip Morris and State
Farm. Ford's proposed Special Jury Instruction No. 21,
did not merely tell the jury it could not impose
punishment for harm suffered by third parties. Rather, it
told the jury it could not consider third party harm for
any purpose, including in assessing the reprehensibility
of Ford's conduct. As proposed, Ford's instruction
directly contradicted the holding of Philip Morris that a
plaintiff may show "harm to other victims" in order to
demonstrate a defendant's conduct "was particularly
reprehensible." (Philip Morris, supra, 166 L. Ed. 2d at p.
949.) In fact, this rule was well established at the time
Ford proposed its instruction and had recently been
confirmed in State Farm, supra, 538 U.S. at pages 419,
423, upon which Ford relied in urging the court to give
its Special Jury Instruction No. 21.
Ford's Special Jury Instruction No. 21 contradicted
another instruction the court gave to the jury, namely, "in
deciding the amount of punitive damages," the [*110]
jury must consider "how reprehensible was the
defendant's conduct." Under State Farm, two factors the
jury was charged with determining in assessing the
reprehensibility of Ford's conduct were whether the
conduct demonstrated an indifference or reckless
disregard for the safety of others and whether the conduct
was repeated or an isolated incident. (State Farm, supra,
538 U.S. at p. 419.) Thus, Ford's proposed Special Jury
Instruction No. 21 not only directly contradicted the
holdings in State Farm and Philip Morris, but it also
contradicted another instruction given by the court.
An appropriate jury instruction would have been one
similar to BAJI No. 14.72.2, which was amended to
comport with Philip Morris, and which delineates the
purposes for which a jury may consider third party harm

and for what purpose a jury could not: "... If you find that
defendant had a practice of engaging in, and profiting
from wrongful conduct [occurring in California] similar
to that which injured the plaintiff, that evidence may be
considered in deciding the issues of reprehensibility,
whether punitive damages should be assessed, and if so,
the amount of punitive damages to be awarded. Do not
include [*111] in your award of damages any sum that
represents damages for injuries to any person other than
theplaintiff[sV (BAJINo. 14.72.2 (Fall 2007-2008 ed.),
italics added.)
(22) California law provides that incorrect or
misleading jury instructions may be rejected by the
courts: " 'A trial court has no duty to modify or edit an
instruction offered by either side in a civil case. If the
instruction is incomplete or erroneous the trial judge may
... properly refuse it.' " (Boeken v. Philip Morris, Inc.
(2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1640, 1673 [26 Cal. Rptr. 3d
638] {Boeken), quoting Truman v. Thomas (1980) 27
Cal.3d 285, 301 [165 Cal. Rptr. 308, 611 P.2d 902].)
Thus, by proposing an instruction that was an incorrect
and misleading statement of law, Ford has forfeited the
right to assert instructional error before this court.13
13 Parties often refer to this as a "waiver."
However, that term is incorrect. "[T]he terms
'waiver' and 'forfeiture' long have been used
interchangeably. As the United States Supreme
Court has explained, however, '[w]aiver is
different from forfeiture. Whereas forfeiture is the
failure to make the timely assertion of a right,
waiver is the "intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right." ' " {People v.
Simon (2001) 25 CalAth 1082, 1097, fn. 9 [108
Cal Rptr. 2d 385, 25 P.3d 598], [*112] quoting
United States v. Olano (1993) 507 U.S. 725, 733
[123 L. Ed 2d 508, 113 S. Ct. 1770])
(23) Further, the fact Ford relies on Philip Morris to
assert its due process rights were violated does not
change this result: "No procedural principle is more
familiar to this Court than that a constitutional right may
be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the
failure to make timely assertion of the right before a
tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it. Courts may
for that reason refuse to consider a constitutional
objection even though a like objection had previously
been sustained in a case in which it was properly taken.
While this court in its discretion sometimes departs from
this rule in cases from lower federal courts, it invariably
adheres to it in cases from state courts ... ." {Yakus v.
United States (1944) 321 US. 414, 444 [88 L. Ed. 834,
64 S. Ct. 660], citations omitted.) Indeed, the Supreme
Court has held that it is precluded from reaching a due
process challenge because of a party's failure to submit

relevant jury instructions: "We have no difficulty
agreeing with the State that [defendant's] counsel's
failure to urge that the court instruct the jury on scienter
constitutes an independent and adequate state-law ground
preventing [*113] us from reaching [defendant's] due
process contention on that point." {Osborne v. Ohio
(1990) 495 U.S. 103, 123 [109 L. Ed 2d 98, 110 S Ct
1691].)
In both criminal and civil cases, the United States
Supreme Court will not review a federal claim arising out
of state court litigation unless there is "no doubt from the
record" the claim "was presented in the state courts and
that those courts were apprised of the nature or substance
of the federal claim at the time and in the manner
required by the state law." {Webb v. Webb (1981) 451
US. 493, 501 [68 L. Ed. 2d 392, 101 S. Ct. 1889].)
Similarly, California courts have declined to review
claims of federal constitutional error in the absence of a
specific and timely objection made in the trial court. (See
People v. Monterroso (2004) 34 CalAth 743, 759 [22
Cal. Rptr. 3d I 101 P.3d956], cert. den. (2005) 546 U.S.
834 [163 L. Ed. 2d 89, 126 S Ct 61]; People v.
Burgener (2003) 29 CalAth 833, 869 [129 Cal. Rptr. 2d
747, 62 P.3d 1], cert. den. (2003) 540 U.S. 855 [157 L.
Ed. 2d 100, 124 SCt 146].)
Thus, by proposing a jury instruction that incorrectly
and incompletely stated the law, and contradicted
existing precedent and other jury instructions given by
the court, Ford forfeited its due process challenge to the
punitive damages award.
(24) It is true, as Ford asserts, that trial courts have
an obligation to instruct juries on the "controlling [*114]
legal principles" in a case, even in the absence of a
specific request from one of the parties. {Agarwal v.
Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d932, 951 [160 Cal. Rptr. 141,
603 P.2d 58].) However, this rule only comes into play
when there is "a complete failure to instruct on material
issues and controlling legal principles." {Ibid.) " '[I]f its
charge does not fully cover the facts and issues as
counsel conceive them, it is [counsel's] duty to request
instructions upon specific questions arising.'" {Thomas v.
Buttress & McClellan, Inc. (1956) 141 Cal. App. 2d 812,
820 [297 P. 2d 768].) Here, the court did instruct the jury
on the controlling legal principles concerning punitive
damages. If Ford wanted a limiting instruction
concerning third party harm, it was Ford's duty to supply
an accurate and complete instruction, which it did not do
here.
(25) Nor can Ford complain that it could not
anticipate Philip Morris would reiterate the rule that
juries could consider third party harm in determining
reprehensibility. At the time of the punitive damages
phase of the trial in June of 2004, both state and federal

case law uniformly held a defendant's similar wrongful
conduct toward others was a proper consideration in
evaluating the reprehensibility of [*115] the defendant's
conduct toward the plaintiff, and therefore was a proper
consideration in determining the amount of punitive
damages to award: "State Farm, in turn, did not bar
deterrence of future public injuries as a goal of punitive
damages. The court reiterated its statement in BMW [of
North America, Inc. v. Gore (1996) 517 U.S. 559, 568
[134 L.Ed. 2d 809, 116 S Ct. 1589] (BMW),] that '
"[p]unitive damages may properly be imposed to further
a State's legitimate interests in punishing unlawful
conduct and deterring its repetition" ' (State Farm, supra,
538 U.S. at p. 416) and did not limit the concept to
punishment and deterrence purely on behalf of the
plaintiff. In elaborating on BMWs reprehensibility
guidepost, the court in State Farm noted that conduct
involving 'repeated actions' was worse than, and could be
punished more severely than, conduct limited to 'an
isolated incident.' (State Farm, supra, at p. 419.)"
(Johnson, supra, 35 CalAth at p. 1206, italics added.)
(26) "To consider the defendant's entire course of
conduct in setting or reviewing a punitive damages
award ... is not to punish the defendant for its conduct
toward others." (Id. at p. 1206, fn. 6.)
Indeed, in arguing for Special Jury Instruction No.
[*116] 21, counsel for Ford cited Romo, supra, 113
Cal.App.4th 738, disapproved on other grounds in
Johnson, supra, 35 CalAth at pages 1205-1207, 1213,
for the proposition that the jury could not punish it for
harm to third parties. In Romo, the Fifth District Court of
Appeal, anticipating Philip Morris, concluded that in
State Farm the Supreme Court had already held that it
was improper to punish defendants for harm to third
parties: "As we read State Farm, then, the legitimate
state goal that punitive damages may seek to achieve is
the 'condemnation of such conduct' as has resulted in
'outrage and humiliation' to the plaintiffs [citation]; it is
not a permissible goal to punish a defendant for
everything else it may have done wrong." (Romo, supra,
at pp. 749-750.) Elsewhere, the Romo court stated that
juries may only punish defendants "based solely on the
harm to the plaintiffs." (Id. at p. 753.) However, the
Romo court also correctly predicted Philip Morris's
reiteration that third party harm could still be considered
on the issue of reprehensibility: "[T]his focus upon
punishing the defendant solely for the outrage inflicted
upon the present plaintiffs is not an evidentiary
limitation. [*117] Plaintiffs are still entitled to show
similar conduct on the issue of reprehensibility." (Romo,
supra, at p. 753, fn. 7.)
Based on its knowledge of existing precedent, Ford
could have crafted a jury instruction (or instructions) that
properly and completely informed the jury for what

purposes it could consider third party harm and for what
purposes it could not. Nevertheless, Ford elected to
submit to the court an instruction contrary to this wellestablished precedent-precedent it relied upon in arguing
the court should give Special Jury Instruction No. 21.
Instead, Ford argued against plaintiffs Special Jury
Instruction No. 1, which instructed the jury it could
consider Ford's repeated conduct in assessing
reprehensibility. Ford even went so far as to argue that if
the court gave an instruction on the factors delineated in
State Farm and in California authority (see, e.g., Simon,
supra, 35 CalAth at p. 1180) in determining the
reprehensibility of a defendant's conduct, the court
should add additional factors not approved by any
precedent and rejected by this court in Buell-Wilson I as
being inappropriate considerations.
In doing so, Ford forfeited the right to contend on
appeal the [*118] court erred in failing to instruct the
jury under its Special Jury Instruction No. 21. (Boeken,
supra, 127 Cal.App.4th 1640.) In Boeken, the Second
District Court of Appeal rejected defendant Philip
Morris's contention, raised for the first time on appeal,
that the jury should have been given an instruction based
on State Farm because Supreme Court precedent already
established that defendants could not be punished for
extraterritorial conduct: "... Philip Morris argues that the
trial court should have instructed the jury using languetge
similar to that from State Farm 'that it may not use
evidence of out-of-state conduct to punish a defendant
for action that was lawful in the jurisdiction where it
occurred.' Philip Morris forfeited this issue by failing to
request such an instruction from the trial court. State
Farm was not the first case enunciating this concept. It
was first addressed in BMW, where the Court stated that
'a State may not impose economic sanctions on violators
of its laws with the intent of changing the tortfeasors'
lawful conduct in other States.' [Citation.] Thus, BMW
provided sufficient authority to enable Philip Morris to
draft and request an appropriate instruction. [*119] The
trial court was not required to draft it for Philip Morris."
(Boeken, supra, at p. 1694, fn. 27.)
Indeed, in a recent Ninth Circuit case, White v. Ford
Motor Co. (9th Cir. 2007) 500 F.3d 963 (White), it was
noted that trial counsel for Ford in 2004 (before the trial
in the instant matter) requested the court instruct the jury
on third party harm, but at the same time acknowledged
third party harm could be considered in considering
reprehensibility: "Concerned that the jury would punish
Ford for the harm suffered by other ... victims, ... Ford ...
requested an instruction that would prevent the jury from
punishing '[Ford] in this case not just for the harm to
these plaintiffs, but for harm to other plaintiffs, whether
in state or out of state.' Ford conceded that evidence of
harm to other people could be considered by the jury in

assessing reprehensibility, but argued that the jury could
punish only 'for the harm to this plaintiff.' The district
court refused such an instruction, deciding that it was not
required by existing precedent." (Id. at p. 972, italics
added.)
Here, counsel for Ford was aware during the 2004
trial that United States Supreme Court and California
precedent [*120] provided that, in determining the
reprehensibility of a defendant's conduct, juries could
consider (1) whether the defendant's conduct
demonstrated an indifference or reckless disregard for the
health or safety of others; and (2) whether a defendant's
actions were repeated or an isolated act that only
impacted the plaintiff, both factors relating to third party
harm. (State Farm, supra, 538 U.S. at p. 419; Simon,
supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1180.) As discussed, ante, Ford
argued against giving such an instruction to the jury and
instead proposed a jury instruction that would have
forbidden the jury from considering these factors.
(27) The Philip Morris decision holds "the States
have some flexibility to determine what kind of
procedures they will implement" to instruct the jury with
regard to punitive damages. (Philip Morris, supra, 166 L.
Ed. 2d at p. 951.) Further, the Supreme Court held a jury
instruction on third party harm need only be given where
the risk of prejudice to the defendant is "significant" and
only "upon request." (Ibid.) Thus, Philip Morris (and
other controlling United States Supreme Court precedent)
comports with California law providing that proper
instructions must be [*121] presented by counsel, and
misleading or inaccurate instructions may be rejected.
(2) Ford's Special Jury Instruction No. 19
Further compounding the matter, Ford submitted,
and the court accepted, Special Jury Instruction No. 19,
based on State Farm's holding that limited the jury's
consideration of defendant's conduct to that which
occurred in the state where the action is pending.
However, that jury instruction also told the jury they
could consider the impact of Ford's actions on California
citizens other than the plaintiffs, i.e., that the jury could
consider harm to third parties, as long as it was limited to
California: "In determining the amount of punitive
damages, if any, that is necessary to achieve the proper
level of punishment and deterrence, you may consider
only Ford's conduct, if any, that has had an adverse
impact on the citizens of California." (Italics added.)
Further, as we discuss, post, the argument of counsel
regarding harm to third parties in closing argument on
the punitive damages phase was limited to harm to
persons within California. It was thus within the
parameters of Ford's own instruction. Thus, to the extent
the jury was allowed to consider third party [*122] harm
in the punitive damages phase of the trial, Ford invited

the error. (Stevens v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.
(1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1645, 1653-1655 [57 Cal. Rptr.
2d 525] [appellants cannot complain on appeal about
jury instructions they requested].)
(3) Ford's belated objection to plaintiffs' oral argument
The fact Ford belatedly objected to plaintiffs'
counsel's oral argument also does not aid Ford's position.
First, as discussed in detail, ante, the third party harm
instruction Ford proposed was an incorrect statement of
law that conflicted with State Farm and Philip Morris.
Second, plaintiffs' arguments were within Special
Jury Instruction No. 19, submitted by Ford, that stated
the jury could consider the impact of Ford's conduct on
persons other than the plaintiffs inside California. In
plaintiffs' counsel's closing arguments at the punitive
damages phase, he made it clear he was "focusing in this
argument just on this state."
Third, Ford's objection came too late, after the jury
had begun deliberations. (Horn v. Atchison, T&S. F. Ry.
Co. (1964) 61 CaUd 602, 610 [39 Cal.Rptr. 721, 394
P.2d 561] [objections forfeited because "[a]t no time did
counsel for defendant ... interrupt plaintiffs counsel's
opening or closing arguments [*123] to make objections
as to the claimed instances of misconduct. Instead he
elected to sit by while the improprieties accumulated
until the conclusion of the closing argument, and then
move for a mistrial"]; Grimshaw, supra, 119 Cal. App.
3d at pp. 797-798 [Ford waived challenge to alleged
misconduct of counsel; motion for mistrial too late to
raise issue]; Warner Constr. Corp. v. City of Los Angeles
(1970) 2 Cal.3d 285, 302-303 [85 Cal. Rptr. 444, 466
P.2d 996] [failure to assert contemporaneous objection to
improper argument of counsel concerning defendant's
"wealth" waived right to seek mistrial].)
(4) Ford's failure to request limiting instruction at trial
As will be discussed in detail, post, Ford asserts it
was error and a violation of due process for the court to
admit evidence concerning the Bronco II's and the
Explorer's propensity to roll over, as that evidence, and
argument relating to it, allowed the jury to punish Ford
for harm to third parties. Ford asserts it properly
preserved this issue by filing a motion in limine to
exclude evidence or argument of third party harm.
However, that motion in limine sought in part to exclude
evidence of (1) Ford's actions outside California; and (2)
evidence of Ford's financial [*124] condition or net
worth.
(28) Further, although Ford's motion in limine made
passing reference to the fact that "plaintiffs should not be
permitted to urge the jury to vindicate the rights of other
persons not before the court" or to "punish Ford for any

conduct that goes beyond the specific harm alleged to the
plaintiffs in this case," counsel conceded at oral
argument before this court that some of the Bronco II and
Explorer evidence was admissible and for certain
purposes. As we explained in Buell I, and discuss in
detail, post, such evidence was admissible for purposes
not impacted by Philip Morris. However, Ford never
requested the court instruct the jury regarding the
purposes for which that evidence could or could not be
considered. This failure also resulted in a forfeiture of the
right to raise the third party harm issue on appeal: "
'When evidence is admissible as to one party or for one
purpose and is inadmissible as to another party or for
another purpose, the court upon request shall restrict the
evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury
accordingly.' [Citation.] Thus, although a court should
give a limiting instruction on request, it [*125] has no
sua sponte duty to give one." {People v. Hernandez
(2004) 33 CalAth 1040, 1051 [16 Cal Rptr. 3d 880, 94
P.3d 1080], second italics added.)
(5) Ford's failure to raise instructional error on appeal
It is undisputed Ford did not appeal to this court on
the basis the jury had been incorrectly instructed or there
was improper closing argument by counsel. It is further
undisputed Ford did not raise instructional error or assert
improper argument by counsel in its petition for
rehearing or petition for review to the California
Supreme Court. Indeed, at oral argument before this
court, counsel for Ford acknowledged it never asserted
instructional error or improper argument of counsel as a
basis for reversing the judgment on the first appeal.
(29) Ford has forfeited the right to raise instructional
error here in response to Philip Morris. The United
States Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction over federal
questions "not pressed or passed upon in the state
courts." (Stern, supra, § 3.16, p. 171.) Ford was required
not only to raise the issue in the trial court, but to pursue
it "on appeal to higher state courts ... in the manner and
with the degree of specificity required by the state rules
of practice." {Stern, supra, at § 3.18(b), [*126] p. 179,
citing Beck v. Washington (1962) 369 U.S. 541, 549-554
[8 L. Ed 2d 98, 82 S Ct. 955].) " 'Without any doubt it
rests with each State to prescribe the jurisdiction of its
appellate courts, the mode and time of invoking that
jurisdiction, and the rules of practice to be applied in its
exercise; and the state law and practice in this regard are
no less applicable when Federal rights are in controversy
than when the case turns entirely upon questions of local
or general law.' " {Wolfe v. North Carolina (1960) 364
U.S. 177, 195[4L. Ed. 2d 1650, 80S. Ct. 1482].)
Indeed, Ford understood at the time of its first appeal
that juries could not punish defendants for harm to third
parties. In its opening brief in the original appeal Ford

argued that "plaintiffs' invocation of the Bronco II as a
basis for punitive damages, in and of itself, is
unconstitutional and grounds for reversal, because due
process forbids imposing punitive damages against a
defendant for conduct other than the specific conduct that
harmed the plaintiffs before the court." However, Ford
was attacking plaintiffs' closing argument during the
liability phase of the trial, argument that, as we explain,
post, was entirely proper. Moreover, that statement was
in a section of Ford's [*127] brief asserting that the
admission of the Bronco II evidence constituted a
grounds for reversal of the judgment, not in Ford's
argument that the punitive damages award should be
reversed. This passing reference in a separate portion of
Ford's brief was insufficient to raise a constitutional
question on the punitive damages award. {Bd. ofDirs. of
Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club (1987) 481 US. 537, 550, fn.
9 [95 L. Ed. 2d 474, 107 S. Ct. 1940] ["casual reference"
in appellate brief in unrelated argument "is insufficient to
inform a state court that it has been presented with a
claim" subject to Supreme Court jurisdiction]; Adams v.
Robertson (1997) 520 U.S. 83, 88-89 &fn. 3 [137 L. Ed.
2d 203, 117 S. Ct. 1028] [reference to different related
argument in appellate brief did not raise federal question
presented to Supreme Court].)
Although it understood then that juries could not
award punitive damages to punish defendants for harm to
third parties, nowhere in the first appeal did Ford assert
the jury should have been instructed on third party harm
or that plaintiffs' counsel's arguments during the punitive
damages phase of the trial was improper. Ford has thus
forfeited the right to raise these issues upon remand.
(6) Recent Ninth Circuit cases
Ford asserts a [*128] recent Ninth Circuit case,
Merrick v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co. (9th Cir. 2007) 500
F.3d 1007 {Merrick), compels the conclusion the court
erred by failing to instruct the jury on third party harm
"irrespective of the proposed instruction's precise
language." This contention is unavailing.
In Merrick, the jury awarded $ 10 million in punitive
damages in an insurance bad faith action. The plaintiffs
bad faith and punitive damages claims "turned upon
linking [the defendants'] handling of [the plaintiffs]
claim to a decade of allegedly improper claims handling
practices." {Merrick, supra, 500 F.3d at p. 1015.) In
response, the defendants requested the court instruct the
jury as follows: "In deciding whether or in what amount
to award punitive damages, you may consider only the
specific conduct by Defendants that injured Plaintiff.
You may not punish Defendants for conduct or practices
that did not affect Plaintiff, even if you believe that such
conduct or practices were wrongful or deserving of
punishment. The law provides other means to punish

wrongdoing unrelated to Plaintiff." {Ibid.) The court
denied the request and, on appeal, based on the
intervening decision in Philip Morris, the [*129]
defendant argued the district court's refusal violated its
due process rights. {Merrick, supra, 500 F3d at p. 1007.)
In addressing plaintiff's claim the district court
properly denied the defendant's proposed instruction, the
Ninth Circuit stated plaintiff was "correct that the first
sentence of the proposed instruction [was] misleading
because it fail[ed] to indicate that the jury may consider
harm to others as part of its reprehensibility analysis."
{Merrick, supra, 500 F.3d at p. 1016.) However, based
on federal law, the Ninth Circuit then held this error by
defendants was not fatal to their appeal because the trial
court had a duty to correct the erroneous instruction and
give the jury a proper one: "[T]he fact that the proposed
instruction was misleading does not alone permit the
district judge to summarily refuse to give any instruction
on the topic. ... Where a proposed instruction is
supported by law and not adequately covered by other
instructions, the court should give a non-misleading
instruction that captures the substance of the proposed
instruction." (Id. at p. 1017, citation omitted.)
However, as discussed in detail, ante, California law
does not require judges to correct [*130] erroneous or
misleading instructions. (Shahinian v. McCormick (1963)
59 CaUd 554, 565-566 [30 Cal Rptr. 521, 381 P.2d
377], overruled on other grounds in Avila v. Citrus
Community College Dist. (2006) 38 CalAth 148, 161 [41
Cal Rptr. 3d 299, 131 P.3d 383].) For example, in
Boeken, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at page 1673, the
Second District Court of Appeal explicitly rejected the
exact federal rule announced in Merrick: "[Instruction O
was incomplete. ... [Defendant] argues that the omission
was so minor as to require the trial court to modify the
instruction. We disagree. 'A trial court has no duty to
modify or edit an instruction offered by either side in a
civil case. If the instruction is incomplete or erroneous
the trial judge may ... properly refuse it.' "
Further, here Ford did not request a legally correct
instruction or request the court amend it to properly state
the law. Ford also argued against instructing the jury in a
proper manner. Indeed, Ford opposed plaintiffs request
the court instruct the jury that, in considering
reprehensibility, it could consider third party harm, i.e.,
whether the conduct was repeated. Finally, unlike the
defendant in Merrick, Ford did not preserve any issue of
instructional error because it failed to raise [*131] the
issue when it first appealed to this court.
White, supra, 500 F.3d 963, another recent Ninth
Circuit case that reversed a punitive damages award
because of the court's failure to give a third party harm
instruction, also does not support Ford's position. As we

noted, ante, in White, counsel for Ford, when requesting
an instruction on third party harm, also acknowledged the
jury could consider third party harm in assessing
reprehensibility: "Concerned that the jury would punish
Ford for the harm suffered by other rollaway victims, [14]
counsel for Ford had objected to the district court's
proposed jury instructions, and requested an instruction
that would prevent the jury from punishing '[Ford] in this
case not just for the harm to these plaintiffs, but for harm
to other plaintiffs, whether in state or out of state.' Ford
conceded that evidence of harm to other people could be
considered by the jury in assessing reprehensibility, but
argued that the jury could punish only 'for the harm to
this plaintiff.' The district court refused such an
instruction, deciding that it was not required by existing
precedent." (White, supra, 500 F.3d at p. 972, italics
added.)
14 The White case involved [*132] a defect in
parking brakes in F-series Ford trucks that caused
the tragic death of the plaintiffs' three-year-old
son when their truck rolled over him in the
family's driveway. (White, supra, 500 F.3d at pp.
966-967.)
In contrast, in this case Ford refused to acknowledge
the jury could consider third party harm in addressing
reprehensibility, and in fact proposed an instruction that
barred the jury from considering this factor and opposed
counsel's arguments that the jury should be instructed on
third party harm on the issue of reprehensibility. In
White, trial counsel for Ford did not submit legally
incorrect instructions as it did here, or oppose
instructions that could have cured that error.
(7) Revision ofCACI instructions after Philip Morris
Ford asserts that because the Judicial Council of
California (Judicial Council) recently revised the CACI
instructions on punitive damages in response to Philip
Morris and declined to add language specifying that
juries could consider third party harm in assessing
reprehensibility, its instruction was sufficient. We reject
this contention.
On May 24, 2007, the Judicial Council's Advisory
Committee on Civil Jury Instructions (Advisory
Committee) [*133] proposed revised CACI instructions
in response to Philip Morris. (Advisory Com. Rep. (July
24, 2007) pp. 2-3.) 15 In August 2007 the Judicial Council
approved the revisions, which added the following
language to CACI Nos. 3940, 3942, 3943, 3945, 3947
and 3949: "Punitive damages may not be used to punish
[name of defendant] for the impact of [his/her/its] alleged
misconduct on persons other than [name of plaintiff]."
15

Ford has attached a copy of the Advisory

Committee report to a September 14, 2007 letter
brief. We may properly take judicial notice of that
document, and do so. (Evid. Code, § 452.)
Of importance to our analysis, in considering what
revisions should be made to the CACI punitive damages
instructions in light of Philip Morris, the Advisory
Committee reviewed comments from the public.
(Advisory Com. Rep., supra, at pp. 1-2.) The committee
noted that "the principal suggestion was to include
language that would expressly clarify how harm to
nonparties may be considered in determining
reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct." (Id. at pp. 23.) The committee ultimately rejected that suggestion,
stating "because the United States Supreme Court did not
approve or suggest any [*134] particular language for
this purpose, it would be best not to attempt such an
addition. The current instructions permit consideration of
a defendant's (1) disregard of the health and safety of
others and (2) pattern and practice. The committee
believes that this language leaves sufficient room for the
plaintiff to present harm to others for the limited purpose
of proving reprehensibility." (Id. at p. 3, italics added.)
These comments do not help, and indeed weaken,
Ford's position that its proposed instruction on third party
harm should have been given. The comments show the
Advisory Committee did not deny the need to instruct
juries that they may consider third party harm in
determining reprehensibility. Rather, they found the
existing instructions already did so. 16 One of the CACI
instructions the Advisory Committee was speaking of,
CACI No. 3945, specifies the factors State Farm and
Simon hold juries are to consider in deciding the
reprehensibility of a defendant's conduct, including
"[w]hether [name of defendant] disregarded the health or
safety of others" and "[w]hether [name of defendants
conduct involved a pattern or practice." 17
16 As discussed, ante, BAJI No. 14.72.2 was
[*135] also recently amended to state that juries
should consider third party harm in determining
reprehensibility, but they could not punish a
defendant for that third party harm.
17 CACI No. 3945 provides in part: "If you
decide to award punitive damages, you should
consider all of the following in determining the
amount: [|] (a) How reprehensible was [name of
defendant]^
conduct? In deciding how
reprehensible [name of defendant]^ conduct was,
you may consider, among other factors: [%] 1.
Whether the conduct caused physical harm; [f] 2.
Whether [name of defendant] disregarded the
health or safety of others; [f| 3. Whether [name of
plaintiff] was financially weak or vulnerable and

[name of defendant] knew [name of plaintiff] was
financially weak or vulnerable and took
advantage of [him/her/it]; fl[] 4. Whether [name
of defendant]^ conduct involved a pattern or
practice; and [%] 5. Whether [name of defendant]
acted with trickery or deceit."
In this case, Ford did not propose an instruction that
set forth the factors juries are to consider in determining
reprehensibility. Moreover, as discussed, ante, plaintiff
proposed an instruction that would have listed the factors
juries were to consider
[*136] in determining
reprehensibility. Ford opposed that instruction, however,
and the court refused to instruct the jury with that
proposed instruction. Most important, as already
discussed in detail, Ford's instruction directly
contradicted the amended CACI instructions and Philip
Morris because it prohibited the jury from considering
third party harm in determining reprehensibility.
(8) Impact ofGVR order
(30) Ford asserts the United States Supreme Court's
GVR order implies the high court found Ford did not
forfeit the right to raise instructional error on appeal.
However, GVR orders do not imply any view on the
merits of the remanded case and do not necessitate Ihe
reversal of the remanded case if the intervening authority
is distinguishable or otherwise does not require a change
in the original opinion. (In re Patrick W. (1980) 104 Cal.
App. 3d 615, 618 [163 Cal.Rptr. 848]; Stern, supra, §
5.12(b), p. 319, fh. 94 [noting that "in a substantial
number of the remanded cases the courts of appeals
adhered to the original ruling, and that very few of these
judgments were reversed by the Supreme Court"].)
(31) Indeed, despite the GVR order, Buell-Wilson I
"retains the ordinary precedential value of a published
opinion of [*137] an intermediate appellate court and it
remains the law of the case on all points other than the
federal constitutional issue." (Romo, supra, 113
Cal.App.4th at p. 744, fh. 1; accord, Occidental Life Ins.
Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1982) 135 Cal. App. 3d
845, 848, fh. 1 [185 Cal. Rptr. 779] ["we refer to the
[vacated] decision ... for the continuing value of its
reasoning in nonfederal aspects"]; DeCamp v. First
Kensington Corp. (1978) 83 Cal. App. 3d 268, 279-280
[147 Cal. Rptr. 869]; Tarantino v. Superior Court (1975)
48 Cal. App. 3d 465, 470 [122 Cal. Rptr. 61]; Guidi v.
Superior Court (1973) 10 CaUd 1, 13, fn. 11 [109 Cal.
Rptr. 684, 513 P.2d908].) The California Supreme Court
routinely cites and relies on cases of its own, even when,
as it notes, they have been "vacated on other grounds."
(See People v. Griffin (2004) 33 Cal. 4th 536, 598 [15
Cal. Rptr. 3d 743, 93 P.3d 344]; People v. Thomas
(1992) 2 CalAth 489, 518 [7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 199, 828 P.2d
101]; People v. Allison (1989) 48 CaUd 879, 898-899

[258 Cal. Rptr. 208, 771 P.2d 1294].)
Accordingly, we conclude Ford forfeited the right to
assert, under Philip Morris, that the court erred in failing
to instruct the jury that it could not punish Ford for harm
to third parties.
(9)Post-oral argument legal developments
After oral argument was heard and this matter was
submitted, two cases were filed relevant to our discussion
[*138] of Ford's forfeiture of the right to raise the issue
of whether the court erred in failing to instruct the jury
on third party harm.
In Bullock v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2008) 159
Cal.App.4th 655 (Bullock), the Second District Court of
Appeal concluded that under Philip Morris, supra, 166 L.
Ed. 2d 940, the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the
jury, " 'You are not to impose punishment for harms
suffered by persons other than the plaintiff before you.' "
(Bullock, supra, at p. 693.) In doing so, the court
concluded Philip Morris's proposed instruction was not
incomplete or misleading even though it did not include
the qualification that evidence of harm to others could be
considered to determine the reprehensibility of the
conduct that harmed the plaintiff. The Court of Appeal
reached this conclusion by first noting that consideration
of harm to others to determine the reprehensibility of a
defendant's conduct to a plaintiff for the purpose of
determining the amount of punitive damages "is not
imposing punishment for harm caused to others." (Id. at
p. 694.) The Court of Appeal further concluded that
defendant Philip Morris "had no duty to qualify its
proposed instruction in [*139] order to encompass a rule
of law favorable to Bullock concerning the permissible
use of evidence of harm caused to others," in the absence
of a request from the plaintiff of such limiting language.
(Ibid.) The court also held that a remittitur was not
appropriate under the circumstances and ordered a new
trial on punitive damages. (Id. at pp. 694, 695 &fn. 21)
Bullock, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th
655, is
distinguishable from our case because, here, Ford's
proposed Special Jury Instruction No. 21 did not merely
state that the jury could not punish Ford for harm
suffered by third parties. Rather, as discussed, ante, that
instruction prohibited the jury from considering third
party harm for any purpose in setting the amount of
punitive damages. Moreover, in our case we do not have
a situation where Ford proposed an instruction that
correctly stated the law, and the plaintiffs failed to
request a qualification that would have made the
instruction more favorable to their position. As discussed
in more detail, ante, plaintiffs did request that the court
instruct the jury for what purposes it was permissible for
it to consider third party harm, and the court, at Ford's

urging, rejected that instruction. [*140] Finally, we have
also concluded here that Ford has forfeited the right to
raise the contention that the court committed
instructional error because it failed to raise this issue on
its original appeal.
The second recent case relevant to our discussion is
Williams v. Phillip Morris, Inc. (Or. Jan. 31, 2008,
S051805)
P.2d
[2008 Ore. LEXIS 5] (Williams
II), wherein the Oregon Supreme Court, on remand from
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Philip
Morris, held that the trial court did not err in refusing to
give an instruction that properly told the jury that it could
not punish the defendant for harm to third parties, but
could consider third party harm in considering the
defendant's reprehensibility. (Philip Morris, supra, 166
L. Ed. 2d at p. 947.) The Oregon Supreme Court reached
this conclusion because the instruction misstated Oregon
law in two respects unrelated to third party harm. The
Willams II court held that a jury instruction need not be
given unless it is " 'clear and correct in all respects, both
in form and in substance, and ... altogether free from
error.' " (Williams II, supra,
P.2d at p.
[2008
Lexis at p. *18J.) "It is not enough ... to offer [*141] a
proposed instruction that is correct in part and erroneous
in part, leaving the trial court to solve the problem for
itself." (Id. at p. *19].)
The Williams II decision provides further support for
our conclusion here that Ford forfeited the right to assert
the court erred in refusing to give Special Jury
Instruction No. 21. We have concluded, ante, as the
Oregon Supreme Court did, that because Ford's
instruction was incomplete, misleading, and affirmatively
misstated the law on punitive damages, the court did not
have an obligation to give the instruction as written, nor
to correct it for Ford.
A. Prejudice
We also conclude, based on our previous reduction
of the punitive damages award and the evidence and
argument of counsel during the punitive damages phase
of the trial, that there was no "significant risk" the jury
punished Ford for harm to third parties. Therefore, even
assuming the court erred in failing properly to instruct
the jury on third party harm, Philip Morris does not
necessitate a reversal of the punitive damages award.
a. Standard of review
(32) Under article 13 of the California Constitution,
"[a] judgment may not be reversed for instructional error
in a civil case 'unless, [*142] after an examination of the
entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of
the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a
miscarriage of justice.' " (Soule, supra, 8 Cal. 4th at p.

580.) Instructional error is deemed harmless unless it is
"reasonably probable defendant would have obtained a
more favorable result" if the error had been corrected.
(Id. at p. 570.)
b. Prior reduction of punitive award
(33) As we have explained, ante, in reviewing the
amount of a punitive damages award for prejudice, for
purposes of our review the relevant amount is not the
amount initially awarded by the jury, but rather the
amount by which the trial court, and this court, ordered
the judgment reduced. (See Hasson, supra, 32 Cal.3d at
p. 419.)
In deciding whether an award of punitive damages is
constitutionally excessive, we review the award de novo,
making an independent assessment of the
reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, the
relationship between the award and the harm done to the
plaintiff, and the relationship between the award and civil
penalties authorized for comparable conduct. "This
'[ejxacting appellate review' is intended to ensure
punitive damages are the product [*143] of the ' "
'application of law, rather than a decisionmaker's
caprice.' " ' " (Simon, supra, 35 CalAih at p. 1172.)
(34) Moreover, there is a distinction to be drawn
between what is traditionally referred to as a "remittitur,"
which we applied to the emotional distress damages, and
a reduction of an excessive punitive damages award: "A
constitutionally reduced verdict ... is really not a
remittitur at all. A remittitur is a substitution of the
court's judgment for that of the jury regarding the
appropriate award of damages. The court orders a
remittitur when it believes the jury's award is
unreasonable on the facts. A constitutional reduction, on
the other hand, is a determination that the law does not
permit the award. Unlike a remittitur, which is
discretionary with the court... , a court has a mandatory
duty to correct an unconstitutionally excessive verdict so
that it conforms to the requirements of the due process
clause." (Johansen v. Combustion Engineering, Inc.
(11th Cir. 1999) 170 F.3d 1320, 1331-1332, fa. &
citation omitted.)
"Thus, in deciding the constitutional maximum [for a
punitive damage award], a court does not decide whether
the verdict is unreasonable based on the [*144] facts;
rather, it examines the punitive damages award to
determine whether it is constitutionally excessive and, if
so, may adjust it to the maximum amount permitted by
the Constitution." (Gober, supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at p.
214.) This is so because " 'the level of punitive damages
is not really a "fact" "tried" by the jury.' " (Cooper
Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. (2001)
532 U.S. 424, 437 [149 L. Ed 2d 674, 121 S Ct. 1678].)

Thus, "the jury's award of punitive damages does not
constitute a finding of 'fact' " to which an appellate court
must defer. (Ibid.)
As we discussed in Buell-Wilson I and reiterate in
this opinion, we remitted the noneconomic damages to an
amount supported by the evidence and omitted any
punitive element.
Moreover, in deciding the constitutionally
permissible amount of punitive damages in our original
opinion, we conducted a de novo review of the punitive
damages award, applying the factors dictated by State
Farm and other applicable precedent. Our Buell-Wilson I
opinion, however, did not consider or justify the amount
to which we reduced the punitive damages award by
reference to potential harm to others. The only evidence
we cited in our discussion of punitive damages related
[*145] to harm to third parties was in our discussion of
the reprehensibility of Ford's conduct. (Buell-Wilson I,
supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at pp. 568-569.) Thus, in
conducting our independent review and arriving at a
constitutionally permissible amount of punitive damages,
we satisfied the due process concerns of Ford.
For example, in Romo, supra, 113 Cal.App.4th 738,
disapproved on other grounds in Johnson, supra, 35
CalAth at pages 1205-1207, 1213, the Court of Appeal
was reconsidering a punitive damages award in light of
State Farm after the United States Supreme Court
vacated the Court of Appeal's original decision. (Romo,
supra, at p. 743.) The Court of Appeal concluded the
jury instructions given by the trial court violated State
Farm and prejudiced Ford. (Romo, supra, at pp. 753754.) However, rather than remanding the matter for a
new trial on punitive damages, the Court of Appeal
reduced the award to an amount that was not
constitutionally excessive: "While the underlying facts
supporting a punitive damages award are for the jury to
decide, the amount of punitive damages must be
independently reviewed on appeal. [Citation.] In
conducting such review, we remove any prejudice
accruing
[*146] to the defendant as a result of
misinstruction concerning the amount of such award; we
do so by modifying the judgment to reflect a level of
punitive damages below which we believe no properly
instructed jury was reasonably likely to go. [Citation.]
Accordingly, our reduction of the award satisfies the due
process interests of defendant." (Id. at p. 754.)
In determining as a matter of law the constitutionally
appropriate amount of punitive damages when this matter
was first before us, we also necessarily reduced the
award to comport both with due process principles,
including the notion Ford could not be punished for harm
to third parties, and the factors to be considered under
State Farm. We made an independent determination

under these factors that Ford's conduct justified an award
of punitive damages in an amount equal to a two-to-one
ratio to the compensatory damages, which we had
already reduced to eliminate any potential punitive
effect. We did not consider harm to third parties (except
when assessing the reprehensibility of Ford's conduct)
when making that award.
There is no basis for a further reduction in the award
or a new trial on punitive damages, as the reduced
amount of [*147] the award comports with the holding
of Philip Morris.
c. Evidence and arguments at trial
Ford has also failed to demonstrate that evidence or
argument at trial prejudiced it in a manner that would
require, under Philip Morris, a further reduction in the
punitive damages award or a new trial on punitive
damages.
(1) Evidence admitted at trial
Ford first asserts that admission of evidence at the
liability and compensatory damages phase of the trial
regarding the Bronco II's and Explorer's propensity to
roll over was itself a due process violation under Philip
Morris. However, as we explained in our original
decision, and again in this opinion, ante, that evidence
was properly admitted as relevant to issues related to
proof the product was defective in the plaintiffs' case-inchief. The Bronco II and Explorer evidence was relevant
during the liability phase of the trial to show, under
California law, that Ford had notice of the defective
product. (Hasson, supra, 32 Cal.3d atp. 404.) Further, as
stated, ante, that evidence was admissible to show Ford
acted with malice on the issue of whether the plaintiffs
were entitled to an award of punitive damages.
"Marketing a product that is known [*148] to be
defective and dangerous to consumers supports an
inference of malice for purposes of punitive damages."
(Karlsson, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 1230; Grimshaw,
supra, 119 Cal. App. 3d at p. 814; Taylor, supra, 24
Cal.3d at p. 895 [malice may be shown by fact the
defendant had acted with a "conscious disregard of the
safety of others"].)
(35) As our Supreme Court explained in Johnson,
United States Supreme Court precedent "makes clear that
due process does not prohibit state courts, in awarding or
reviewing punitive damages, from considering the
defendant's illegal or wrongful conduct towards others
that was similar to the tortious conduct that injured the
plaintiff or plaintiffs. [A] civil defendant's recidivism
remains pertinent to an assessment of culpability."
(Johnson, supra, 35 CalAth at p 1204.) " ' "[P]unitive
damages may properly be imposed to further a State's

legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and
deterring its repetition" ' [citation] and [State Farm] did
not limit the concept to punishment and deterrence
purely on behalf of the plaintiff." (Id at p. 1206.)
(36) Nowhere does Philip Morris suggest due
process requires trial courts to exclude otherwise
relevant, [*149] admissible evidence in the process of
determining liability or whether an award of punitive
damages is warranted. "A basic principle of federalism is
that each State may make its own reasoned judgment
about what conduct is permitted or proscribed within its
borders, and each State alone can determine what
measure of punishment, if any, to impose on a defendant
who acts within its jurisdiction." (State Farm, supra, 538
U.S. at p. 422.)
Rather, Philip Morris held that in appropriate cases
courts will need to ensure, by appropriate jury
instructions and limitations on argument by counsel, that
evidence of third party harm is not used to punish
defendants when determining the amount of punitive
damages to award.
(2) Closing arguments at liability phase
Ford also attacks statements made by plaintiffs'
counsel in closing arguments that it claims were in
violation of Philip Morris. This contention is unavailing.
In the first phase of the bifurcated trial, the jury was
deciding liability, compensatory damages, and whether
plaintiffs were entitled to punitive damages. Ford points
to closing arguments counsel for plaintiffs made there
that allegedly invited the jury to punish Ford for harm to
third [*150] parties. Specifically, Ford points to the
following arguments made by plaintiffs' counsel: "They
go ahead and release the Bronco II in 1983 ... knowing it
will roll over and kill or catastrophically injure many
people, which it has. flf] Fraud, oppression, malice, these
are issues that relate to one question that has [sic] clear
and convincing. I\his is t]he last question on the verdict
form, [and] it is the most importan[t] [answer] you will
give in this case. ... [f] ... This is the report to the
Consumers Union. Bronco II. [The following]
[q]uotation [appears] in the document[:] 'We are in deep
trouble regarding our rollover rates. Our data are not
terribly favorable. Our rollover rate is three times higher
than the Chevy S-10 Blazer. We think, however, we have
clouded their minds/ Ron Campbell testifies that Ford is
aware by 1989 that many people are killed or seriously
injured in [Bronco II] rollovers. Right in this time period,
and they are going out to market with this new launch
[i.e., the Explorer] with Job 1 with the engineers telling
them [that it had] the same problems. Conscious,
deliberate, oppressive, fraudulent conduct. [f| ... [If]
Hundreds of Explorer rollover [*151] cases. [Ford

expert] Tandy, involved at least in dozens of on-road
untripped Explorer rollover cases. And I cross-examined
[Ford expert] Germane, from other cases .... Cases that
these guys are working on together. Ford management's
willingness to accept this risk from the Bronco II through
the [1997 model Explorer] is the definition precisely of
fraud, malice and oppression.'' (Italics added.)
Counsel's argument in the first phase of the trial did
not ask the jury to punish Ford for harm to third parties.
Rather, as discussed, ante, this argument properly
referred to facts supporting entitlement to an award of
punitive damages, i.e., whether Ford's actions
demonstrated malice, fraud and/or oppression. (See
Karlsson, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 1230; Grimshaw,
supra, 119 Cal. App. 3d at p. 814; Taylor, supra, 24
Cal.3d at p. 895.) Philip Morris does not stand for the
proposition that juries cannot consider the repeated
nature of a defendant's conduct in determining whether to
award punitive damages, and the factors used to reach
that conclusion. Rather, it only held that in determining
the amount to award, juries could not punish defendants
for harm caused to third parties.
(3) Closing [*152] arguments at punitive damages stage
The statements made by plaintiffs' counsel in the
bifurcated punitive damages closing argument also did
not create a "significant risk" the jury would punish Ford
for harm to third parties. Ford focuses on the following
arguments by counsel: "So you understand what the
consequences and what the risk factor was that they
voluntarily, at the highest level of this company, chose to
put people in wheelchairs, brain damaged or death, in a
defectively designed product, their decision to put this
vehicle out to the market in California. And I am focusing
in this argument just on our state. And the effects it has
on the people driving these vehicles out there on the
highway, not knowing what they are in for if they should
do a simple avoidance maneuver. That is the ramification
in California, without fixing its known stability
problems. That was callous, that was willful disregard.
Did they do the test? No. The test drivers are out on the
roads of California. Willful disregard of the health and
safety of [Mrs. Wilson] and those like her. Was this a
single isolated incident? No. You have heard of others in
California. Just a few we were allowed to present.
[* 153] [fj History repeated itself They had had the same
problem before. The same issues. Did they learn? Did
they care? Did they really care? [f| [Thousands of these
vehicles were manufactured and sold in their defective
condition and they are on our highways in California.
And every time we look at one of those vehicles, we
hope and pray there is no [accident] avoidance maneuver
necessary, flf] ... [f| [R]eprehensibility of the conduct I
submit to you, here in California, the unlawful conduct

taking place in this state that should bear the weight of
your discussion and consideration, [^f] ... [f] This is not
only ... a case involving one family here in California,
but... they marketed to specifically, the soccer moms, the
women with babies, the toddler seats, the families."
(Italics added.)
(37) Based on our review of the record, plaintiffs'
counsel was not asking the jury to punish Ford for harm
done to third parties. Rather, counsel was discussing the
repeated nature of Ford's actions in arguing the
reprehensibility of Ford's conduct. That argument was
entirely proper and did not create a "significant risk" the
jury would punish Ford for injuries to third parties:
"California has long [*154] endorsed the use of punitive
damages to deter continuation or imitation of a
corporation's course of wrongful conduct, and hence
allowed consideration of that conduct's scale and
profitability in determining the size of the award that will
vindicate the state's legitimate interests." {Johnson,
supra, 35 Cal. 4th at p. 1207.) "Nothing [State Farm or
Philip Morris have] said about due process review
requires that California juries and courts ignore evidence
of corporate polices and practices and evaluate the
defendant's harm to the plaintiff in isolation." (Ibid.)
Moreover, as discussed, ante, counsel's argument
was within the parameters of the special jury instruction
submitted by Ford based on the holding in State Farm
that juries could not punish defendants for conduct
outside the state in which the action was pending. That
instruction informed the jury it could consider harm to
"the citizens of California." Plaintiffs' counsel informed
the jury, when discussing the impact of Ford's actions on
third parties, that it was limited to considering Ford's
conduct with regard to the citizens of California. Thus,
plaintiffs argument was within the bounds of an
instruction Ford itself drafted [* 155] and proposed to the
court. Ford cannot complain it was prejudiced by
argument based on one of its own instructions.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed in all respects except as to
the award of noneconomic damages to Mrs. Wilson and
punitive damages to the Wilsons. The award of punitive
damages to the Wilsons is reduced to $ 55 million. The
award of noneconomic damages to Mrs. Wilson is
reversed and remanded for retrial on the issue of the
amount of noneconomic damages, unless Mrs. Wilson
shall, within 30 days from the date this opinion is filed,
file with the clerk of this court and serve upon Ford Mrs.
Wilson's written consent to a reduction of her
noneconomic damages award to $ 18 million, in which
event the judgment shall be modified to award Mrs.
Wilson noneconomic damages in that amount, which will
result in a total reduced award to the Wilsons of $

82,606,004 ($ 4,606,004 in economic damages + $ 18
million in noneconomic damages + $ 5 million in loss of
consortium + $ 55 million in punitive damages), and in
which event the judgment will be affirmed in its entirety,
as modified. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.264(d).) The

parties shall bear their own costs on appeal,
McConnell, P. [*156] J., and Irion, J., concurred.

